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A REPORT ON JAPAN

BY

NOEL F. BUSCH



NEW YORK & LONDON
D. APPLETON-CENTURY COMPANY, INC.

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Time, Inc. from *Life Magazine*.

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author wishes to thank the editors of *Life* and *Horizon* for permission to use material that has appeared in these publications.

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PART I

The Occupation

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I

Moshi, moshi, anonay
Anonay, anonay!
Moshi, moshi! anonay,
Ah, so deskal

This odd little verse can be sung to the tune of *London Bridge Is Falling Down* and translated roughly as follows: "Hello, hello, are you there? Are you there, are you there! Hello, hello! are you there? Ah, is that so!" Representing an American effort to reproduce the sound of a Japanese telephone conversation, or, indeed, a Japanese conversation of any sort, in which these phrases seem to recur with astonishing frequency, it was composed by a U.S. correspondent in the early days of the occupation. Tokyo Mose, the Army's radio successor to the infamous Tokyo Rose, put it on the air, Japanese stations copied it, and within a few weeks it was part of the standard repertoire of geisha girls and native crooners—for whose audiences, of course, even the tune was a novelty.

The popularity of *Moshi, Moshi* has now, mercifully, subsided, but it still supplies as good a clue as any to what is currently going on in Japan and what it all means. The good-humored mystification suggested by the song expresses the attitude of the U.S. forces toward the occupation. The enthusiastic acceptance of the song by the Japanese expresses their attitude. These two surprising but complementary states of mind, in turn, largely account for the character of what is obviously one of the most important social, political, economic and military developments in the world's history. By no means the least impressive feature of it is the fact that its real authors—*i.e.*, the population of the U.S.—know so amazingly little about it.

The occupation of Japan was touched off by the most highly publicized explosion in history, in August of 1945; but while the U.S. public has since heard plenty about the atom bomb, it has heard comparatively little about Japan. There are obvious reasons for this omission. The occupation is a resounding success; and while trouble and scandal make news, success only makes history.

Nonetheless, in a world as full of gloomy tidings as the present one, it might seem that this

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paradox could be at least temporarily inverted; and even if the occupation were only to be regarded as history, it would still be the history of something not only important but also lively, strange and highly entertaining.

Estimates of the exact degree of the occupation's success will of course vary with the measure used and the person using it. For example, applying the small calipers of what was expected of it at the start, the achievement is almost incalculable. In 1945, it was generally supposed that the Japanese would not only put up a lengthy last-ditch fight before surrendering but also that even after the surrender we might expect an underground resistance which it would take years to eradicate. There was, of course, no last-ditch fight; and if there is an underground resistance, it is so far underground that it can be regarded as interred. However, since our expectations of what the Japanese would do when defeated were based in part on a pardonably faulty notion of their national character, it can be urged that these scarcely offer a fair basis for judging the actual result—though they may tend to suggest the advisability of learning enough about the subject to

avoid such erroneous prognostications in the future.

Another convenient measure to apply to the Japanese occupation is the yardstick of the occupation of Germany—where, as of 1947, the population is starving, where there is no national government at all, and where plans have not even yet matured for putting the country back together again in line with promises made at the time of the surrender. In Japan, starvation is at a minimum, the government has never stopped functioning, and, since the country was never taken apart, the U.S. is at no pains to re-assemble it.

No doubt the occupation of Germany is scarcely analogous. There, the obliteration of the Hitler regime and the division of the country into occupation zones held nominally by Allied, but actually by rival if not hostile, powers guaranteed profound confusion. The confusion was compounded by physical destruction on a much larger scale than Japan's, and by an economy both more complex in itself and more vital to its neighbors. Nonetheless, in at least one particular—*i.e.* the exclusion of the Russians from a major role in Japan—the distinctions form a part of occupation policy and

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hence are a legitimate factor in comparison. How big a factor is a matter of opinion; but it remains true that in Japan, instead of being obliged to welch on its promises, with corresponding loss of prestige both in the defeated country and in the world at large, the United States has more than made good on them, with a corresponding gain in both directions.

A standard even more appropriate for judging the Japanese occupation is its basic intention. Set forth at length in the Potsdam Declaration, this can be more simply stated as rendering the Japanese (1) unable and (2) unwilling to wage war. Judged by these standards the success of the occupation seems even more sensational. Japan was rendered unable to wage war within a few weeks after the surrender, by an almost incredibly rapid program of disarmament and demobilization. Its unwillingness to wage war involves the more distant future and cannot yet be guaranteed in perpetuity, but judging from the present indications—which include a constitutional renunciation of force as an instrument of national policy—it is so sincere as to be almost embarrassing, for the present at least.

Of course, to say that the occupation is a

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resounding success is not to argue that it is faultless, or even to impugn the day-to-day stories with Tokyo datelines which often present a very sorry picture of developments. The occupation, as a political and military structure, is comparable to an architectural accomplishment like the Manhattan skyscrapers. When viewed en masse and from a distance these take shape as an accomplishment of heroic proportions, but the view by no means indicates that New York City provides a Utopia for its inhabitants. On the contrary, being used to the skyline and taking it for granted, New Yorkers are quite naturally and properly more excited about how much it should cost to ride on the subway, why satisfactory apartments are so hard to find, and whether the police will solve the latest murder case or sporting scandal. Similarly, in Japan, the correspondents whose duty it is to keep the U.S. informed about what is going on there would be guilty of dereliction if they confined their reports to panegyrics on its over-all grandeur. It is their business to examine it in detail; and, to alter the metaphor, their concern is quite properly less with the forest than with its trees. Nevertheless, since U.S. readers are dependent on day-to-day reports for their

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knowledge of the situation, and since readers cannot be expected to have a clear picture of the grandeur of the enterprise as a whole, such dispatches may convey a false impression. And to the degree that they imply or suggest that things are not, in general, going extremely well, they may even, in a peculiar way, be positively dangerous.

The danger in not knowing how great a success the occupation has been to date is two-fold. For one thing, while success to date does not guarantee success for the future, it at least suggests how the future of the occupation can be made successful as well. For another, the effects of current achievement can to some degree serve as the measure of its ultimate significance.

One way to see what the occupation can finally mean, if Americans really want it to have great meaning, is to consider the historical background involved. The Japanese are people who emigrated eastward from Asia and were stopped by the Pacific Ocean. Trapped in a historical and geographical pocket, they distilled the already ancient and over-refined civilization of the continent into a kind of elixir of conservatism. Worshipping their own past

in the form of ancestors, they made a virtue out of retrogression and by means of it developed a fragile, nervous, and yet brilliant culture which the Nineteenth Century found imprisoned in its industrial revolution, like a butterfly in amber.

While the Japanese had been retrogressing toward a remote and upside-down perfection of their own, the rest of the world had been racing in the opposite direction, *i.e.*, westward. When the most advanced outposts of European civilization reached the coast of California, two antithetical trends in human development were separated only by the Pacific Ocean; and evidently in view of the nature of the western trend, this ocean would be crossed and the two trends would collide.

Thus the Japanese surrender not only gave the newest country in the world, and one which had never really run a major occupation, the job of running a country which is in this sense the oldest in the world, and one which had never been defeated; it also marked a global milestone in Occidental progress, and the passage of European civilization across the earth's greatest, final barrier.

The U.S. (which is often accused of being

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unable to get involved in any international affairs without bungling them) has so far handled this unprecedented situation, without perhaps even fully understanding it, with great dexterity. How this came about, what obligations it imposes, and what further possibilities it offers are questions which will repay investigation. It would be a great pity if the answers were to be concealed by a curtain composed, not of iron, but merely of our own indifference.

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II

It may be that the whole story of the Japanese occupation has been neglected simply because, being so large, it is extremely hard to tell and tends to fall apart or come out piecemeal, in a rash of statistics, argument, or isolated incident. How does one begin this story, when not one American in ten has ever been in an army; not one in twenty has been out of his own country, and not one in two hundred has ever seen Japan. Yet a knowledge of Japan, the wide world, and the Army are all essential parts of the idiom in which any report on the occupation must be composed.

The word *Japan*, to the average American, may well suggest a vague fan picture in which the main elements are shrines, temples, rock gardens, pagodas, and geisha houses, all equipped with sway-backed roofs, and most of them built on the slopes of snow-capped Fujiyama. Similarly, *occupation army* may suggest an even more confused mental montage in which the major items are apt to be a parade,

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General Tojo bleeding on his sofa, jeeps, fraternization, Private Hicswa and the braid on General MacArthur's hat. In view of the limited coverage the press can give, these impressions may be justifiable, but for complete fidelity to fact they leave much to be desired. Any effort to portray the real nature of the occupation should thus, perhaps, start with a simple description of what the whole thing looks like.

The visitor to occupied Japan arrives by plane or ship in Yokohama, a port city which is to Tokyo rather as Newark or Jersey City is to New York. He then proceeds to the capital either by electric train or by a bumpy, dusty, miserable highway through marginal weedy lots, dotted with wooden shacks or concrete ruins, denoting severe bombing and improvised rebuilding. After twenty miles or so, solid structures begin to be evident; and the general appearance of the neighborhood suggests to the visitor, if he is accustomed to metropolitan America, that he must be on the outskirts of some large population center such as the northern Bronx. His car then stops and he is made aware that he is in central Tokyo. It develops that most of the streets do not have names;

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that Japanese move about in chattering swarms and wear wooden-soled sandals with what appear to be heels at both ends; that it is extremely hot; that the air is damp and that there is a mild aroma of wood smoke and old fish. The visitor's first impression of Tokyo is a poor one.

The visitor is on official business, or else he would not be in Tokyo at all (unless he is what in the new lexicon of the occupation era is rather disparagingly called a *dependent*). Hence his first business is to get a billet, *i.e.*, room, either at the Imperial Hotel, if he happens to be a high-ranking officer or V.I.P., or else at one of several others which are inferior even to this vastly overrated caravansary. He then proceeds to headquarters at the Dai Ichi Building, where he finds himself lost in an alphabetical maze in which words like SCAP, FEAF, and SCAJAP, or local vernacular like *jeepu* or *dozo*, are tossed about in a meaningful way by the denizens. It takes the stranger some time to get these sorted out. By the time he does so, he has caught the flavor of life in Tokyo for its occupation personnel.

This flavor is not that of cosmopolitan life in a great foreign city, for the people he trafficks

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with most are other Americans, usually those who work with him or live in the same billets. It is not the life of a small American town because, among other things, it lacks many of the conveniences such as fresh food, good cars, and fine roads. It also lacks some of the problems, such as servants, housing and money. It has some of the elements of a camping trip incongruously conducted in urban surroundings, since almost everyone, military or civilian, wears old khaki pants and shirts and rarely bothers to put on a coat for dinner. Even more it suggests at first some sort of nightmare business convention, held amid ruins, to which the entertainment chairman has missed the train and where attendance is permanent and obligatory.

The occupation is a Japanese room boy who, told to awaken his master at eight o'clock, tiptoes into the room, writes on a piece of paper, "Sir, it is eight o'clock, please to wake up," puts the note on the bureau and tiptoes out again, without making a sound. It is a pair of crack Japanese golfers on one of the few unrequisitioned courses, waving a slow G.I. foursome to go on ahead of them; or Jiro Sato, the Japanese Davis Cup star, giving tennis lessons to a U.S.

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colonel. It is a series of newspaper advertisements in Japanese for courses in U.S. tap dancing; cultured pearls and silk kimonos on bargain sale on the ground floor of the Ginza Commissary; a German Jesuit priest drinking American canned beer on the military car of the late Sunday train from Atami, where he has said three masses; and a Quonset Hut colony called Palace Heights across the park moat from the bombed-out residence of Emperor Hirohito. It is the color and composition of canned beets, coleslaw, stewed carrots and mayonnaise on an hors d'oeuvres plate in an officers' mess—so scrupulously arranged because the Japanese prize food for its appearance rather than its edibility.

But by the time that he has discovered all this, the visitor has also learned that the scene of his discoveries, Tokyo, is by no means the whole of the occupation. Indeed, properly speaking, Tokyo is not the occupation at all but only its headquarters. Headquarters of the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers (or SCAP, as this institution is known throughout Japan) consists of some two thousand soldiers and civilians headed by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur in his capacity as Supreme

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Commander. The occupation itself consists of approximately 130,000 American and the 35,000 British troops which are stationed, mostly in small units, at garrisons all over the four main Japanese home islands.

The U.S. occupation troops, which hold all of Japan except the British zone of western Honshu and the Island of Shikoku, are commanded by General Robert L. Eichelberger from his Eighth Army headquarters in Yokohama. Like General John R. Hodge, in command of occupation forces in Korea, General Eichelberger is responsible to MacArthur in the latter's purely military capacity as the Army's Far East Commander in Chief. In practice, like Hodge, Eichelberger has effective autonomy of command in purely military, as opposed to policy, matters.

In the early days of the occupation the Sixth and Eighth Armies had the ticklish job of disarming a Japanese land force of well over two million which had never been engaged in battle. This was accomplished so rapidly that the Sixth Army was disbanded early in 1946; and the Eighth Army's present functions are comparatively routine, consisting mainly of supervising Japanese efforts to obey directives. In

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addition to directive checking, it has at various times been engaged in burning or detonating vast stores of munitions at Japanese army depots; gathering in machinery and other items marked for possible use as reparations; snooping through Japanese factories and warehouses to make sure that inventories thereof were accurate; supplementing the Japanese transport system in essential jobs like food distribution; policing its own personnel or guarding its own warehouses; and keeping itself happy under the mildly trying conditions of a strange environment where the girls speak gibberish and fail to match domestic beauty standards.

Despite such a handicap, it is not surprising in view of the Japanese attitude toward their conquerors, that fraternization seems an even more inappropriate euphemism for what goes on in Nippon than it is for similar activities elsewhere. General Eichelberger has had the good sense to let nature take its course, with the result that bad behavior has been at a minimum since American soldiers are for the most part sensible and civilized individuals. What little bad behavior comes to light is promptly punished; and it seems to be due less to the unruliness of the Japs than to the U.S. eager-

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ness to get its soldiers home as fast as possible.

In consequence of this policy most of the Eighth Army now consists of replacement troops. Combat veterans were quite understandably dazzled and even charmed by the contrast between the behavior of the Japanese civilians at home and the Japanese soldiery they had encountered elsewhere. New arrivals from the States on the contrary are often imbued with a fine martial frenzy against the Japanese as a race. This sometimes leads to a little unpleasantness until the nature of the situation soaks in and improves their manners.

Outside of a few rape cases, which are treated with prompt severity, much of the bad behavior of the occupation troops falls into the category of practical jokes and drunken frivolity. There is the case of a Japanese clerk in an army bureau where the U.S. officer in charge found it refreshing to improve his underlings' English according to a special Berlitz method of his own. This consisted of teaching them Anglo-Saxon gutter monosyllables and admonishing them to use them, when speaking to Americans, as expressions of respect. The clerk in question fell into talk with a G.I. on a late evening train from Tokyo. When he employed

a few of the phrases taught to him by his superior, the G.I. not unnaturally took offense and, in the ensuing fracas, threw him off the train.

Incidents like this are rare. More often the high spirits of the occupation army are released in comparatively harmless pranks like ordering the conductors of trolley cars or electric trains to stand out of the way and running these conveyances in their stead; stealing souvenir kimonos from geisha houses; or selling rationed cigarettes on the black market exchange.

Since the bad conduct of one soldier outweighs the good conduct of a dozen, even these trivial peccadilloes can do considerable harm. Fortunately, they are also infrequent and it is noticeable that, so far at least, the Japanese are inclined to make allowances. They put such things down to individual eccentricity and do not allow individual instances to injure their faith in occupation policy which, they assume quite correctly, does not encourage such goings on.

To new arrivals from the States or elsewhere, it may come as something of a shock to discover that, for all its minor inconveniences, the routine of occupation life is often definitely agree-

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able, and that its compensations may even outweigh its disadvantages. Occupation personnel is divided into two major categories, Army and Civilian. These are subdivided further by rank in the former and by Clerical, Administrative, and Fiscal ratings in the latter. C.A.F. ratings, in effect, grade civilians according to their pay scale, for purposes of establishing what privileges they are entitled to in the way of billets, transportation and so forth. The fact is that all ranks and ratings get good accommodations, excellent food and plenty of diversion, all at prices which would be unthinkable in the United States.

Most of the larger cities of Japan, with the exception of Kyoto, Japan's ancient capital and cultural center, were more or less demolished by bombing. The buildings that were destroyed, however, were mostly wooden shacks or factories, and there are plenty of residential structures left to accommodate most of the occupation personnel in comfort and considerable style. All of Tokyo's best hotels, for example, have been taken over by the Army as billets for officers and civilian employees. For prices which would be nominal at home, their "guests" get excellent accommodations, good

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army food prepared by Japanese cooks, and service on a scale that went out of U.S. fashion with the Civil War. Officers or civilians with dependents get either splendid or substantial Japanese houses, according to the priority established by rank and length of overseas service, or else somewhat less lavish but nonetheless livable quarters in Quonset Huts or low cost building projects which will eventually revert to Japanese ownership. Rentals, even for officers, do not exceed one hundred dollars a month, for which excellent value is received. If any repairs or remodeling are necessary, these are paid for by the Japanese government as part of the occupation cost, to the considerable satisfaction of Japanese contractors who charge all that the traffic will bear. The servant problem exists, if at all, only for the servants, but even they are not likely to be much bothered by the necessity of accepting a wage scale which averages about six dollars a month—since a job in an American household usually means at least one square meal a day as well as a roof.

Food for dependents or other private householders in the occupation is purchasable at rock-bottom prices in the local Commissary,

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which gets it by refrigerator ship from the United States. Since the Army refrains from buying food on the domestic market, items like fresh milk, sweet butter and green vegetables are rare but otherwise the variety is commendable; and jars of caviar which would cost six dollars in New York are on sale for three dollars. Civilian clothing and army uniforms are also available in the Commissary which operates like a small-scale Macy's. Silks and souvenirs from Japan's domestic stock piles may be acquired at bargain rates. Getting around town presents something of a problem, since Tokyo streetcars are always packed beyond capacity, with queues waiting to board them at every stop. But out-of-town travel is simplified by the fact that many trains have at least half a car, and frequently a whole one, reserved, free, for Allied personnel. In town, the jeep is the modern equivalent of the army mule, and periodic sales of surplus jeeps are sufficiently frequent to put this means of transport within the reach of many who might have a hard time paying for a new car at home, even if they could get delivery.

Schools for dependents' children are excellent. Diversions such as golf, tennis, and swim-

ming at requisitioned courses, courts, and pools are easily available. The social life of the occupation is somewhat restricted but includes few of the rigors emphasized by Kipling and others in descriptions of the garrison life of British Imperial forces which it recalls in some ways. Good American whiskey, to be sure, is scarce but American canned beer is always available as is its Japanese equivalent, a brew which many of the visitors find preferable. There are also ample stocks of the locally manufactured Scotch, brandy and saki, which are almost unobtainable for the native population. Cocktail parties and dinner dances are part of the occupation routine; and at such affairs a nice sense of social discrimination can be observed, based not upon stateside considerations, but upon purely occupational qualifications in position, pay and prestige. Quite aside from its practical compensations, occupation life offers a spiritual compensation in that it makes the occupant, if that is the proper word, feel important, as well as free from all the petty harassments of small-community life at home. It is not surprising that most of the resident personnel seem cheerful and well-adjusted; nor that a fair percentage, both Army and civilian, plan to stay on

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after the period of contracted service to help the Japanese reconstruct their country on a more commercial basis.

As to the Japanese, their personal contact with the occupation is surprisingly limited. Since there is practically nothing to buy in Japanese shops, few commercial connections are established, personal or otherwise. Japanese restaurants are "off-limits" in the first place and, in the second, the Japanese system of dining out requires such elaborate preparations in the way of restaurant reservations and exchange operations, to say nothing of an acquired taste for raw fish, that few Americans bother with it. Hence, aside from romantic entanglements and a few rather exceptional associations between officers and the richer Japanese householders who can still afford to entertain on a modest scale, most of the ordinary day-to-day contact between Americans and the native population is on a master-servant basis. As such, it runs remarkably smoothly; for while the majority of Americans are not accustomed to having any servants and are charmed by the experience of having several, most Japanese are accustomed to serving and are thus not only expert but also contented in the role. For Japan's servant class,

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in fact, the occupation merely means the substitution, for their former employers, of Americans, who have fitted rather neatly into the national economy in the niche vacated by the demoted aristocracy.

How long mass occupation, as distinct from mere governmental control, should last; or whether its personnel, already cut down by 60 per cent since V-J Day, should be reduced even further remains to be seen. Meanwhile, occupation duty even for the G.I. has some of the aspects of a world tour, and General Eichelberger has done as much as possible to encourage this impression by setting up numerous and splendid beer halls, theaters, rest areas and hotels for enlisted men as well as officers all over the highly scenic Nipponese landscape. The sign on one of these rest camps—YOU NEVER HAD IT SO GOOD—may be a slight exaggeration. When Eichelberger called attention to it on one occasion in a letter to a national magazine, one of his subordinates wrote in to reply that the sign could much more appropriately have been placed on the porch of the Imperial Hotel. Nonetheless, troops occupying Japan are suffering no hardship, and save that Frauleins are better looking than *neisans*, their lot is clearly

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happier than that of their confreres in Germany.

If few Americans at home have a clear picture of the occupation of Japan it may also be said that the majority of Japanese do not really know much about it either. Japan is a minuscule country compared to the United States but, while this facilitates the occupation's job, the country's chopped-up topography and the density of population in urban or even rural settlements combine to prevent the occupation from calling much attention to itself. In the larger cities to be sure the preponderance of the occupation's superior vehicles over charcoal-burning trucks, oxcarts, two-wheeled barrows, bicycle express wagons and shanks' mare, which are the common Japanese means of locomotion, may give an exaggerated impression. In the countryside, small as it may be by American standards, the occupation army is a much less noticeable feature of the scene. The Japanese landscape, a neat patchwork of little mountains and green, level valleys set out in rice or wheat, was untouched by the war; and many towns and villages or even whole districts have encountered no more spectacular evidence of the defeat than the occasional dust cloud raised by a passing jeep.

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Far from being an impediment, however, the paucity of its personnel helps rather than hinders the occupation in its work. This is due to a strange combination of circumstances of which the most important is that the Japanese, far from regarding the occupation as an unwelcome intrusion, seem to consider it more in the nature of a special Providential benefaction.

III

That the U.S. occupation forces in Japan find their life there agreeable does not in itself supply much foundation for the statement that the occupation is a success. Whether or not the Potsdam Declaration of its purpose was an adequate one, the purpose certainly goes far beyond supplying an agreeable sojourn, however educational or even remunerative, for the few thousand Americans who avail themselves of the opportunity. Nonetheless, the pleasurable aspects of the occupation for the occupants are significant; for they derive from the same basic cause that accounts also for the more substantial virtues of the enterprise. This cause is the Japanese attitude toward the occupation, which is at once the most important and the most mystifying factor in the situation.

To Americans who have never been in Japan it naturally seems quite incomprehensible that a nation whose troops fought with a ferocity exceeded only by their persistence should overnight turn into an amiable race of patient and

obedient students of Democracy. In trying to account for such a metamorphosis, Americans consequently start by belittling it as far as possible in order to render it plausible. They explain the residue of change which the circumstances render undeniable by assuming that the Japanese are up to another one of their characteristically deceitful tricks, such as they practiced with so much diligence during the war, and of which the war itself was certainly the most notorious example. This is an entirely understandable form of rationalization; it consists essentially of examining the circumstances and, by applying to them a sort of inverse Golden Rule, figuring out a logical explanation—if the Japanese behaved the way Americans might behave, if Americans were deceitful and tricky like the Japanese.

Unfortunately, the method of determining motivation by putting oneself in the other person's place often works extremely well in domestic situations, but it rarely leads to valid conclusions in international ones. (One of the reasons why wars occur is that every nation makes the error of supposing other nations will react in the same way that it does, thus neglecting a difference in national psychology which

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may be the determining factor.) The Japanese reaction to defeat—without an understanding of which it is impossible to begin to understand the success of the occupation—cannot even be defined in terms which would normally occur to the American mind.

To define the Japanese attitude toward defeat requires first of all a superficial conception of the meaning of that tedious Oriental cliché, "face." In itself, there is nothing very mysterious about face; it merely denotes self-esteem, or, more precisely, a confidence that the character which the world sees in one conforms more or less to the character that one wishes to display. However, where the Oriental idea of self-esteem differs from the Occidental one is in the justification the individual demands for a condition which is indispensable to both. To the Occidental, face may be bound up with ideas of ability to earn a living, a consciousness that one is obeying the Ten Commandments, the possession of a new car or a thousand and one other things which, to the Oriental, would be comparatively insignificant. To the Japanese, on the other hand, self-esteem depends upon an even greater number of qualifications which seem valueless to the Occidental and which in

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the last analysis can perhaps never be explained to him. However, if he cannot share the Japanese evaluation of the forms of behavior which justify self-esteem, he can at least see what some of them are, and accept the fact that, to the Japanese, they are of controlling importance.

For any American, loss of the war to Japan would have resulted in an unimaginable loss of personal and individual face. For the Japanese, losing the war entailed no such loss. He was spared any sense of chagrin on this score by the simple fact that the Emperor proclaimed the surrender. To the Japanese, one of the most basic, if not indeed the fundamental, obligation upon which face depends consists exactly of obedience to this dignitary. Hence, as soon as the surrender was announced, it became just as important to the Japanese to obey the Emperor's command to co-operate with the Americans as it had previously been to kill as many of them as possible. If dying in large swarms in the streets of Tokyo would serve the purpose of preserving amity with the Americans, the Japanese would now no doubt be fully as prepared to do this as they were to expire in large swarms on the Pacific Islands with the opposite

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result in view. However, while obedience to the Emperor may be the fundamental factor in the Japanese reaction to the occupation, it is by no means the only one. The Japanese have agile minds and they carry their rationalization considerably farther.

Having been confronted by and having accepted the fact of defeat, the individual Japanese was left with alternative conclusions. He could suppose that he had been defeated by a power weaker and inferior to himself. This was so painful as to be inadmissible. (Indeed, some analysts of Japanese behavior reported, even before World War II began, that the ill-success of the "China incident" might make it necessary for the Japanese to fight America if only to avoid the ignominy of being beaten by the inferior Chinese.) The other conclusion was to assume that he had been beaten by a power far stronger and superior to himself, indeed by the best in the world. A man who has been knocked out in a barroom fight might feel some consolation if he later learned that his opponent had been Joe Louis. This assumption enabled the Japanese to avoid chagrin, for he could blame defeat on the ignorance of the militarists who had made the mistake of not knowing what

kind of scrap they were getting into. Consequently, the Japanese adopted this attitude, and then proceeded to another hypothesis even more significant in explaining their present pattern of behavior.

Trained for centuries to admire victory in war above all else, and convinced, both by the facts and their own interpretation of them, that the Americans were better at war than they were themselves, the Japanese saw a way to save further face by imitating their conqueror with the object, eventually, of becoming exactly like him. If by a process of imitating Americans, the Japanese could eventually become more American than the Americans themselves, they would clearly not only have lost no face; but assuming that the Americans were better than they were in the first place, as the war had proved, they would have actually gained face. Just as the only way to have proved that the Americans were better was to have been beaten by them, so the only way to retrieve the situation was to be like the Americans. The best means of accomplishing this was to welcome them and learn their ways, in the most wholehearted fashion.

Whether or not this attitude on the part of

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the Japanese represents a "sincere" repentance for their error in causing the war; or a "sincere" friendliness toward Americans now, it is difficult to say. Sincerity also defines itself differently for the Oriental mind, and any kind of sincerity that was not based on personal advantage of a basic sort would probably seem profoundly sentimental to an Oriental (although western Christian civilization prefers, somewhat idealistically, to believe otherwise). What is more to the point, the notion that Japanese submissiveness in defeat represents some sort of conscious trickery on their part is as erroneous as the prewar notion—that they were a monkey race whom we could defeat overnight if the occasion to do so ever arose. Even the idea that they are genuinely submissive and repentant misses the point entirely.

In fact, the Japanese are not animated by negative and reluctant acceptance of the occupation. Their mood is one of aggressive and positive appropriation. They are behaving as though occupation by Americans had been their top war aim all along. For the moment at least, they really feel this way. Since they want to copy Americans so much, the presence of models, in the form of occupation troops,

amounts to a sort of Christmas every day. It makes the Japanese like the Americans even more for taking the trouble to send the models, and thus convinces them that Americans must like them very much also.

Under these circumstances it is not astonishing that the Japanese are going about their latest venture in imitation with all the diligence which they once applied to less essential and preparatory ones. Imitation, as anyone knows who has ever watched a baby or been to school, is merely another name for learning. The Japanese are now demonstrating their capacity in this important branch of human activity, as applied to politics and other basic enterprises, with even more efficiency than that which previously enabled them to produce championship Olympic swimming teams ten years after they learned to swim the crawl and a big league industry fifty years after they learned that locomotives were not dragons.

To say that the Japanese response to the occupation is, on the whole, overwhelmingly favorable does not mean, of course, that it meets with equal favor among all segments of the population, nor that all aspects of the occupation are equally effective. One group re-

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sponding less favorably are the Japanese farmers, who suffered so little from the war and have seen so little of the occupation that they may even misdirect their thanks for those agrarian reforms which may in time make them the occupation's prime beneficiaries. Even in cities, a small measure of actual hostility to the occupation still exists, especially among ex-soldiers. This springs less from ideological or practical causes than from emotional ones, such as remembrance of friends killed in battle or chagrin over the conciliatory attitude of Japanese girls. The great industrialists, who have lost their holdings; the purged politicians, who have lost their authority; and the Army and Navy officers, who have suddenly been deprived of both prestige and livelihood, naturally prefer the old days. But even these groups have a resigned rather than a rebellious attitude. It is conceivable that they may pluck up their courage and try to reassert themselves in the future, but there are no signs so far that such a thought has even occurred to any of them.

The aspect of the occupation that has made the least dent on the Japanese population is, rather paradoxically, the one which perhaps

gets most attention in American papers—the trial of the war criminals, which drones on interminably in the Japanese War Ministry Building on the outskirts of Tokyo.

Like the Nuremberg Trials the Tokyo Trials have received extensive coverage. All trials sound dramatic; they are easy to report; and this one, though less eye-catching than its counterpart in Germany, nonetheless had an impressive all-star cast in the criminals' dock. The fact remains that the event itself is lackluster; and if its purpose is to dramatize for the Japanese the error of their ways, and deter them from other militaristic cliques for the future, it is not too soon to mark it as a partial failure.

The gravest faults in the Tokyo Trials are apparently inherent. The fundamental propriety of having a panel of warmongers tried by a panel of jurists, of whom one at least represents a power which not only aided in the warmongering under discussion but still appears to be engaged in this practice more eagerly than ever, seems to the Japanese questionable. This is an unavoidable flaw in the proceedings, as is the language difficulty which slows them down to a snail's pace. More important is the fact that, like most all-star productions, this one

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is top-heavy with talent. If the criminals could have been tried one by one and sentenced at weekly or fortnightly intervals, the drama would at least have had a running villain and people would have been interested. As it is, the spectacle is diffuse, the accusations involved, the questioning cumbersome, and the houses poor. The handful of spectators who do attend appear only slightly less bored than the participants themselves. Not only the defendants but their counsel actually spend a good part of the time dozing in their seats, aroused only occasionally by the efforts of the presiding judge, Australia's Sir William Webb, to restore dignity to the proceedings by means of sardonic interjections.

That some Japanese have a rather negative response to the occupation and that some aspects of it arouse no response at all, merely serves to dramatize by contrast the reactions of the remaining Japanese majority. It is nevertheless essential to remember that, although the occupation itself is a success, and life for the occupying forces is usually an agreeable one, life in Japan generally is in a miserable condition, economically and otherwise. Yet even the misery of existing conditions as a

whole, far from being a detriment to the occupation's success (as the misery of Germany is to the occupation there), has had the opposite effect. The occupation shines like a good deed in a naughty world; and the more brightly it shines by contrast with its surroundings, the more the Japanese enjoy its warmth and light. It is understandable enough that the Japanese, utterly disillusioned with militarism, should turn to a new philosophy in the hope of finding a way out of their spiritual confusion. What may seem contradictory is the way in which even the material sufferings following their defeat have tended to aid rather than obstruct the occupation's progress; this is owing both to the nature of the hardships and to the Japanese reaction to them.

Japan's countryside was undamaged by the war, and its farmers, who prospered throughout, are still reasonably prosperous, but Japan's cities—where the economic penalties of war would have been concentrated anyway—also suffered all the material damage. The material ruin of all the larger cities (except Kyoto, Japan's "cultural capital," which was left unbombed) is the lesser of two evils. The traditional flimsiness of Japanese houses, which

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made their destruction so easy, is in fact a kind of insurance against periodic earthquakes and fires, and also facilitates rebuilding them. Sawing and joining with accustomed diligence, the Japanese are not greatly disheartened by a practical problem which differs in degree but not in kind from previous calamities. Their less apparent economic difficulties are not so readily remediable.

Along with several million dwellings, Japan lost many million dollars' worth of industrial plants. Lost too were the empire, which had previously supplied raw materials, and the war industry, which had been the backbone of Japan's national economy. The net consequence of all this, along with demobilization of six million servicemen, was large-scale unemployment, estimated in 1947 at five million. Closing of plants earmarked for reparations and slowing down of others whose disposition is uncertain may finally enlarge this total to eight million, or one ninth of the national population. This figure omits two million or so war casualties whose families are also without visible means of support. Owing to the oddities in the Japanese industrial system, unemployment may be partial; owing to the Japanese family system,

indigent workers may have a roof; and owing to Japanese hardiness, they can get along on nearly nothing. Nonetheless, with reconversion in full swing but with little to reconvert to, there can be no doubt that Japan's working classes are in desperate straits, with few prospects of improvement until a peace treaty allows the nation to resume international trade on whatever basis we deem suitable.

Unemployment and consequent low purchasing power work against inflation, while scarcity of goods and consequent high prices work toward it. Japan's present scarcities are so extreme that, despite unemployment, living costs are forty times prewar levels. Pressures like these obviously present serious problems. Crime, in a country where even petty theft was once almost unknown, now flourishes, accompanied by a lively rise in black market racketeering and unlicensed prostitution. Entrepreneurs in such lines of endeavor now enjoy a field day.

Among signs of the times for the Japanese, as sharply distinguished from the occupation forces, are thousands of half-naked, verminous humans of all ages sleeping in swarms on the stone floors of Tokyo's unheated railway sta-

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tions; the sidewalks along the Ginza, where a pair of shoes costs sixty dollars; a newspaper saleswoman with her wares spread over her small sleeping son to keep him warm on the pavement in the autumn night; and an old dandy furtively poking a paper bag with his silver-handled cane to see if it has garbage in it. Attentive Japanese insect fanciers long ago learned that their crickets are much more eloquent than Occidental katydids. In the October evenings, they sing: "*Katasase, susosase samusaga kuruzo*," meaning, "Sew your sleeves, sew your skirts, for the winter is coming." In the autumn of 1947, the crickets' insistent drone seems specially urgent.

The hardships of the populace in Japan may actually aid the occupation. Unlike the situation in Germany the Japanese are a Spartan race, long inured to sacrifice and low living standards, and inclined to place spiritual premiums on endurance rather than on consumption. For them, the physical discomforts of life do not involve spiritual suffering commensurate with that inflicted by the same conditions on Europeans (who pride themselves almost as much as Americans on competitive expenditures for personal comfort). Even more important is the

fact that the Japanese quite correctly place the blame for their present miseries not upon their conquerors nor even on themselves but upon the government which got them conquered. In addition to blaming their own government for starting the war, they credit the Americans with ending it. The end of the war, while it brought with it economic hardships, at least ended the even more severe hardships of bombings and lessened their miseries on an over-all balance. As a corollary to crediting the United States in general and the occupation in particular for the progressive diminution of their dilemma, they fully expect that both these agencies will help to complete its solution. Nor has this hope been groundless.

The occupation's not-altogether altruistic efforts to alleviate the distress of the Japanese cities has so far been most spectacularly exhibited in the form of food shipments, consisting mainly of grains, which are being sent in at the rate of roughly one hundred thousand tons a month. Although the flour is distributed by the Japanese government through local ration boards, and although, accustomed to the finest white polished rice, the Japanese find their new diet less palatable than nourishing, they

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are at least able both to discern and to remember where it came from. Indeed, the imports of food alone, which currently amount to about 8 per cent of total Japanese consumption, might serve to reconcile them to the occupation even if all the other concomitant factors were not present.

Within the next few years Japan's economic situation will doubtless settle down and some of its more dramatic and extreme dislocations be adjusted. This will only be accomplished with considerable travail, and the eventual resolution is not likely to be a completely satisfactory one, at least for the Japanese. While some sort of workable economy for the nation was guaranteed at Potsdam, no one guaranteed it a high living standard; short of a miracle, indeed, the low prewar standard which the lost empire was designed to raise is likely to be even further lowered. The degree to which it will be lowered will depend largely on the degree of foreign commerce allowed to the nation. This as well as much of its internal economy can be regulated by the conquerors even without an occupation as though by turning a faucet handle. In this case the faucet is the amount of steel scrap and basic materials

which the Japanese can buy. Steel is the basic ingredient of industry, and the Japanese have little of their own and cannot get it elsewhere under present controls.

In view of these circumstances, as well as others which are part of the international situation as a whole, the Japanese attitude toward America is likely presently to undergo a change of some sort. As the war recedes in their memories they are likely to blame it less for their difficulties, and consequently to assign the United States a smaller share of credit for the amelioration of those difficulties that resulted simply from peace. And as the nation begins to find its place in the postwar world, and as the true disadvantages of this place become apparent, they are likely, to some degree at least, to blame us. This alteration constitutes part of the challenge which the current success of the occupation offers for the future. And it does not alter the fact that so far even Japan's miseries and misfortunes have contributed to, instead of detracting from, their already intense desire to co-operate with their conquerors.

Like many other peculiarities, the Japanese attitude toward their conquerors is as hard to describe in the abstract as it is easy to recog-

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nize in the fact. When an American traveler arrives in occupied Japan, the more he is prepared consciously or otherwise to encounter a hostile or at best submissive native population, the more quickly he is compelled to modify his notions if only as a means of adjusting successfully to the new environment. By the time he has made the dusty journey from Yokohama to Tokyo the manner of the porter who carries his bag, the swarms of waving children along the road, even the expressionless faces of laborers working in the fields or ditches, have already convinced him that, somehow or other, the notions of Japanese behavior as set forth in most western analyses are, somehow, gravely at fault.

Soldiers who encountered the Japanese on the battlefields were astonished at the contrast between their behavior in war abroad and at home in peace. They were quickest to value it correctly, even if they could not altogether account for it. Conversely, the people who still doubt this unaggressive attitude most are American commentators, who, not having seen it for themselves, and unable to reconcile it with their notions of human behavior derived from Occidental observations, quite understandably

stick to the conclusion that it cannot exist. It is, in fact, one of those national phenomena which probably has to be seen to be believed; but which once seen cannot be disputed.

To say that the Japanese attitude toward their conquerors is the major factor in the success of the occupation is by no means to argue that it is the only, or even the decisive, one. Japanese enthusiasm was probably as fragile as it was intense. It could easily have been completely destroyed, or rather prevented from existing at all, by the one step, so widely recommended before the surrender, of removing the Emperor along with his government. By this procedure, America would not only have removed the basic motivation for Japanese cooperation with their conquerors. It would also have assumed the job of policing and governing a consequently hostile nation in which even the language is so unknown that, excepting the invaluable Nisei, not a thousand interpreters in the whole United States are able to make sense in it.

By keeping the Emperor the United States avoided these pitfalls. On the asset side of the balance sheet it acquired, as a means for employing the good will thus created, a ready-

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made machine consisting of the two million or so Japanese citizens in government employ, from top-rank ambassadors to village postmen. By the addition of a Central Liaison Office in Tokyo to communicate directives to the Japanese government, this vast if somewhat creaky apparatus became a device with the prime function of distributing and effecting the orders of General MacArthur's Supreme Headquarters. In consequence MacArthur has not only been governing Japan well but he has been doing it with an economy of means unheard of for a good-sized American city, let alone a foreign nation with a potentially hostile population of approximately seventy-three million.

IV

On December 6, 1941, the United States may or may not—as the Pearl Harbor investigation later spent a long time trying to find out—have had an adequate notion about how to make war on Japan. It certainly had no notion at all about making peace and running the Japanese government on its home ground. As late as the summer of 1943, in fact, the occupation of Japan did not amount to much more than a wrinkle in the brow of a Washington Co-ordinating Committee called SWNCC (for the State, War and Navy Department appointees who composed it), charged with working out some sort of formula for the project.

SWNCC's formula, as eventually worked out, envisaged an occupation run on the spot by the U.S. Commander in Chief whose decisions were to be subject to review by an allied advisory board in Washington. Shortly after the surrender the latter, under the title of The Far Eastern Advisory Commission, was formed in Washington. Meanwhile, the Army

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had been handed the job of figuring out what sort of people it would need for the occupation and finding them or training them as quickly as possible. This was a considerable undertaking in view of the degree of ignorance about Japan then prevalent, the uncertainty of the future, and the material available. However, if the war had followed its anticipated course, a fairly complete scheme for the occupation and a reasonably complete organization for putting it into effect might have been available by, perhaps, the spring of 1946.

As events turned out, both the Washington blueprint and the Tokyo blueprint underwent considerable modification. In Washington, the Russians refused to join the Far Eastern Advisory Commission. They proposed instead an Allied Council in Tokyo, modeled on the one which was already working so badly in Berlin. The United States countered by proposing to reform the Far Eastern Advisory Commission, giving it final authority for fundamental changes in the Japanese political structure and major shifts in the actual Japanese government, and to set up in Tokyo a four-power Allied Council whose function would be purely advisory. On this basis, the Russians

agreed to join both the Allied Council and the Far Eastern Commission.

At present the FEC (with the word *advisory* omitted) is composed of delegates from the United States, the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, China, France, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, and the Philippines. Headed by its U.S. member, Major General Frank R. McCoy, it meets weekly in the unused Japanese Embassy in Washington and announces its decisions through the State Department. Directives to implement its policies go to MacArthur from the joint Chiefs of Staff. Though the FEC is nominally the top authority for the occupation, the verbal alterations in its title and charter (while they served their purpose in convincing the Russians that it would not be *infra dig* to join) did not really alter the function of the Commission much more than it altered its composition. The U.S. retained a veto power on Commission decisions which it has scrupulously refrained from using. Since MacArthur's voice would presumably be the one behind the veto, if it were used, the Commission does not actually impair his authority to any noticeable degree.

General McCoy, an experienced officer and

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an old Japan hand, is also sufficiently expert in diplomacy to prevent the Commission from coming to an open divergence of views with MacArthur. The nearest thing to such a break to date occurred in 1946, with the release of the new Japanese Constitution. Drafted by Prince Konoye and extensively revised by MacArthur, with the aid of his section heads (not to mention the literary influence of Thomas Jefferson, Tom Paine and the Kellogg-Briand Anti-War Pact) this document proved almost as much of a shock for the Commission, which had nominal responsibility for approving it, as it did for the Japanese, who were expected to adopt it. The draft constitution, however, was eventually approved by the one and adopted by the other virtually without change; and if it can be regarded as a proof of Japanese good intentions, it also stands as even better proof of where the authority for the occupation actually resides.

While SWNCC and later the FEC were evolving gradually in Washington, even more drastic alterations in the occupation plan were taking place on the other side of the world. If Japan had quit the war in 1944, the U.S. would have been sadly embarrassed; and even as

things actually turned out, a good many junior as well as senior officers in August of 1945 had to spend late nights in Manila drafting last minute improvisations for handling the situation. Most of the plans that then existed envisaged, if not actual armed resistance, at least a fairly complete breakdown of the Japanese government and economy. The scheme for running Japan through its own government, which has since proved so handy, naturally involved a large number of hasty changes still represented by inky erasures and inserted alterations on orders issued from headquarters during the lively weeks before and after the surrender.

The occupation's first practical problem, as distinct from revising its blueprint, was the purely military one of landing troops, getting them scattered around the country with the necessary supplies, and starting the disarmament of the fully equipped and thoroughly disconcerted Japanese home army. It was only while all this was going on, and while MacArthur was issuing the first sweeping directives of occupation policy, that the actual organization of the enterprise began to take shape in Tokyo. As first conceived, the occupation was to be mainly a military operation, involving

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direct supervision of all phases of Japanese life, at all governmental levels. This was to change into a civilian administration over a period of years, as circumstances indicated. The existing circumstances, however, indicated that the more quickly the occupation could take advantage of the Japanese eagerness to obey the slightest whim of its Commander in Chief, the more quickly and the more thoroughly its job could be completed. Consequently, MacArthur's organization chart developed from the start into a sort of double enterprise with an administrative machinery for telling the Japanese what to do on the one hand and a military machinery for seeing that they did it on the other.

As head of both divisions, MacArthur functioned, and still does function, in the double role of Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and also as Commander in Chief of U.S. armed forces in the Pacific. In practice, most of the local responsibilities and authorities of the latter role were relegated to General Eichelberger, whose virtually autonomous command of the occupation army at his headquarters in Yokohama enables MacArthur in Tokyo to spend most of his time operating on

the policy level as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

The headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) currently consists of some fifteen sections each responsible for *supervising*, i.e. running, a major branch of Japanese affairs. The sections are split up into varying numbers of divisions which in turn are headed by a total of some hundred or so anonymous officers and civilians of various ages, qualifications and capacities who, in effect, constitute the present super-government of Japan. To say that these individuals govern Japan is no exaggeration, for just as the Far Eastern Commission directives are usually produced by MacArthur, so the actual drafting of these directives is naturally and properly handled by his SCAP sections. In fact, governing is an understatement of their activities, for in addition to running Japan through its own Emperor, Cabinet, and Diet, they are also reforming it. In view of the willingness of the reformees, and the means at their disposal, their accomplishment in this line is limited only by their liaison with the Japanese and each other, personal competence, and the hours in the day.

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The nerve center of SCAP is the Dai Ichi Building—a fair-sized, partially air-conditioned Tokyo edifice which was built to serve as home office for the insurance company which still occupies its basement floors. On the sixth floor of this is MacArthur's own office, flanked by those of his aides and some of his staff officers. Most of SCAP's top military personnel, all of its Government Section, and a snack and Cola bar for Dai Ichi's five hundred or so U.S. tenants are scattered above and below. Other SCAP sections are quartered in near-by buildings—most in the Forestry Building next door or the former headquarters of Radio Tokyo a few blocks farther down Tokyo's nameless main street, opposite the Imperial Hotel. Occupation offices, like quarters, are, of course, requisitioned from their former proprietors and paid for by the Jap government.

The astonishing economy of means which is the salient characteristic of SCAP's operations is appropriate enough since one of its operating principles is to give the Japanese Government as much responsibility as possible for carrying out the reforms prescribed for it. However, in view of the alacrity with which all Japanese agencies, from Premier Katayama's somewhat

shaky cabinet to the newly founded geisha union, respond to SCAP's smallest suggestion, its influence goes far beyond mere supervision. From their shabby little cubbyholes, SCAP's section and division heads, none of whom make more than ten thousand dollars a year and most of whom have only one or two assistants, control huge slices of Japan's political, cultural and economic life with less commotion than might be expended in the United States on a cigar stand.

SCAP's three first sections—responsible for Government, Civil Information and Education, and Economic and Scientific aspects of Japanese life—started one month to a day after the first troops landed. Now headed respectively by Brigadier General Courtney B. Whitney, Lieutenant-Colonel Donald R. Nugent, U.S. M.C., and Brigadier General William Marquat, they still comprise the core of the enterprise and are together responsible for most of the occupation's major accomplishments to date. Among the most widely publicized and the most immediately discernible have been those achieved by the Government section, since these affect the aspects of Japanese life which are most strikingly apparent.

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Working either directly or through the Central Liaison Office, the Government Section handles the SCAP directives in response to which the Japanese government rid itself of militarists; provided the nation with a new constitution; held two national elections in which Japanese women, newly equipped with the right of suffrage, voted for the first time; chose three new premiers; and accepted the Emperor's renunciation of whatever claim he had to divine origin, whereby not his will but the people's became officially the sovereign power in the land. These items all by themselves would make quite a creditable list of accomplishments for a two-year period. In fact, they were accomplished in the space of six months and represent only the show window portion of the Government Section's activities. Even more significant for the future may be less sensational but more basic accomplishments like, for example, that of the Section's Local Government division run by Lieutenant-Colonel Cecil G. Tilton.

Tilton has the help of two U.S. assistants. With these—and of course, the Japanese government's Central Liaison Office through which political directives channel to the Home Min-

istry's Tokyo staff of some two thousand—he has been effecting a complete renovation of local government throughout Japan. Governors of Japan's forty-six prefectures used to be appointed by the national government in Tokyo. Henceforth governors, as well as town and even village mayors—who used to be appointed by the governors—will all be elected by direct popular vote. Municipal and prefectural assemblies will be reformed and methods of electing their members improved. The net purpose is to take the whole provincial government out of the hands of the national government, which used to be able to control it by throwing a master switch in Tokyo, and put it in the hands of the people. The results of all this are not immediately apparent; but what they mean is that Japan's top political leaders in future should come up from the ranks of local politics instead of from the elite of Tokyo's governing bureaucracy, which supplied them in the past.

Colonel Tilton runs only one of the divisions in the Government Section. Others, supervising government powers, public administration, purges, and public opinion, have been, and still are busy with a series of further alterations

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which may not make Japan into Plato's ideal state but which, in view of Japanese enthusiasm for the changes, should add up to a reformation considerably more drastic than the restoration of the Meiji dynasty which enabled Japan to emerge as a world power in the first place.

That the Government Section's efforts to improve Japanese political procedure have gone much deeper than day-to-day news stories may have suggested does not mean that Japan now has a smoothly efficient popular government. On the contrary, the best that the most sanguine administration in the Section could hope for would be to impose a pattern on the nation's political life in which, given favorable conditions, such a development might eventually result. In actual practice Japanese efforts to swallow democracy at one gulp often result in somewhat startling regurgitations.

When woman suffrage was introduced in April 1946 the occupation authorities were vastly pleased to discover that after the very first election in which the women were allowed to participate, no fewer than thirty-nine lady politicians turned up in the new Diet. It was only later that the reason for this brave show-

ing, which gave these ladies a prestige momentarily equivalent to that of the legendary 79 Ronin, became apparent. The reason was simply that Japanese women voters had taken it for granted that they were only allowed to vote for other women. However, by the time the women voters learned of their mistake, women Diet members gave such a good account of themselves that twenty-five were elected in April 1947.

While the British have somehow always been able to retain the pomp of royalty without letting it interfere with the superficial *lèse majesté* of democratic government, the Japanese are a little bit beyond their depths in trying to duplicate this feat. This was well demonstrated by the ceremonial promulgation by the Emperor of the new Japanese constitution in November of 1946, an event which produced a nationwide celebration only exceeded by the fiesta following the fall of Nanking in 1937. Its high point was reached when the Emperor read the new constitution to the assembled houses of parliament. Considerable suspense was added to these proceedings by the performance of the Lord Chamberlain whose duty it was to climb a double flight of curved steps leading to the

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dais and then, still with eyes front, to climb down them in reverse, after handing the Emperor his lines. The spectacle of a Japanese Democrat descending the stairs backwards on this solemn occasion somehow seemed to symbolize the Nipponese approach to its new way of life in an appropriate if not altogether encouraging fashion.

On more humble levels also the Japanese effort to understand the meaning of democratic procedure has not always been instantaneously successful. A case in point was the following letter dispatched, by an optimistic member of the new so-called geisha union, to Tokyo's Provost Marshal:

Through the kindness of Supreme Headquarters we reception girls were released from the restriction of freedom which derives from the loan with our employer. And now we have awakened to democratic ideas and are filled with hope for free life.

But against our will, we must say we can't provide for ourselves in this place that has not enough sanitary arrangements. For now we have no ability or fund by which we can be independent and make an honest life. But we are all striving to make an honest life as soon as possible.

And this time we have organized ourselves into

a self-governing body aiming at mutual aid, sanitation, and cultivation.

We shall be very happy to have your sympathy and mercy.

Since the Provost Marshal's office has placed all geisha districts off-limits for Allied personnel, its sympathy remained unexpressed and the geisha union's hopes were in this case doomed to disappointment. A somewhat analogous argument worked better with the Japanese police force which, in its various branches, used to enforce everything from traffic ordinances to the latest government decrees in metaphysics. In Tokyo, even the traffic cop on the corner finds that pedestrians now often disregard his signals—unless an MP happens to be sharing his beat—as part of their new-found individual freedom. A Japanese prostitute in the summer of 1946 shocked a policeman who tried to arrest her by explaining that as a free, voting citizen she had the right to choose and to practice her own career without advice from anyone. "Democracy has made things hard for us," the policeman said, and let the lady go.

Transforming the most militaristic and regimented nation on earth into one which will be peacefully guided by individual initiative takes

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a good deal more than the announcement of such a change, as enunciated in the new Japanese constitution. It means so educating the Japanese that, instead of reverting to habit and sticking their heads in the buzz saw for a second time like the stubborn Germans, they can profit from their new condition and will want to do so. The alterations of the Government Section are thus in a sense superficial ones, since they depend ultimately on whether the new generation of Japanese cares to avail itself of the opportunities which they provide.

Stabilizing the reforms entails educating the Japanese, and especially the young Japanese, to appreciate their advantages; and even more fundamental than all the operational changes effected by the Government Section may be the job assigned to, and being ably done by, SCAP's Civil Information and Education Section, with a staff of about the same size as that which would be required in the United States for a survey of the public schools in one small state.

V

In the activities of the Civil Information and Education Section of SCAP, touching the delicate nerve center of Japanese culture, MacArthur's device of preserving the structure of the existing Japanese government served a double purpose. Not only did it enable SCAP to proceed with the convenient economy of means which characterizes all the occupation's other reforms; it also, thereby, enabled SCAP to proceed far more effectively than would otherwise have been possible. The occupation forces might have tried to do directly the job which the C.I.&E.'s Education division has now largely completed by working through the Japanese Ministry of Education. Had it done so, it would have been confronted by a task of such immense complexity that all American educators put together would have had a hard time even knowing where to start. Moreover, eventual failure would have been guaranteed.

Even supposing that enough Americans knew enough Japanese to supply a new set

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of textbooks for use in Japanese schools, it scarcely requires a profound study of psychology to suspect that the Japanese teachers charged with using the textbooks might have had some misgivings about them; and that these misgivings would have been passed on to their pupils. Furthermore, such a direct contravention of the principles of free speech and free thought, as extolled in the American definitions of democracy which the textbooks themselves would have contained, would scarcely have failed to arouse a fair degree of confusion if not downright cynicism among the very readers they were intended to convince.

On the other hand, by the highly convenient device of letting the Japanese pedagogues rewrite their own lessonbooks, the occupation not only guaranteed the sincerity of the books but also drew upon that genuine and well-founded disgust with the prewar processes of militaristic thought which the Japanese educators naturally shared with educators elsewhere but of which they were, in Japan itself, the chief if not the sole repository. Consequently, in view again of the basic Japanese response to the occupation, it may not be especially surprising that the enthusiasm of Ja-

pan's historians, geographers and philosophers to provide textbooks has been even more intense than that of the students to use them.

Another paradox in the Education Division's reform of Japanese education is that, while it has used the Japanese Ministry of Education as the means of making its reforms, it has at the same time been busy purging the Ministry of all dangerous influences and curtailing its functions. Like the Government Section, C.I.&E. has as one of its aims decentralization, so that the Japanese educational system can never again be operated by a central switch in Tokyo. In this aim too the Ministry has been entirely co-operative and, while helping SCAP instigate its reforms with one hand, has been gracefully committing modified *hara-kiri* with the other, only complaining because these two apparently contradictory processes were not proceeding more rapidly. The readiness with which teachers, from those in elementary schools upwards, excised nationalism, Shinto worship and morals (*i.e.* emperor reverence) from their curricula was only matched by their eagerness to get something new to put in their place. Supplying new textbooks for the schools is, by defi-

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dition, harder than throwing out the old ones, but the job was fairly well completed in time for the opening of the school year in April 1947, along with manuals for teachers telling them how to use the new books.

Japan's school system consists of roughly nineteen million students, five hundred thousand teachers and forty thousand schools. The efficiency with which it operated was such that, according to reasonably reliable statistics, the literacy of the population before the war was over 99 per cent, or the world's highest, despite the fact that Japanese, as the C.I.&E. soon discovered to its chagrin, is the world's hardest language to be literate in. To some degree, its very efficiency was due to the centralization of the system which stemmed down directly from the Ministry in Tokyo; and it was this efficiency which enabled the militaristic government to take control of it so readily and completely. By the time of Pearl Harbor, Japan's school system was, in effect, a vast chain of military academies, in which all subjects were taught as part of a philosophic system in which service to the state, and usually armed service, was the chief goal.

The inroads of Japanese militarism into its

school system included actual supervision of curricula by army officers. How little this arrangement had appealed to Japanese educators themselves was suggested not only by the alacrity with which they responded to SCAP directives but also by the fact that they did not even wait for SCAP itself, much less its C.I.&E. Section's Education division, to be founded before starting to set their own house in order. Between the surrender and the formation of SCAP, the Japanese government and Ministry of Education contrived to complete a school survey of their own (which showed among other things that some four thousand schools had been destroyed by bombing); start the program of censoring militaristic or ultranationalistic passages in textbooks; eliminate military training; restore educational as opposed to military control in institutions where the latter had superseded it, and issue an order entitled "School Education under the Changing Circumstances" which reopened the nation's schools in August of 1945. Hence, although SCAP gave C.I.&E. its charter within a few days after the ceremonies aboard the *Missouri*, the Education Division's first job was to catch up with the Ministry of Education which had

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already started to accomplish the mission set by the occupation authorities.

As stated in the SCAP General Order establishing it on September 22, 1945, the mission of the Education Division of the Civil Information and Education Section is

“to utilize the educational system of Japan as an instrument for accomplishing those reforms necessary to bring the basic pattern of Japanese thought, life and actions into conformity with the standards considered essential in a country which is to resume self-direction and a position of dignity in the community of nations.”

To this high-sounding end, the division may either offer technical guidance or suggestions to the Ministry of Education; or it may, through the Supreme Commander, issue directives which, under the occupation, have the force of law. In general, the latter process is reserved for basic issues. Most of the division's business is accomplished by informal and friendly conference between its members and liaison officers of the Ministry of Education, which is charged with effecting its recommendations.

A partial list of the division's accomplishments to date would include screening of all teachers; elimination of Shinto teaching in

schools supported in whole or part by public funds (as part of the general policy of separating religion and state); censorship of textbooks and substitution of new ones; re-orienting teachers by means of special courses, and reform of the previously highly nationalistic institute for educational research; elimination of warlike sports and drills; installation of new teaching methods like movies and radio; and the introduction of special courses in political education. Meanwhile the decentralization of the whole school system has been carried sufficiently far by the central Tokyo Ministry to suggest that henceforth Japanese education will be controlled through more or less autonomous regional subdivisions, instead of through local political authorities or by direct edict.

Thus generally defined, the reforms might amount to much or little. Nor can their actual significance be accurately gauged even by visiting a school and observing what occurs there in contrast to what would have been occurring three years ago. To be sure the children may not now be wearing uniforms—but Japanese school uniforms were a means of economy and identification rather than of militaristic training. They may no longer have the closely

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cropped haircuts which used to be but are no longer obligatory, and they may not stand up with bowed heads when the teacher enters the room nor turn toward the Imperial Palace and make obeisances in the direction of the Emperor. These are superficial symptoms, however, and the real value of the alterations lies again in the spirit in which the Japanese are carrying them out. This spirit seems to guarantee that the change is not less, but more, profound than any itemization of its details may suggest.

There is, of course, plenty left to do. Japanese educational methods in the past were democratic in the sense that they were so highly competitive that only the very top honor students could hope to get into the higher educational brackets. Hence, despite the creditable universality of mere literacy, higher education was confined to a minute percentage of the population and this constituted a factor in a national political structure destined purposefully or otherwise to keep leadership in the hands of the few. These few, moreover, were molded by the handful of professors in the top universities which specialized in producing diplomats, politicians, and other educators ac-

cordova, naturally, to the prevailing notions of the ruling group. A necessity for lasting reform of Japanese education will be a broader system of higher education, ensuring both a larger ruling group and a more heterogeneous one, which will be less readily susceptible to governmental conditioning.

Teachers themselves will need to be less completely dominated by the dictates of ministerial policy. Education for girls—heretofore a thoroughly secondary concern of the Japanese school system, in which the higher branches were confined to flower arrangement, samisen playing, and the refinements of the tea ceremony—will need to be recast in line with their new responsibilities. Lastly, students themselves of all sorts will have to recover from their present peculiar habits of mental discipline which, while they seem to render Japanese scholars preternaturally apt in absorption, also by the law of compensation, render them feeble in creative powers. Such ends as these involve deeper aspects of Japanese behavior than the structure and character of the nation's school curricula and necessarily lie in the future. Meanwhile, the present accomplishments are at least a step along the right road.

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It is not a road to be traversed without difficulty, and these difficulties may multiply rather than diminish in the future, considering some of the obstacles already encountered despite C.I.&E.'s efficiency and Japanese co-operation. The prime handicap is that the Japanese government, in its present economic straits, is hardly in a position to make the teaching profession, underpaid there as elsewhere, financially attractive. Occupation costs and reparations, while perhaps justified as punitive measures, thus tend to work, in this respect as in some others, at cross-purposes with the American aim of creating a new generation which will appreciate the advantages of the peaceful way of life. Even in its most militaristic days Japan expended a remarkably larger percentage of its budget on education than was spent on the army and navy. With the latter cut out entirely, the Japanese government might well be able to afford even better appropriations, which would be to our advantage; but this again will depend on the degree of general economic recovery which U.S. policy sees fit to permit.

It is noteworthy that the Education division's troubles have by no means been entirely ob-

jective ones. Internal divisions of policy have also inevitably played their part in its efforts to handle a problem of extreme subtlety and one which, even in America where educators might be expected to agree with each other, has always aroused fundamental disagreements about both ends and means. Probably the liveliest scrap in the internal workings of C.I.&E. resulted from the visit to Japan of a distinguished group of educators who, at the invitation of General MacArthur, made an inspection tour in the spring of 1946. The report of this committee was in general highly favorable to the work in progress but it also included a recommendation to the effect that the best thing to do with Japanese educational reform would be to start at the bottom with a new language.

The concern of the educators about the Japanese language was much less preposterous than it sounds. Indeed, the first thing any Occidental naturally feels when he finds that written Japanese is even more complicated than it looks is that the best thing to do with such a preposterous *mélange* would be to throw it away and start fresh. Japanese characters were borrowed from the Chinese in the Fifth Cen-

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tury, but in acquiring a written language the Japanese did not bother to change their spoken one. The resulting confusion has been compounded through the centuries ever since, with truly alarming consequences. In some cases, of course, Japanese words for Chinese symbols occasion no more difficulty than, for example, English, French and Italian words for the Arabic numerals. In others, however, the original aberrations of the Chinese, superimposed upon quite extraneous oddities of Japanese word structure, have led to such dizzy ambiguities and contradictions that even the most educated Japanese can barely read the front page of the daily paper without a dictionary and none can hope to learn the language properly, even in a lifetime devoted to nothing else. Nonetheless, for many complex reasons, the scheme (which hopeful investigators always suggest) of resorting to *Romaji*, or Roman liberation of Japanese pronunciations, apparently offers even greater ultimate difficulties in a language based upon visual rather than auditory symbols—it would mean, for instance, the virtual obliteration of all Japanese classical literature, in which the visual connotations and associations of the charac-

ters play an important part. After due thought, and to the considerable relief of the resident Education Division as well as the Japanese Ministry of Education, the proposal to give the Japanese a new language as well as a new way of life was discarded.

While the reform of Japanese education is possibly the most important objective in C.I.&E.'s program, at least so far as the future is concerned, it is probably outweighed at present by some of the Section's more pressing tasks. Colonel Nugent, who prepared for his assignment by teaching at Stanford and spending a few years in Japan before the war, also has charge, as the name of his Section indicates, of supervising all media through which Japanese get their news of what is going on at home and in the outside world. On the face of it, this looks like censorship and would of course resolve itself into that and nothing more, were it not for the willingness of the media themselves to co-operate. Actually it is a sort of public relations job, the aim of which is simply to help the Japanese in interpreting the news themselves not with, but without, reference to a government which would determine what the interpretation should be. Since the Japanese

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are quite accustomed to censorship but not at all accustomed to thinking things out for themselves, this job is considerably harder. It is especially taxing in relation to foreign news, because the Japanese have received so little in the past few years that was even remotely honest. Now they naturally need considerable aid in evaluating by means of the press, radio and movies, what are, even to experts, extremely complex developments in the field.

So far as the press is concerned, C.I.&E. merely sees to it that while every shade of opinion may be expressed in Japanese newspapers their news columns stick to the facts as strictly as possible. In nations used to a free press, this would be a hard and subtle job; truth is the philosopher's lodestar, and no one can say what interpretation of even the simplest news story is actually the true one. In Japan such subtleties are not involved. The press used to be a medium not only of government propaganda but also of every sort of libel, character assassination, and special pleading. Improvement is easy because there is so much room for it.

Even more enthusiastic than the co-operation of the newspapers—whose owners and reporters welcome their opportunity to tell the

truth—has been the co-operation of radio and movies. Japanese radio used to be a semiofficial monopoly, supported not by advertising but by the fees of some five million set owners. Programs were 65 per cent speeches, all delivered in perfunctory style by politicians or announcers who had little incentive to be interesting. The monopoly is being broken down and Japan may soon have at least two competing networks. Meanwhile, program directors now come to C.I.&E.'s radio department for advice on how to use the medium along American lines.

Public opinion forums of the air, special programs for workmen audiences, straight entertainment and every other sort of novelty have been received by Japanese artists and audiences with almost alarming eagerness. Very shortly after the Radio Department was set up, 65 per cent of Japanese programs consisted not of speeches but of popular music, both Japanese and American. C.I.&E. suggested that this was perhaps too much of a good thing, but the latest trends in Japanese microphone manners are even more disturbing. These suggest that, along with the less dubious blessings of democracy, the Japanese are going to accept the

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honey-voiced radio announcer without those sensations of retching that so often accompany a quiet evening at the dials in the United States. Soap opera has already started and may soon excel the American model in sheer imbecility.

Standard Japanese art forms in the cinema used to be two: "modern" pictures with Japanese stars, which were poor to fair copies of Hollywood, and "classic" Japanese pictures, derived indirectly from the *No* or *Kabuki* forms of dramatic art in which the cast changed but the plot, so far as any existed, remained the same. Since the occupation, Japanese movies have forgone the classic almost entirely. They have also gone in for first-rate newsreels, and, most amazing of all, introduced those Hollywood staples—the bedroom and the kiss. The Japanese attitude toward public or even private kissing used to be somewhat analogous to the American attitude toward public defecation—to which, conversely, the Japanese have no objections whatsoever. Such innovations are strong medicine for native audiences but SCAP has not yet seen fit to import the oriental equivalent of the Hollywood Producers' Association, nor have the sedulous Japanese, oddly enough,

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as yet discovered the need for an equivalent of the Hays code or the Legion of Decency.

SCAP's C.I.&E. Section, even more than the Government Section, will have incalculable effects on the future life of the nation. However, whether or not one accepts the economic interpretation of history, it is clear that what becomes of Japan remains intrinsically an economic problem. Even more basic than either, then, may be the role of SCAP's Economic and Scientific Section, or E.S.S. The assignment of E.S.S. is a threefold one: to hold Japan's economy together during the period of the occupation; to reform it in such a way that it can find more incentive in peace than war; and to make sure the new economy will be workable enough to support the changes effected by the other sections. The best way to see how it does this may be to view its operations in some detail.

VI

Sokubei Mitsui, a Japanese Samurai, or freelance knight, in the days when Japanese society was run on pseudo-Arthurian lines, found himself financially embarrassed. For a feudal knight to go into trade was about as demeaning as it would have been for Sir Galahad to have taken the same step. Nonetheless, the Mitsui children were hungry and Mitsui took it, starting early in the Seventeenth Century with a Tokyo brewery and expanding with a pawn shop. Resolved at least to carry Samurai principles into his new endeavors, Sokubei Mitsui fed his children well and reared them in prosperous surroundings. His precepts were eventually codified in a will left by one of his sons, which provided for disposal of the business on hereditary lines and laid down the policies—combining a measure of *noblesse oblige* with a sharp eye for the main chance—on which it was to operate.

The Mitsui will was an effective instrument. The family obeyed it and prospered so much that by the latter part of the Eighteenth Cen-

tury it seemed wise to formalize it into a sort of family constitution. Under the terms of this constitution, Sokubei Mitsui's descendants prospered even more notably. Started at about the same time as the Rothschild dynasty in Europe, the Mitsuis far outstripped this celebrated clan. When Japan was opened up to world trade, they rode the crest of an even bigger wave and by 1935 controlled an estimated 15 per cent of Japanese banking, mining, steel, shipbuilding, and insurance business. One way to judge their holdings, which were quite beyond the scope of arithmetical computation, would be to imagine an amalgamation of Ford and Du Pont with the Maritime Commission, operating without restraint of antitrust laws or a corporate income tax. This, however, would be to underestimate the influence of the Mitsuis greatly.

When Sokubei Mitsui slipped from Samurai poverty into commercial prosperity, he set an example which was followed by others of his type. In the succeeding centuries, these other families played out a sort of tournament which, by the early thirties of the present century, had cut the field down to a total of some sixteen. Their companies—of which the top four were

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Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Yasuda, and Sumitomo, specializing respectively in industry, commerce, banking, and mining, so far as they limited their spheres at all—comprised what were called the *Zaibatsu*, meaning, roughly, family corporations. The *Zaibatsu* controlled the economy of Japan with a completeness, so far as their millions of employees were concerned, mitigated only by a paternal solicitude often lacking in less rigid and traditionalized corporate structures elsewhere. If the *Zaibatsu* did not actually run Japan itself, their co-operation was essential to any group that did; and when Japan's top military clique took control in the early thirties it did so by means of an alliance with the *Zaibatsu*, including naturally the Mitsuis.

Toward the end of 1946, a meeting of the Mitsui family and its retainers was held in their Tokyo directors' room. When the meeting was over, an aging executive named Tatsuo Sumi, whose hereditary post dated back to the Seventeenth Century, announced the sense of its findings: "There is nothing more to do...a glorious history has been wiped out."

The fall of the house of Mitsui was in line with SCAP's basic directive of November 6, 1945. The executor of this directive was Mr.

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James McInnes Henderson who, as head of the Economic and Scientific Section's Anti-Trust and Cartels division, was in charge of all such details Mr Henderson trained for his job as head of the West Coast offices of the Anti-Trust Division of the U S. Department of Justice Before that, he was a secretary to Senator Sheppard of Texas and had practiced law in St. Louis, Missouri Wiping out a four-hundred-year-old, two-billion-dollar company was for Henderson an entirely routine part of the day's work Operating from a minute one-room office on a salary of ten thousand dollars a year, his business was not to knock down one Zaibatsu but to bowl them all down like ninepins and see that no one set them up again

While in theory it is no concern of the United States whether Japan has trusts or monopolies, the occupation's purpose in pulverizing the Zaibatsu is obvious enough. Any such neat packaging of the country's economy is inherently expansionist, since the combines are too big for their domestic breeches. It is also capable of co-operating to serve, or even manage, a like-minded government A more diffuse industrial pattern, in which many smaller organizations will compete with each other for

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shares of a domestic market will, theoretically, find its incentive in peace instead of war and at the same time be beyond the reach of a war-minded government clique, if one were ever to develop.

Dealing with the Zaibatsu, either directly or through the Central Liaison Office, Henderson used a technique borrowed from American trust-busting routine. Zaibatsu holding companies, subsidiary and interlocking family directorships are dissolved. The subject companies are broken up into independent concerns, most of them run by existing management, in which average salaries are limited to three thousand yen (two hundred dollars) a month with a top of sixty-five thousand yen a year. Stock holdings are converted into government bonds and then frozen for ten years, to give the new managers time to get entrenched in their positions and resist any subsequent efforts of their former Zaibatsu overlords to buy their way back in. However, the extraordinary thing about Mr. Henderson's accomplishments is not his methods or his power. It is, on the contrary, precisely that neither the methods nor the power are unique at all.

Antitrust operations comprise only one of the

ten divisions of E.S.S.—which in a practical sense amounts to the core of the occupation. Set up under the administrative direction of an ex-anti-aircraft officer named Brigadier General Marquat, who makes no pretence of knowing any more about fiscal matters than the average professional soldier, E.S.S. consists of some three hundred officers and civilians who between them guide, supervise and effectively control Japan's economic life, including industry, commerce, labor, and finance. That Japan wants to turn over a new leaf can be established from the reactions to other SCAP sections; but whether she can will depend very largely on the results of the job performed by E.S.S. and the closely related and perhaps equally important National Resources Section which deals with agriculture, forestry, fishing, and mining.

Japan's economic problem can be stated simply. It is summed up in the fact that the nation contains seventy-three million people but only fifteen million acres of arable land. This makes Japan by far the world's most underprivileged state in the ratio of useful soil to population. The analogy usually employed to dramatize its deficiencies in this respect is to compare it with what California might be

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like if the latter had to support a comparable population; if Japan's national philosophy had not already included a mission to conquer the world, such a population pressure might have suggested the advisability of inventing one.

Whether a nation should encourage or permit a population larger than it can feed may be a permissible question. So far however, unlike mass extermination, birth control on a compulsory national or racial scale has never been employed or recommended even by an occupying power; and the examples of the recent past seem to show that, when left to their own devices, overpopulated nations try to make themselves even more overpopulated in the hope of becoming numerous enough to over-run their neighbors. In any case, short of restoring Japan to its 1850 population, which was about half the present one, the solution to the primary equation seems extremely hard to find. To be sure, the Japanese not only do not eat much but do not want to; also, they get a lot of their food out of the sea. Nonetheless, even with the most efficient diet imaginable, and the most improved methods of farming, they are still far from being self-sustaining. The best that can be figured out in the way of land

reclamation will not afford much more than a million additional acres at the outside. This will leave Japan under the necessity of importing at least fifteen per cent of the food it needs to live on. This food has to be paid for somehow, presumably in exports.

Japan's population problem makes it a little easier to see how its militarists were able to give considerable plausibility to their arguments for the desperate gamble to conquer East Asia and turn it into a *co-prosperity sphere*. Nonetheless, the loss of the Empire need not be quite as overwhelming as might at first appear, partly because, along with the loss of this asset, goes abolition of the army and navy which were required first to secure and then to service it. Assuming that the removal of the tax burden of these nonproductive agencies can be considered as canceling out at least in part the loss of Japan's colonies on the asset side, it should be possible for the nation to set up shop in the peacetime world on more or less the same economic footing that it had before. The chief difference will be that now Japan must depend entirely on the good-will of her customers for the trade balance which is absolutely essential to her existence. It would be absurd to suppose

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therefore that cupboard love is not a factor in Japanese enthusiasm for getting along with America, which is at once her best potential customer and the authority which will decide when and where she may acquire other customers. But it would be equally absurd and disadvantageous to discount the enthusiasm on this account. Under such conditions, cupboard love may be the most genuine kind. Furthermore, if the Japanese cannot find their way to self-support by trading with us, or with their neighbors, with our approval, we will have to foot the bill for the difference between what she can raise and what she must have. This, in effect, is what we have been doing since the occupation started and what we will have to continue until it ends.

Owing to the peculiar make-up of the Japanese economy, the nation's present dilemma presents itself in a reasonably convenient form. Japan's farmers, comprising about forty per cent of the population, not only keep enough food for themselves but, with the present shortages, manage to be unusually prosperous. Save for a lack of fertilizer, which E.S.S. is trying to supply, the farmers at present constitute no particularly urgent practical problem. The cur-

rent food crisis, in short, is at least confined to the cities, where it can be dealt with more readily. So far it has been handled in the main simply by distributing grains through Japanese ration boards. This has worked well enough not only to prevent mass starvation but to convey to the urban population a perhaps exaggerated conception of America's concern for their well-being.

Although Japan's farmers do not constitute an acute and immediate problem, they do, as the backbone of the nation, offer an exceedingly complex one in those phases of the job concerned with reforming the economy along workable lines for the future. Indeed, SCAP's much discussed land reform directive may prove to be, in the practical sense, the most striking of all its subluxations of the Japanese social structure. The purpose of SCAP's land reform program is to abolish absentee landlordism and to put Japan's agriculture, like everything else, on a more decentralized and individualistic footing. This would seem at first glance to be a fairly simple procedure; but in fact, owing to typical Japanese peculiarities, it encounters major difficulties of two sorts. One is that the very conception of property and owner-

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ship in Japan is quite different from that which obtains in Occidental countries. The second is that land property rights especially are affected not only by an elaborate system of loyalties, inheritances, and verbal obligations which often go back for centuries and have more than the force of law, but also by certain simple geographical or topographical considerations which would make ownership of land much harder to define than it is in the United States, even if the concepts of ownership were identical.

The National Resources Section, for example, is confronted by the fact that, to a considerable degree, both farm labor and farm ownership in Japan are arranged more or less along socialistic, not to say communistic, lines. Villagers help each other to cultivate their fields. Because rice cultivation requires lots of water and because the Japanese water supply is limited, these fields are of value only if there are agreements on the use of water for irrigation. Thus, it does a farmer no good at all to own a rice paddy if a neighbor upstream can cut off his water supply. All the efforts of either SCAP or the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture are not likely to alter the complex and enduring

verbal contracts set up during the centuries to adjust the equities in such matters.

Farmers in Japan, as elsewhere, are by nature less fundamentally dependent on developments in the world outside their farms, less responsive to them and more inclined to conservatism, even if not in the matter of property, then for what may be called reasons of mere temperament. SCAP's land reform directives have been well received by the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture and even by the farmers themselves, considering these factors. Their eventual significance, however, cannot be determined until the years have shown the sincerity with which regulations breaking up the old feudal patterns and conferring individual landrights are actually carried out. This is true even more than of SCAP's efforts in some other directions, and in proportion to their potential effect. Meanwhile, a more crucial and more spectacular transformation—because its results are both more immediate and more readily discernible—is that which is occurring in the ranks of Japanese labor, owing primarily to the efforts of the E.S.S. Labor division.

Before the war, almost all of the seven million workers in Japanese industry belonged to

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a sort of nationalized company union patterned, more coincidentally than otherwise, on the Nazi Labor Front. This was dissolved immediately after the surrender. Since then, over five million, three hundred thousand workers have enrolled themselves in what, although their methods seem exceedingly strange, must be considered genuine unions of one sort or another. These now attempt to bargain collectively with bosses who, in turn, are no longer the old-line monopolists but comparatively new and therefore inexperienced entrepreneurs. Despite the rather weird consequences of this situation, the Japanese labor movement affords evidence even in its nomenclature that the Nipponese flair for imitation is so deeply ingrained as to be ineradicable. The labor movement is split up into a Japanese Federation of Labor, with one million members, and a National Congress of Industrial Unions with a membership of one million, six hundred thousand, each run along lines somewhat analogous to its American namesake.

In copying the pattern of American labor, the Japanese did not at once catch on to its purposes or methods. Thus when Japanese railroad workers struck last year, instead of walk-

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ing off the trains, as the Brotherhood of Railroad Workers had just been threatening to do, the Japanese walked on to the trains and stayed on. This was perhaps in the tradition of the American sit-down strike but the Japanese introduced a new and characteristic variation. This was to keep the trains running, to run more of them, and to run them more punctually than the management had been able to do previously. In addition, they stepped up maintenance standards and held all revenue in escrow. All this, during a severe transport shortage, was intended to impress the public with the justice of their demand for higher wages; and management hastily acceded to their request for a modest raise. In a later local strike, railroad workers won another victory by tooting whistles on all trains for a full minute in a simultaneous squeal. No less peculiar than the technique of the unions is the reaction of employers. One boss, for example, stubbornly refused to grant a wage increase requested by his workmen on the ground that to do so would deprive them of their right to have a strike. Another wanted to join the same union as his workmen and could not see why this was impractical.

The salient fact about the Japanese labor

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movement, however, is neither the rapidity of its development nor the eccentricity of its technique. It is rather that its real boss is not the head of either of its major union groups but rather the minute twenty-nine-year-old American named Theodore Cohen who in 1947 held the post of Chief of E.S.S.'s Labor Division. Japanese labor chiefs and the Japanese Government may propose, but Mr. Cohen, an ex-scrubteam New Dealer who used to teach history at New York's City College where he took a B.S. in 1938, disposed. Combining in his small frame the powers of Lewis Schwellenbach, William Green and the NLRB, he functioned with one assistant in a room just big enough to hold his own small person and a battered guest chair, which the bigwigs of Japanese industry often occupied while expressing sentiments of respectful or enthusiastic concurrence. Like Henderson of the Anti-Trust Division, Cohen is important not because he is unique but because he is only one of a group of similar E.S.S. chieftains whose merest whims have, for obvious reasons, the force of Acts of Congress approved by the Supreme Court.

Japan's present inflation, so far as can be de-

terminated from the somewhat erratic Japanese statistics, has run living costs up to seven times last year's and forty times the average of 1936. Japan's OPA chief is a twenty-eight-year-old Minnesotan named Willard Egekvist. Qualified by a Harvard Ph.D. in Business Administration and two years as an Army efficiency expert, Egekvist, as head of E.S.S.'s Price Control and Rationing Division, is in effect the court of last appeal on rations and prices of everything from bamboo shoots to bicycles. All Japanese industry is supervised by Joseph Z. Reday, like Mr. Cohen a Washington product, whose current influence in Japan makes that of all the Zaibatsu put together inconspicuous.

To say that one of the limitations on SCAP's accomplishments is the liaison between its various section chiefs is no figure of speech. In view of their varying objectives and their enormous powers, head-on clashes, overlapping assignments and divergences of policy are naturally everyday occurrences. This is especially likely to be true within E.S.S. where, for example, while Mr. Reday is trying to hold a disintegrating national industry together, Mr. Henderson is pulling its financial structure apart and trying to install a new managerial class, whose

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members are in turn the natural adversaries of the labor movement which Mr. Cohen is trying mightily to encourage. Even more common than confusion of purpose between divisions within a single section are divergences between two or more sections, like the one which occurred when the Labor Division of E.S.S. supported Japanese Newspaper Guild members in a strike against the management of the paper *Yomuri Shimbun* on the issue of whether workers or management should determine policy. C.I.&E., which has its own reasons for wanting to know with whom to discuss policy in matters of the press, supported management in this case, and won its point in the settlement handed down by the Japanese Labor Relations Board.

In such cases again the economy of means which is SCAP's distinguishing feature proves to be an almost indispensable functional asset. Because the whole of SCAP is concentrated within a few blocks and much of it under the single roof of the Dai Ichi Building, it is no trick at all for division chiefs to keep in touch with each other. In fact, they have difficulty doing anything else and if they don't meet in the snack bar on the seventh floor they are almost sure to see each other in the Imperial

lobby before dinner, or on the improvised roof garden of the Dai Iti Hotel where a Japanese band plays every evening, and the waitresses serve a Tokyo Scotch called *Suntori* with *ice-u* and either Coke or water.

As to the technical or professional competence of individual members of SCAP, generalizations are difficult. Americans who were unimpressed by the kind of personnel attracted to Washington during and just before the war might not find the Tokyo team much more impressive. There is little incentive for top-notch American experts in any field to exile themselves for a year or more in jobs which offer little in prestige or pay. Moreover, big domestic reputations are not required as a means of impressing the Japanese, who would be unaware of them anyway, and they might even be a detriment, in that virtuosi are rarely inclined to be tractable and adaptable. The young men in SCAP, mostly hired by the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department, at a time when reconversion made even good jobs in Washington hard to fill, are in fact a middle-of-the-barrel cross section of American administrative talent.

Many of its members are certainly naive,

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erratic or overconfident. Nonetheless, trying to make new reputations rather than to preserve old ones, freed from many of the complications of government at home, and given large but well-defined areas of responsibility, they are doing an earnest, honest and creditable job, which is, among other things, an extremely encouraging commentary on the calibre of American executive talent in general.

The only way to get a real idea of the size and variety of this job—which varies from the importing of food to eradicating bushido, from freeing Japan's tenant farmers to locking up ex-militarists—is to pore through the several-hundred-page volume of directives issued to date. Even this would give no indication of SCAP's program for the future. What may eventually become the biggest SCAP section, for example, has barely started to function. This is the Reparations Section, whose job is to supervise the distribution of reparations and the return of looted property when the FEC has made up its mind as to how, when and where this complex readjustment should be handled.

Reparations will presumably take the form of machinery and capital goods, and will be

payable mainly to China, Korea, and the Philippines and, conceivably, the U.S.S.R. (which has dismantled Manchuria already but still wants more). Even if the U.S. wanted some share of these, there is practically nothing in Japan which it could use; and it seems likely that its claims will be waived, thereby enabling it to act more effectively as a distributing agent and referee among the other claimants. Meanwhile, occupation costs are at present running to about six hundred million dollars per year. Theoretically, the Japanese government will pay for these; but with a public debt of 279 billion yen currently mounting at the rate of 75 billion yen per year, it seems doubtful whether it can ever manage to do so. Here again, the economy of means of the occupation is of considerable interest to the U.S. taxpayer, who will have to foot the bill for Japan's conversion. Considering that its net effect may be the priceless advantage of a semi-dependency, and certainly an advantageously situated ally off the coast of Asia, this bill, owing to the conduct of the enterprise as a whole, may be an extremely moderate one.

The economy of means which characterizes the occupation is, no doubt, primarily attribut-

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able to the Japanese response to it; but here it may be time to reflect that this response might easily have been misused. That it was not is due primarily to the Commander in Chief who, although he was not basically responsible for the Japanese attitude, deserves full credit for diagnosing it correctly and exploiting it to the utmost.

VII

One of the more acute embarrassments in the present global eminence of the United States is its shortage of foreign emissaries who can be relied upon not to make fools of themselves through their ignorance about the subjects on which they are supposed to be experts. Since we have not heretofore needed to make a specialty of international relations, our lack of talent in this field need occasion neither wonderment nor shame. Since the country in which the U.S. has its major postwar stake is in many ways the most mysterious of all, the United States is doubly fortunate in having, as its occupation leader there, a Commander in Chief whose whole previous training was calculated to make him an expert on this abstruse and difficult subject, and one whose character matched his training.

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur has done a remarkably good job in Japan. In view of the objective circumstances and his own personal background, it would have been

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even more remarkable if he had done otherwise. Extraordinary as the Japanese response to the occupation has been, even more extraordinary is MacArthur's peculiar fitness for utilizing this response. The peculiarities of his training and character are such that, if America had not conquered Japan and put him in charge of the occupation, both would have been, if not actually wasted, at least profoundly unfulfilled. Providence seems, in fact, to have had him in mind for his present function since about the time Perry sailed into Tokyo Bay.

To go back as far as Perry's arrival in Tokyo Bay may be stretching a point. In reality, it was several years after this event that MacArthur's father ran away from home to fight in the Civil War. While this determined the elder MacArthur's later decision to remain a soldier, which in turn accounted in some degree for his son's choice of the same career, Douglas MacArthur's firsthand acquaintance with the Japanese was delayed until 1905 when he was sent as an observer to the Russo-Japanese War. After graduation from West Point two years before, MacArthur had joined his father, by this time a general, to help him squelch a rebellion in the Philippines. When the Russo-Japanese war

broke out, and Theodore Roosevelt was wondering who to send as observers, the War Department gave him a memorandum saying "The two best qualified men are the MacArthurs." Douglas MacArthur's qualifications as a Far Eastern expert in general and a Japanese occupation commander in particular have been increasing ever since.

After the Russo-Japanese War, during which they got a good look at the Japanese army in action, the two MacArthurs made a tour of the Far East, which included Siam, Java, Malaya, India and Ceylon. In the years thereafter, the younger one worked up to the rank of brigadier general and compiled the brilliant World War I record which brought him immediately afterward the appointment at West Point; he was the youngest Superintendent in the history of West Point, where his graduating marks had set a record sixteen years before. MacArthur left the Point in 1922 to go back to the Philippines.

Geographically, economically and racially, the Philippines supply the world's closest equivalent to a small-scale working model of Japan. While America had never conducted a major occupation of a conquered country until after World War II, it did, from the Spanish-Ameri-

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can war until shortly before World War II, conduct in the Philippines an occupation of a liberated one; an operation which was a model, in both senses of the word. MacArthur's specialization in the Philippines, already begun under his father, continued with two tours of duty there before his return as the youngest chief of staff in American history, under Hoover. It was climaxed when he went back again in 1935 as military adviser to the Commonwealth Government and later stayed on at the invitation of Manuel Quezon, as Field Marshal of the Philippine Army. He held this unique post, which afforded him an unparalleled opportunity to study the Philippine occupation from both sides, until Franklin Roosevelt made him head of all U.S. forces in the Far East a few months before Pearl Harbor.

If the post of Commander in Chief of the Occupation had been open at the time of Pearl Harbor, MacArthur would already have been well qualified to hold it. As it was, the war which was a prerequisite for establishing a vacancy in this position enabled him to improve his qualifications in two respects. He was enabled to get a postgraduate course in Japanese behavior seen at close range and from a fresh

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viewpoint. And the Japanese, heretofore as unprepared to be governed by MacArthur as he was prepared to govern them, were enabled to correct their deficiency. During the war, MacArthur was the only U.S. commander the Japanese heard of but they heard lots about him every day, in his celebrated communiqués. In consequence and in view of the great Japanese regard for authority, by the time the war ended MacArthur would have been the only conceivable choice for occupation commander, even if his sole preparation for the job had been the conduct of the war—which was, in fact, merely its last phase.

MacArthur's conduct of the Pacific War was notable for the accomplishment of great ends with little means. The general defended Australia, a country as big as the U.S. with an army barely big enough for a good St. Patrick's Day parade. He did this by using the army to attack the Japanese in New Guinea, which was the start of what later proved to be, geographically speaking, the longest campaign in military history, since it rolled the prodigious Japanese offensive far back beyond its starting point. In view of the neatness and dispatch which has characterized all MacArthur's military achieve-

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ments, the economy of means which characterizes the occupation ceases to be astonishing. It is a sort of signature which the general attaches to all his activities. MacArthur likes small, compact organizations, in which responsibility is clearly defined and vested in the minimum number of top executives. He organized and runs SCAP with the least possible fuss and bother, just as, from all accounts, he ran West Point and the Philippines, and just as he conducted his campaigns in the South Pacific.

In view of MacArthur's qualifications, the way he has handled the occupation is probably less noteworthy than that he has been allowed to handle it with so little interference. This is partly a result of past circumstances. The general was Superintendent of West Point at a time when many of the senior officers in World War II were undergraduates, and U.S. Chief of Staff at a time when men like Marshall and Eisenhower were junior officers. Now, at sixty-seven, while not greatly senior in age to these dignitaries, he is vastly senior to them in possession of high rank and thus enjoys a specially privileged position vis-à-vis the War Department.

Even if he were not entitled by his qualifica-

tions and position to run Japan more or less as he sees fit, it would be hard to prevent him from doing so. Tokyo is half the world away from Washington and running an occupation demands policy decisions quickly and on the spot. MacArthur's autonomy in Tokyo is in part due to this situation. It is due also to the fact that MacArthur himself is an authoritative individual brought up in a school which regards responsibility more as an obligation than a misdemeanor; and one who has fully justified his own faith in his own abilities in this direction.

The authoritative aspects of MacArthur's character, which may have predisposed him to the Orient and which have certainly been emphasized by his long sojourn there, have helped make him an even more controversial figure in his own country than he would have been anyway in view of the brilliance of his career and the rapidity of his rise in a profession which places high premiums on seniority. Ever since the celebrated episode of the Bonus March in 1932, when MacArthur as Chief of Staff was obliged, under orders, to use tear-gas on a mob in Washington, the general has been *persona non grata* among U.S. Leftists, liberals

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and fellow-travelers. Nothing that happened during the war tended to enhance their esteem for him, when his front rivaled the European one that appealed so much more deeply to the left-wing elements. In addition, for complex reasons of interservice rivalry, MacArthur incurred the dislike of a good many Navy men. Finally, even now, the exaggerated admiration entertained for the general as a potential political figure by the McCormick press is a source of embarrassment to the general, as it ensures a certain degree of suspicion, if not actual hostility, from other and more influential quarters.

The very qualities which have helped make MacArthur a controversial figure in his native land, which he has now not seen since 1935, are precisely those which complete his qualifications for his present duty in the country he and his forces have conquered. Some Japanese may not like the occupation and all Japanese have some faults to find with it; but no Japanese at all has anything but good to say of the general. The mannerisms of dress, speech and bearing which to an American may seem to betray in MacArthur traces of unbecoming egotism or flamboyance, are measured by a different standard in Japan. There, they seem

to be a bare but appropriate minimum of front required by his position. When a sketchy biography of MacArthur in Japanese came out in 1946, the book sold a million copies in record time. If MacArthur came home and ran for president of the United States in 1948 (which he has no intention of doing), he might have a hard time getting nominated, let alone elected. But if America sees Caesar in MacArthur, Japan sees Abraham Lincoln; and if he stayed in Tokyo and ran for Shogun (which he has no intention of doing either), he could win in a walk.

Running the occupation is theoretically a two-sided enterprise which consists of issuing orders to SCAP and Far Eastern Command in his capacity as dual Commander in Chief of both, and of obeying the orders issued to him by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on behalf of the FEC. In practice, like a good editor who avoids pencil work on manuscripts by careful selection of writer and subject beforehand, MacArthur is able to keep manual effort on these assignments down to an efficient minimum. Except for the rabble which waits outside the door of the Dai Ichi every day to watch him drive off to the Embassy for lunch, and those whom he passes en

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route, the general sees no Japanese at all except, at rare intervals, the Emperor or the Prime Minister. This is a part of a fixed policy of establishing a gulf between himself and the Japanese and is one of the things which MacArthur, out of his long familiarity with Oriental psychology, did more or less as a matter of course. However, in addition to serving the primary purpose of giving the Japanese proper respect for the occupation as a whole, it also serves the secondary purpose of keeping him free of commotions which might otherwise complicate his administration, as they apparently complicate the administration of the American zone in Germany.

As to his own organization, this too has been trimly built. Except for major policy directives, which may originate either with section or division heads, with MacArthur or in Washington, it more or less runs itself. Critics who have commented adversely on the suitability of placing an anti-aircraft officer like General Marquat in charge of the Economic and Scientific Section, or making an ex-Manila lawyer, like General Whitney, responsible for the reorganization of the whole Japanese political structure, have a plausible argument but one

which misses the point of MacArthur's organization plan. The sections are run by non-professionals whose qualifications are not their specialized knowledge of their fields but rather their knowledge of the general's plans and policies. Under them, the specialists who run the divisions can thus enjoy a greater measure of individual responsibility and more incentive to run their own shows than they would under specialized civilian executives. As military supervisors of what are primarily civilian agencies, the section chiefs occupy positions comparable to those of the civilian secretaries of the armed services in Washington.

MacArthur's relations with the Far Eastern Commission started out a little uneasily. Some members of the State Department, even when the occupation started, were not entirely reconciled to the plain common sense of keeping the Emperor and the framework of the existing Japanese government. The divisions of opinion in Washington were climaxed by a startling statement from Dean Acheson in 1946, to the effect that MacArthur was in Japan to execute policy, not to make it. For a soldier not always noted for patience and forbearance, MacArthur has taken a remarkably diplomatic and accom-

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modating point of view of FEC's advices, with the result that their relations have grown increasingly smooth and he has had an increasingly free hand.

The absence of a Russian zone in Japan, or of Russian influence in the administration, is responsible for a good deal of the ease and dispatch with which, compared to its German counterpart, the organization runs. But here too MacArthur deserves a share of the credit. Had the Russians been allowed in Germany on the terms laid down for them in Japan, they might have been a good deal less troublesome there. MacArthur was at least to some degree, directly or otherwise, responsible for the fact that Russia's sole official representation in Japan now consists of the mission headed by General Kuzma Derevyanko, as delegate to the Allied Council which meets in Tokyo twice a month.

Not to be confused with the FEC in Washington, the Allied Council, which also includes representatives from the British Commonwealth, China and the U.S., is a purely advisory body whose function is to review and comment on the occupation's deeds and policies. In fact, its sessions in the Meiji Building, a few blocks

down the street from the Dai Ichi, resolved themselves into a monotonous exchange of barbed amenities between General Derevyanko and the late George Atcheson, Jr., a less snappish and considerably more coherent ambassadorial representative.

Sitting across the Council's table from the latter, the Soviet General—who looks like an ex-halfback from Carnegie Tech, wears crimson shoulder-boards as big as shingles and puffs a six-inch Russian cigarette with a sneering expression—accused his chosen adversary of everything from fascism to dilettantism and brought a new grievance to every meeting. Mr. Atcheson, aware that General MacArthur has felt able to ignore the Council's findings as well as the meetings themselves since he addressed the first one last spring, usually replied mildly, in words to the effect that his colleague's views would prove very helpful and that he was most grateful to have had the chance to hear about them.

In actuality, of course, Derevyanko has a good many irons in the fire besides his appearance at the Allied Council meetings; and he sounds off there not for MacArthur's benefit but for that of the Japanese press. Since the

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comments of the general are in fact often irrelevant, to say the least, MacArthur has had no reluctance whatever about having them reported where, as communist propaganda, they may be expected to backfire most effectively. Furthermore, the reports of squabbles in the Council are to some degree actually helpful, since they tend to combat the curious impression, quite general in Japan when the occupation started, that MacArthur himself was a communist and that he wanted Japan to follow the Kremlin line.

This was a characteristic Japanese over-response to MacArthur's action in releasing political prisoners from Tokyo jails, of whom the majority were indeed communists. Later developments have convinced the Japanese public that MacArthur's gold braid is not actually in hammer-and-sickle motif; and that this gesture was just part of the general inconsistency of democratic behavior. The prestige of the party line has fallen off accordingly.

In prewar Manila, the MacArthurs lived in an elaborate penthouse on top of the Manila Hotel. Like his job, MacArthur's present life is more or less an extension of the Philippine model. In Tokyo, he and Mrs. MacArthur oc-

cupy the residence of the American Embassy, a group of Neo-Georgian buildings which, almost alone in their district on the outskirts of the city, escaped bombs and conflagration. The daily schedule of the general's life, the result of a lifetime spent largely in the tropics, follows a set routine. He gets up around eight and spends an hour or so after breakfast playing with his son Arthur who, now nine years old, is being educated by a tutor. About ten A.M. the general arrives at the Dai Ichi building where he stays till one-thirty or two. After lunch and a siesta at home, he gets back to the office about four and usually stays until eight or nine in the evening.

Of the top generals who were on MacArthur's staff through the war, several, including Sutherland, his chief of staff, and Bonner Fellers, the general secretary to the Allied Council, have gone home as part of the general thinning out and cutting down of personnel throughout the theater. Most of those who remain, like Generals Marquat, Whitney, and Charles Willoughby, his intelligence chief, are holdovers from prewar days in Manila. Inured to the general's somewhat unconventional hours, they integrate these as best they can

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with the more conventional ones kept by their own subordinates.

Like the occupation as a whole, MacArthur's dual headquarters for SCAP and Far East Command are skeletal organizations. They run with a minimum of confusion and a smooth serenity which increases as one nears the top of the organization chart. This serenity reaches its maximum intensity in the large, well-upholstered, air-conditioned room on the Dai Ichi Building's sixth floor, in which, behind a wide and scrupulously tidy desk, MacArthur manages the whole enterprise. Thinner now than he was in the days of the New Guinea campaign, but still inclined to energetic gestures and paces of the floor, MacArthur enjoys receiving occasional visitors, either members of the resident press or touring V.I.P.'s. Using the rather grandiloquent, oratorical style which has always characterized his usually somewhat one-sided conversations, he enjoys telling them off the record what he thinks of the occupation so far and what he expects of it. MacArthur feels that the Japanese are sincerely eager to replace the vacuum left by their previous militarism with a wholesome and practicable form of democracy. He thinks that Americans are capable of giving them this

and that the Japanese are capable of absorbing it. He considers the most serious threat to the program to be the challenge of communism, both ideological and strategical, and is all the more aware on this account of the profound urgency of his present assignment, which he sees as the fitting climax to a career of warfare. "It is Mars's last gift to an old warrior," says the general, shaking the box of matches with which from time to time he relights his pipe, for emphasis.

In a conversation of this sort, MacArthur's almost elocutionary metaphors and the nervous gestures with which he accompanies his words are often regarded as part of a process of self-dramatization. Actually they betoken the efforts of an intense penetrating and earnest mind, more used to expressing itself in action than in words, to state a sentiment which it is difficult to phrase. The sentiment is one of deep and genuine community of purpose between himself and destiny. In the U.S. this feeling might seem presumptuous, but in Tokyo it acquires a kind of truth from its context. The planets, Mars included, seem closer in the clear Pacific sky; and the rattle of MacArthur's matchbox becomes there a sound symbolic of

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the place and time, like the clatter of jeeps on the nameless streets, the scuffle of wooden soles on their rough stones, and the tinkle of Tokyo's new songs behind their walls and paper windows.

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PART II

The Japanese

▪

VIII

Japanese reaction to the eventual peace is not, like Japanese reaction to the stimulus of the occupation, a simple response which can be observed and diagnosed. Rather it is a whole series of problematical responses to non-existing and unpredictable stimuli. It involves Japanese character; this is a subject which, unlike the Japanese mood of the moment, remains something of a mystery.

The Japanese are possibly, for a European, the most *different* people on earth. What are, specifically, some of the differences, superficial or otherwise?

The Japanese may be a mysterious race to the rest of the world but they have few mysteries from each other. In Japanese families, except unusually rich ones, father, mother, and children may all inhabit the same room. Moreover, they all inhabit it all the time, since it is the only room they have; and since the room has only the thinnest walls of paper or the

flimsiest wood, not only the inhabitants but also the neighbors and the passers-by have a fairly clear notion of what is going on inside it.

Under these conditions it should be relatively easy to get at the facts about the Japanese and make them clear to everyone. Perhaps it would be, were it not that in trying to describe even so simple a thing as a Japanese room, there arises the familiar difficulty that words in the language of one country rarely correspond precisely to objects in another. The very concept of a room in Japan differs considerably from the western concept. To the western mind, *room* may suggest part of a house, not the whole house. In western countries, the room is a container for the furniture on which people sit, recline or put things. In Japan, it contains, often enough, practically nothing; its floor is the furniture. In the west, a room implies shelter against the elements and privacy within the house. In Japan, it is hard to tell where the room ends and the outdoors begins. Its walls of paper or thin wood which slide back and forth are functionally quite different from western walls of solid masonry or plaster.

When one says that the Japanese sit on the

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floor of their room, the westerner gets a completely erroneous picture if he thinks of himself squatting laboriously in tight clothes on a dusty carpet. The Japanese wear clothes adapted for such postures; and the floor is not a carpet but a soft, shiny mat which is both clean and comfortable. It is clean because the Japanese would as soon wear shoes in the house as a westerner would wear them in bed. Indeed, in one sense, the room *is* a bed, for the Japanese sleep on the floor, with nothing more in the way of mattress or springs than a couple of quilts spread out under them. This may be a little bit misleading also; for in addition to sleeping in the room, its inhabitants use it as a kitchen, cooking such food as needs to be cooked over a tiny pot of charcoal in the middle of the floor; as a parlor and banquet hall, when they sit around on the floor to dine or chat with each other; and as a warehouse, since the family's possessions are stored in one or two recesses behind the thin and slippery panels of the walls. So it may be as well to stick to the word *room*, divorcing it as far as possible from any connotations beyond that of an enclosure of some sort in which people spend part of their time.

To begin with then, what does this Japanese room look like? The best way may be to go into one and look around.

First one leaves one's shoes at the door—but here more explanations are already in order. In Japan, shoes are not leather things which in the case of men lace up the front or in the case of women have high heels. They are in all cases a species of wooden sandals called *geta*, designed especially for Japanese conditions, including the condition of slipping them off easily. These sandals are not flat boards; the sole of each has two ridges that run across, one under the ball of the foot and one under the heel. These ridges keep the wearer's foot out of shallow puddles and make the *geta* more manageable than an ordinary flat clog. The *geta* is held on by a wishbone-shaped cord which, sprouting between the big toe and the toe next to it, branches back across the top of the foot and is attached to the sole on either side of the instep. The attachment consists of knots in the cord beneath the sole. In addition to keeping the feet dry, the ridges in the sole prevent this knot from touching the ground and thus from being worn out. Japanese may wear such shoes on bare feet or over a sort of

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sock, which is really a footmitten¹, with a separate compartment for the big toe, so as to provide the necessary gap for the geta cord between this member and its nearest neighbor.

Having slipped off his geta, the visitor leaves them on a flat rock conveniently placed under an overhanging eave so that they will remain dry in case it is raining. The door then opens, not by swinging back on hinges, since it has none, but by sliding to one side, and the visitor steps up onto what we must call the floor of the room. The mats of which this floor is made are called *tatami*. They come in one size only (roughly one yard by two yards and a half by two inches), so that rooms are described as being so many tatami in size. More like hard mattresses than mats in the western sense, these tatami are set into the framework of the house but not fixed there by any more than gravity, so that they can be lifted out if need arises.

To the westerner, the first impression conveyed by the appearance of the room is that he has accidentally stepped into a three-dimensional painting by the specialist in rectilinear drawing, Piet Mondrian. This may be because the absence not only of furniture but also of draperies, knickknacks, or even a fireplace or a

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stove suggests that the thing cannot be adapted for living and must serve some more abstract purpose, such as that of mere decoration. He becomes more acutely conscious of its decorative value than he would be in even the most diligently decorated western room which, to the very degree that the many objects in it have been consciously arranged, calls attention to the objects and to their utilitarian purposes.

The room is never a bare rectangle. On the contrary its proportions have a delicate asymmetry which is one of the standard ways that most Japanese objects, for all their extreme simplicity, avoid standardization. Moreover, each wall space is broken by the carefully composed lines of screens and doorways; and by the recess in which is placed the only object of pure decor. This object is often a scroll, unframed and made of paper, with a print of one of the conventional subjects which appeal to the Japanese: geishas with fans; a friendly, graceful tiger; or Fujiyama, glittering among its clouds.

The room contains some sort of plant or flower. This plant is in itself of the most delectable shape and color; and it is so placed as to emphasize adroitly the composition of the

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walls and doorways, and its own irregularity. The room is also likely to contain one irregular curved line somewhere; this will be the post of a doorway or the side of the scroll recess, made of a young tree trunk in its natural shape; it will be carefully insinuated, to accentuate by contrast the straightness of the other lines which might otherwise seem accidental.

The walls of the room, where they front on the outdoors, are merely screens, which can slide back to make the whole indoors part of the garden outside. This garden is as carefully organized as the interior into a composition of earth and rocks, tree trunks and water. The walls inside the room are of wood, unpainted but polished to a washed, not waxy, smoothness. The colors of the wood, and the paper screens, and the light tan mats make a subtle harmony, as muted as the notes of a geisha song, and as artful as the combination of lines, and fractions of lines, which divide them.

The delicacy of the Japanese room, which all Japanese take for granted, can best be appreciated by looking at a Japanese room in western style such as one may find in the house of any rich Japanese who can afford one. This room is, almost invariably, a monstrosity of bad

taste. Its most noticeable feature is that it is packed with so much machine-tooled furniture and bric-a-brac that it looks like the interior of a warehouse. A huge factory-made table stands in the middle, covered with several layers of embroidered table cloths, surmounted by doilies, dishes, ashtrays and bronze dust-collectors. Around this are placed overstuffed chairs, arm to arm. Squeezed behind the chairs, around the wall of the room, are great chests, more tables, and, if possible, some radios and phonographs. Occupants edge themselves to a table seat like travelers in a crowded Pullman diner. They then find themselves confronted by walls which are plastered with a *mélange* of snapshots, lithographs, old-school oil paintings and any other relics that can be affixed thereto. In the interstices of this horrid *mélange* may be discerned a hideous wall-paper, notable chiefly for the way in which its bright colors clash with those of the imitation Brussels carpet.

To the uninitiated eye, all this may suggest that the Japanese lack taste; or that their noteworthy adaptive faculties are strangely deficient in the matter of household furnishing. The true explanation is much simpler. To the Japa-

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nese, a western room presents itself merely as a tasteless interior cluttered up with different objects. Hence, when the Japanese householder sets out to make a western home, he naturally supposes that the more cluttered and tasteless he can make it, the more authentic it will be. He goes the whole way in this direction.

So much, then, for the Japanese room. Now, what about the people who live in it? The westerner, as he looks about, notices on every side all sorts of things that strike him as small eccentricities of behavior. Pleasing or distasteful, meaningful or otherwise, they add up to a general picture of the way Japanese act. They constitute clues to the riddle of how Japanese think and feel; and they supply the evidence on the basis of which it may be possible to form some notion of that elusive abstraction called The Japanese Character.

Japanese infants, who are considered to be one year old at birth, lead a lordly existence. Happy and serene, their word seems to be the law. They are rarely contradicted and scarcely know how to cry.

Older Japanese children have a harder time of it, but not much. Mothers are always bossed

by their sons and sometimes by their daughters. According to Japanese theory, the best times of life are infancy and old age; life in Japan conforms to this theory.

The Japanese language is a mysterious code, which often seems to be designed less for telling things than for keeping secrets. About half the words in an ordinary Japanese conversation are participles designed to make sure that the respondent is listening.

Japanese women speak one language, men another, poor people a third, and so on. When speaking in anger, Japanese use a different language from that appropriate for good humor. Hissing by sucking breath in through the teeth is an elegant mannerism to show extreme approval.

Quarrels among Japanese individuals are extremely rare. Japanese get along well with each other. Theft—until recently—was almost an unknown vice among the Japanese. Savagery among them occurs only in unusual circumstances when normal restraints are removed. The Japanese are obedient, docile, and mentally acquisitive.

The Japanese are intensely industrious. All of them expect to work all their lives and do so

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cheerfully, unless unsettled in their minds by doubts imported from elsewhere. The incentive for their work is not so much money as approval from their fellows.

The social structure in Japan is a wide-based pyramid, surmounted by a steeple. At the top of the latter are the rich, but very few of them. At the bottom of the pyramid are the farmers, workmen, and small businessmen, of whom the population is composed almost exclusively. All these regard themselves as more or less equals and do not struggle much to rise above their station.

In Japanese villages, the main street on which most of the houses front is a sort of communal parlor. Here citizens gather to chat, stroll and sun themselves, as well as to shop, conduct business and get from one place to another. Roads in Japan were not designed for automotive traffic, and have not been brought up to date.

The Japanese, like the British, pass each other on the wrong side. Japan, unlike England, is at least consistent in that locks and door-knobs turn the wrong way also. When calling someone, the Japanese wave him away.

Religion in Japan is a matter of confusion.

Although they have innumerable gods, the Japanese do not pay much attention to them. Buddhism is more a philosophy than a form of worship. Shinto is a word that confuses the Japanese as much as it confuses westerners. Japanese shrines are beauty spots, enhanced by superstition. They are not religious in the western sense.

The idea that the Emperor is divine is, of course, a myth but not such an absurd one as the myth that the Japanese really believe in it, a fallacy that springs from an error in translation. Since the Japanese have no conception of divinity, they have no word for this condition. The Japanese word for which *divine* has been used as an English equivalent means merely *noble* or *heroic*. The Emperor gets the same worship that in the U.S. goes to George Washington or to the Supreme Court. To the Japanese he is perhaps divine more in the Colony Restaurant, than in the Scriptural, sense.

Relations between the sexes in Japan, like other human contacts, are conducted amicably. Marriage, arranged by parents and go-betweens, and conducted on a functional basis, is most usually successful. Love—which, after all, is the result of sexual repressions—occurs

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less frequently in Japan than in most Occidental countries. As elsewhere, it is frequently unhappy.

The Japanese like to have names for everything. People have several names, suffixed usually by the polite syllable *san* which means slightly more than Mrs., Miss or Mister. Seasons, houses, districts, and even almost every day in the year all have their special names also. The Japanese feel that to name a whole street whose blocks and houses are already titled would be superfluous. Tokyo's main street, like most others in Japan, remains anonymous.

Except in large cities, the Japanese wear loin cloths for work and kimonos for leisure. In the winter, Japanese women sew up the sleeves and skirts of their kimonos to keep the wind out.

Elegant in native dress, Japanese usually look shabby in either skirts or trousers. When wearing the latter, Japanese men have a hard time with their buttons.

Kimonos are made of the finest silk and speak a language of their own, by means of color and pattern. Young girls wear bright kimonos and bright sashes. As they grow older,

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the kimonos become subdued according to a definite program. This program includes the months of the year, each of which calls for a pattern of cherry blossoms, snow, maple leaves, cormorant fishing or some other seasonal specialty.

Japanese men as well as women have impedimenta to carry around with them. For this purpose they use, not brief cases or portman-teaus, but squares of silk with the four corners knotted crosswise to make a sort of bundle.

Japanese eat most fish raw, except oysters, which they customarily fry. At banquets, the raw fish is dipped in soya sauce and radish; it tastes excellent. Along with fish, the Japanese eat rice, eels, bamboo, beans, seaweed, and suki-yaki, which is a kind of stew cooked in a chafing dish with soy-bean sauce. Their diet is sustaining and agreeable, but it lacks variety, proteins, and certain other qualities.

The great thing for a Japanese gourmet is not the taste of his food but its arrangement on his plate, the plate's arrangement on the table, and the table's in the room. Ocular responses of all sorts are especially important to the Japanese.

Tea drinking appeals to the Japanese even

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more than to the English but they do it differently. Ordinary tea is mildly flavored hot water. Ceremonial tea is fine green powder swirled into a soupy mixture by means of a sort of bamboo shaving brush. The method of swirling, the cup, the posture of swirler and drinker are governed by complicated rules and constitute the tea ceremony. This ceremony occurs at a special time of day and in a special kind of room, which should be entered by a special door.

In Japanese dancing, motion is at a minimum. What there is of it involves the hands more than the feet. The dancer wears an elaborate kimono; her skill consists partly in making this fall into becoming folds. Facial expression is part of the dance; a smile would be indecorous but gestures may be made with eyelids. Men and women do not ordinarily dance together unless at a geisha party, where the men are drunk.

The Japanese love nature in all its forms. Crickets, in their opinion, sing instead of squeak. As an object of décor, the Japanese like nothing better than a rough old rock, whether it be big or small.

Trees and shrubs appeal to the Japanese.

Even the smallest house has a garden. Their offices often look like hot houses, owing to the number of plants and flowers. The line between the interior decorator and the landscape gardener is a hard one to draw in Japan. A janitor must have a green thumb.

The Japanese like water and enjoy splashing around in it. Long before their Olympic teams began to win the swimming races, they were expert swimmers. They like taking communal baths and pouring water on each other. When a Japanese takes a bath alone, he dips hot water out of the tub in a small basin, which he pours on himself. A fire underneath the tub keeps the water hot. It drains off through a hole in the floor. The Japanese urinate unconcernedly in public.

Like water, fire is a source of pleasure to the Japanese. They keep little pots of charcoal burning here and there and warm their rooms with them in winter. They like paper lanterns lighted up by candles. That fire engines, with their water hoses, also greatly please the Japanese, is a peculiarly appropriate coincidence.

The most popular vehicle in the Japanese countryside is the oxcart, rivaled by the bicycle

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and the barrow. Japanese apparently do not know how to make a wheelbarrow with one wheel; though wheels are scarce, even their push carts usually have two.

Japanese carpenters use the two-edged saw, with a long, straight handle. For scaffolding they use long poles joined with rope instead of nails, so that, when the job is finished, the scaffolding can be removed for future use. Observers sometimes suppose that it would be wiser to let the scaffold stand and take away the building.

Farmers use scythes with phenomenally short blades. Lawn mowers are almost unknown in Japan, perhaps because there are few lawns. Gardens are composed of dirt, rocks, trees and flowers. The Japanese, like the Chinese, naturally use human excrement for fertilizer.

Because Japanese children must learn to draw in order to write, Japanese artists start where most western ones leave off. They paint with unimaginable speed, dexterity and skill. Even a Japanese policeman can draw a decorative map.

Japanese animals enjoy kind treatment from their owners. Cats and dogs are comparatively

rare. Japanese horses, unlike those of China, seem to have good blood in them. The Japanese like horse racing. Baseball is now the best-loved Japanese game but they play it with a difference. Batsmen rarely run out infield hits. Nobody says "Kill the umpire."

Japanese history, while colorful and full of commotion, seems to be mainly concerned with astral bodies, Mongolians, civil war, paper fans, suicide, Confucius, the divine wind, hairy Ainus, Momotaro the Peach Boy, Fujiyama, and a large number of rice bowls. However, while American, English, Roman, Greek and even Egyptian history deal with ourselves and our derivations, Japanese history deals only with the Japanese and their derivations. These are less absorbing and therefore less intelligible topics.

Americans and others know so little about Japan because, until lately, they had even less reason than they have at present to be much interested in it. Another reason for lack of interest may be that the literature on the subject is deficient. Outside of Sir George Sansom's able but somewhat heavy-footed history, a little known novel by Thomas Raucat called *The Honorable Picnic*, and a mass of useful but

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specialized technical works, the best-known, worthwhile, widely popular books about Japan are Lafcadio Hearn's. In what may well be his most ambitious essay, Hearn takes Jujitsu as the symbol of Japan and argues that it sums up the Japanese point of view.

Jujitsu or Judo is a form of contest which might be defined as philosophical wrestling or pugilistic metaphysics, in which the object is to use one's own weakness to defeat an opponent by means of his own strength. It has an elaborate code which comes as close as anything in Japanese morals to the code of chivalry.

If, on the day of the surrender, the Japanese had sent a torpedo through the *Missouri*, that would not have been Jujitsu but a stupid form of treachery. If the Japanese were now only pretending to like democracy in order to get rid of the army of occupation as quickly as possible, that too would be inferior Jujitsu. If, on the contrary, they were to capitalize on U.S. willingness to teach them democracy by learning it even better than their teachers; and if they then proceeded, by peaceful means and entirely according to Hoyle, to outproduce and outmaneuver the U.S. in the world's competi-

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tive market despite the disadvantages of size, geography and resources, that indeed would truly be Jujitsu. It would also be quite a neat trick if the Japanese could do it; and they are probably entitled to the chance to try.

IX

The ways in which Japanese behavior apparently differs from normal human behavior as defined by western concepts are extremely deceptive. In the first place, when it differs from the Occidental norm, Japanese behavior often conforms to the Asiatic norm. In the second place, although the Japanese behave like everyone else in a number of ways, their peculiarities, both real and presumptive, are arresting. These differences attract more attention than their numerous similarities to westerners. In the third place, such real peculiarities as do exist in Japanese behavior are not only few in true comparison to its normality, but may also be the result of entirely normal reactions to the peculiarities of the Japanese environment and hence really tend to prove, not that the Japanese are fundamentally unlike, but that they are fundamentally like, everyone else.

If Japanese peculiarities were in some way integral and not the result of environment, then the Japanese would retain these differences in

a new environment. As a matter of fact, however, the Japanese who emigrated to California (until the notion that they were an inherently inferior race, along with certain economic pressures, caused laws to be passed preventing this practice) did so from the normal human impulse to better their condition in life. In addition, once they got to the U.S., they soon became indistinguishable except in appearance from other U.S. citizens. Indeed, even such salient Japanese physical peculiarities as small stature, bow legs and bad eyes tended to vanish as soon as Japanese immigrants got a balanced diet, stopped squatting on the floor, and learned to read English instead of picture signs.

If it be assumed that the apparent peculiarities of the Japanese character are the result of specific environmental factors, the business of analyzing the Japanese character becomes a question of determining what factors account for what traits. This may be difficult, owing to the basic philosophical uncertainty about human behavior in general, and the complexities of the particular subject in hand. At least, however, it is in the realm of possibility and puts the subject of the Japanese character on the common-sense plane of cause and effect.

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Since custom and costume are even verbally analogous, as good a starting point as any for an investigation of Japanese character may be the handy and obvious matter of Japanese clothes. At first glance, a westerner finds it extremely strange that the Japanese should still go about in what looks like fancy dress, consisting of a kimono and a pair of sandals. On second glance, it seems even stranger, for this adherence to Oriental costume seems to contradict the widely advertised Japanese talent for imitation. Why, if the Japanese can copy extraordinarily complex western devices like clocks, electric lights, and navies, cannot they copy a simple thing like a pair of trousers?

The superficial explanation for Japanese adherence to Japanese dress has been excellently stated by Lafcadio Hearn. He points out that if the Japanese wore western clothes, they could no longer kneel or squat with comfort, since western clothes are not designed for such postures. If the Japanese could not kneel or squat they would need furniture in their houses. If they had furniture, they would have to have wooden floors, instead of their light and soft straw mats. If they had furniture and wooden floors, the houses would have to be bigger and

more heavily constructed. Hence, exchanging the kimono for trousers would involve an architectural revolution. In big cities where this revolution is gradually taking place, sartorial change is taking place also. Architectural change, however, is impeded by the fact that earthquakes, typhoons and volcanic eruptions are still dangers to be considered at all times and most places in Japan. Light frame houses can be readily replaced, whereas strongly built western ones cannot be. The Japanese are likely to go on wearing kimonos until someone alters the climate even more noticeably than one Japanese scientist has already proposed doing—by means of an atom machine in Guam to deflect typhoons.

The question of Japanese clothes is a relatively simple one so far. In order to pursue it farther, certain fairly well-accepted principles of human conduct should be borne in mind. Human beings are creatures of habit and these habits, traced to their origin, often reach back into infancy. Stated conversely, in the theories promulgated both by the Society of Jesus and by some recent psychologists, the child is father to the man and as the twig is bent the tree shall grow. Without subscribing entirely to the doc-

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trines of the Jesuits and the psychiatrists, this seems no more than common sense; and it has indeed been proved so frequently that it would be superfluous to argue it again here. More to the point, if one can account for the peculiarities (or even the conventionalities) of individual humans in one society by the peculiarities of their individual upbringings, it should be equally possible to apply the same method to a group of individuals, insofar as they have all shared certain kinds of infantile training. Some of the mass peculiarities shared by all Japanese, which distinguish them from other peoples, nations, or races, should be derived from Japanese peculiarities in upbringing.

Admitting that the re-education of children is essential to the re-orientation of the race, it is no more than a logical and short step in the same direction to suppose that even earlier influences than those of school and college will affect the re-orientation even more profoundly. In addition to being useful in the abstract as a means of understanding a few of the peculiarities of the Japanese character, some effort to examine the sources of their peculiarities might be of practical use as well.

With these principles in mind, the question

of Japanese clothes becomes more interesting. Women's clothes in Japan, as in western countries, are more important than men's clothes. The most noticeable item of women's clothes to the Japanese is not the kimono but the sash or *obi* which holds it in place and which, even more than the kimono itself, is altogether indigenous. The *obi*, the center of interest of a Japanese woman's dress and peculiar to that dress, is made of heavy material, tied, not in front, but in an elaborate knot at the small of the back; and the kind of material and the kind of knot have great ritual importance. The *obi* and its characteristics are true peculiarities of the Japanese; therefore, if the assumptions about childhood patterns are correct, there should be some dramatic reasons for the *obi* readily apparent in the early conditioning of Japanese children.

Japanese children, as noted previously, lead a most luxurious life; and their chief luxury is being carried pickaback. The usual carrier is the mother; and she carries the child in a kind of sling in which the knot is important since if it came untied the child would fall on the floor. This form of pickaback ride is also a true Japanese peculiarity; while Chinese children are

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also carried on their mother's back, they are rarely tied on; and while Indian papooses are tied on, they ride in baskets, facing backward.

Various reasons have been advanced to explain why Japanese women wear obis and tie them in back. Some say that because geisha used to tie their obi in front, more conventional women chose to tie theirs in back as a badge of respectability. This seems dubious on the face of it, since styles are usually set by women whom men find especially attractive, and geisha occupy that role in Japan. It seems doubly dubious since when geisha began tying their obi in back, as they have now done for several centuries, respectable women would doubtless have switched back again to a more convenient system. It seems more plausible to reason that since Japanese children of both sexes are accustomed to getting pickaback rides from their mothers, they form the habit of looking at women's backs with special interest, and never lose it. It would then be natural enough for women to place special emphasis on the adornment of this part of their anatomy; and for them to provide, in the elaborate knot in their heavy sashes, an agreeable and decorative suggestion of the sling that holds such important and

pleasant associations. The back of the neck is another focal point of a lady's beauty, and for the same reason. After spending a large part of their formative years studying exactly this portion of their caretakers, it is less than astonishing that Japanese children should become connoisseurs of it. And offhand it is hard to think of any better reason why this particular region, and no other, should be chosen by the Japanese people, and no other, as a crucial point of feminine beauty.

Indeed, the relation between childhood conditioning and its projection as adult peculiarity is so striking in this case that it might, by itself, be enough to substantiate the Freudian-Jesuitical principle and even to suggest a rather startling new principle in the derivation of fashions and aesthetics in general.

Such an inquiry would lead to many interesting speculations: for instance, on the cultural effects of methods of carrying infants, on a comparative basis, adducing such evidence as the enthusiasm for weaving baskets among some Indians, or the affinity for fast, wheeled vehicles by grown-up Occidentals who have been conditioned to the high-velocity perambulator and spent some of their happiest hours

therein. Another line of inquiry would be the direction of Japanese sexual preferences and taboos, adducing such evidence as Japanese pornographs, of which an abnormal proportion show intercourse being conducted from the rear; or Japanese conceptions of propriety, whereby it is considered less immodest for Japanese women to show their breasts than for them to show the insides of their mouths, which children inspect when getting premasticated food. It may be more appropriate to extend the application of this principle in a more inclusive way to Japanese peculiarities in general.

A point worth noting about Japanese children is that there are a great many of them. The Japanese have never learned to practice birth control. On the contrary, they prize as many children as possible, partly as a means of insurance against old age, because the children remain devoted and obedient to their parents. Because they are so numerous, and because of the Japanese housing arrangements, they are obliged to get along well with their parents and each other, by constant practice in their difficult enterprise. Not only are Japanese small fry likely to have large numbers of brothers and sisters. They are also likely to have large num-

bers of contemporary playmates, all of whom live in proximity and are readily acceptable as being almost brothers and sisters. Japanese villages, even in the deep country, are so constructed that all the houses are close together and the main road serves as a sort of communal day nursery. The interdependence of children on each other, their fondness for each other, and their lack of individual initiative or even identifying behavioristic features are as noticeable as their numbers would lead one to expect.

Another impressive feature of Japanese upbringing is the way in which children are fed. Japanese children are not weaned until a comparatively late age, often not until the next child makes his appearance. Before weaning, also, they get more thoroughly fed than children elsewhere. Breast feeding in Japan may be emphasized because such feeding is both an economically and an emotionally satisfactory method. In any case, by the time a Japanese baby is weaned, he is sick of milk and hence not jealous of his successor; and long before this he has got disgusted with food in general. The idea that food is scarce and hard to acquire, which western infants who are fed at stated intervals naturally derive from their condition-

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ing, never occurs to a Japanese baby. Instead, he learns to regard food as merely a rather tedious accompaniment to the agreeable experience of being carried about and otherwise made much of. When he does get food, it is just like everyone else's. No one makes much fuss about food in Japan; and delicacies more elaborate than simple bean-pastry candy are extremely rare.

Where education is concerned the Japanese child also gets special treatment, compared to children elsewhere. For one thing, his education starts early and consists of intensive house-breaking by his parents at an age when western children are still damp and troublesome. For another, the education is uniform, since almost all Japanese have the same living standard and are bound by the same conditions, and conventions. Partly on this account, Japanese children may dislike school but they do not dislike it as much as children elsewhere, despite the fact that their lessons are much harder. The first thing a Japanese school child encounters is an endless collection of complicated symbols which are moreover to be used in spelling words of which the complexity is such that he can never hope to learn all of

them. Far from being discouraged by this prospect, Japanese children learn elementary reading more quickly than western ones.

Taking the sociability, the feeding habits and the scholastic training of Japanese children as samples, it should now be possible, if our hypothesis holds water, to find in Japanese adult behavior some corresponding idiosyncrasies in which these conditions of childhood are projected, and which could scarcely be explained in any other way. Then we may check the hypothesis further by selecting oddities of Japanese adult behavior and seeing whether these also can be traced back to peculiarities of childhood conditioning.

Among Japanese adults, easily the most obvious outward trait is politeness and consideration for each other. Far from snapping and snarling, like most Americans and many Europeans, Japanese adults treat each other with delicacy and restraint. Japanese are readily responsive to authority. Individual Japanese on a plane of equality seem to have none of that rivalry, that desire to lead and avoid being led or pushed, which, comparatively, characterizes western conduct. Japanese waitresses, when not occupied with serving, chatter, sing and

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giggle happily together; when occupied in serving, they do it with unending outward good humor, toward each other as well as toward their patrons. Japanese workmen co-operate happily and smoothly, and enjoy working together. Communal farming may be necessitated by the economic and topographical character of the country, but it is conducted as though it were dictated by the topography of human nature. In fact, the most notable, because special, characteristic of the whole social structure of Japan is an ease and friendliness, remote from that of western civilization, and all the more notable because of the conventional ceremonies which are designed to express, enhance and further it. This friendly, fraternal relationship between adults in Japan seems in fact to correspond with nothing else on earth—except the similar relations existing among the swarms of children, squealing and scrambling and happily hoisting each other about in gutters of fifty thousand Japanese villages.

The ability of the Japanese to get along well with each other and their docility on the domestic, individual plane is of course in sharp contrast to their behavior on the external, in-

ternational plane. This contrast is indeed so sharp that it suggests that there may be a connection between the two. Possibly it is because Japanese sadistic impulses are so scrupulously checked and controlled on the individual plane that they demand an outlet on the national plane. Their behavior pattern in this respect, like that of the Germans, affords an interesting comparison with that of less severely disciplined nations like the U.S. or Britain where fierce competition and even aggressions on the individual plane seem to be accompanied by placidity and a desire for peace on the national plane. In any case, the contrast between Japanese individual behavior toward each other at home and Japanese national behavior toward the rest of the world outside serves to make the former all the more arresting.

The theory might be advanced that Japanese adults are obliged to get along well together because so many of them have to live together in a small country of such limited resources. This may well be a contributing or complementary cause, insofar as the sociability of the Japanese does indeed suit their way of life, and is encouraged thereby. That it will scarcely serve as a basic cause can be shown by apply-

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ing such pragmatic reasoning to the next items on the list, *i.e.*, Japanese reaction to food.

In a country where seventy-three million people must live on the produce of fifteen million arable acres with a few almost negligible imports, food, according to this line of argument, would be highly prized, and a subject of general interest. In fact, as noted, the reverse is the case. The adult Japanese attitude is remarkable because the Japanese take no interest in food at all. (This intense and apparently frivolous interest in the appearance of food, as distinguished from its taste, is in reality an expression of their aversion to food, as such, a kind of protest against the vulgar necessity for nourishment.) Conversely, where food is purely functional, Occidental investigators are amazed at how little a Japanese family seems to need; or on what light rations Japanese soldiers were able to campaign in the field, without appreciable discontent.

Such an attitude toward food would seem reasonable only in a country where the people were so sure of plenty to eat that the fear of not having enough had never occurred to them. But in fact, while the Japanese seem to fear starvation less than almost anyone else, they actually

have reason to fear it more. It would be an agreeable compliment to human will power to suppose that this is a purely practical reaction; but it seems more likely that again it is rather the consequence of the early conditioning in which they are specifically surfeited with food, and simultaneously given a feeling of security by parental attention and serenity in their social background.

The Japanese characteristics by which most commentators are chiefly impressed, agreeably or otherwise, and on which they are most unanimous, is the Japanese flair for imitation. In a nation which has jumped from medieval civilization, however highly developed, to modern industrialism in less than a century, examples of this trait are too obvious to enumerate; indeed the accomplishment as a whole is sufficient evidence in itself. Why the Japanese possess the trait of imitation more than any other people remains to be explained; and that the trait is useful will, again, scarcely serve as an explanation. On the contrary, it merely makes an explanation harder to find; for if the advantageousness of imitating were enough to account for it, then the Filipinos and the Chinese would have caught up with industrialism

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also, but they have signally failed to do so. Nor will the fact that the Japanese long ago imitated the Chinese by copying their language serve to explain their later rapid assimilation of European culture on a basis of racial habit. On the contrary, this merely makes the habit all the more remarkable, by proving that it is lasting as well as widespread.

This flair for imitation on the part of the Japanese can be construed as a childhood attitude projected, not statically, as in the case of Japanese social adjustment and the Japanese attitude toward food, but rather kinetically, like the projection of an image on a motion picture screen. The Japanese response toward education is already conditioned by the time Japanese children are of school age, because they have already formed favorable relations with other children and with adults. School reinforces this response; and it continues to increase and develop throughout adult life, becoming intensified because it is eminently advantageous.

Imitation is merely learning in its most acute form; and the Japanese inability to create or originate, which has been described as a trait complementary to their capacity for copying,

is in actuality a part of the young student's obedient willingness to absorb knowledge without impudently trying to improve on it. Just as school presents itself to the Japanese child as a continuation of his agreeable infancy, so learning in later life is attractive as an echo or extension of his happy childhood. All the important influences in this childhood, such as favorable responses to an agreeable parental authority, predispose him to acquire knowledge rapidly and painlessly; and this he does, to a degree not approached by the representatives of any other race.

One might wonder why, this being the case, the Japanese kept themselves bottled up for so many centuries; and why, instead of going in search of models to copy, they waited for models to be brought to them. The answer here is obviously complicated by geographical and historical, as well as behavioristic, causes. But one might hazard the guess that just as Japanese are responsive to anyone who stands in the role of a friendly authority or teacher—a category which of course currently includes General MacArthur—they are equally and correspondingly opposed to a hostile authority which cannot be cast in such a role. Such au-

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thority indeed seems foreign to their experience and is therefore unassimilable and to be hastily discarded. The Japanese welcomed St. Francis Xavier as a teacher in the 16th Century; but when the growth of Christianity threatened the unity of the country, and when its philosophy became a subversive political force rather than a subject to be learned, the Japanese resented and attempted to eject it. The Japanese mission, dispatched on a world tour of America and Europe in 1860, learned as rapidly as possible and helped set in motion Japan's astoundingly fast study of Occidental civilization. Conversely, once having learned writing from the Chinese, the Japanese seem to have lost interest in copying from Asia—perhaps partly because their cultural superiority to their nearest Asiatic neighbor, Korea, seemed to justify a paternal rather than filial attitude toward Asiatics generally.

So far, three aspects of childhood conditioning in Japan have been examined to see how they are projected into adult life. It remains to be seen whether other peculiarities of Japanese adult behavior selected at random can plausibly be derived from their childhood training. And it also remains to be seen what all this

proves even if they can be so derived—beyond the fact that the Jesuits and the modern psychologists are correct in their views of human conduct.

So far, only outstanding characteristics of childhood training have been examined for their influence on Japanese behavior. For the next step it may be fair to select the most complex and mystifying Japanese adult idiosyncrasies and see whether these can be regarded as extensions of childish or infantile idiosyncrasies. If Japanese religion were chosen as Exhibit A of a national characteristic, it might well be urged later that the explanations are inadequate but no one could suggest that there has been an effort to cheat by taking an easy example.

Nothing could be more Japanese than the Japanese religion, which is a strange *mélange* of Buddhism, Shintoism and Confucianism. By the same token nothing could be more paradoxically complex—since the fact that it is partly borrowed from China, or even via China from India, is in itself what makes it so especially Japanese, if only as the supreme example of the Japanese readiness to copy anything. But here, to avoid irrelevant extensions of a line

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of thought, it may be recalled that even the simplest human action has a multiplicity of causes. It is not of interest to list all of the springs of Japanese religion but merely to ascertain the main one. Japanese religion is conducted in shrines whose architecture could be related to the architecture of Japanese houses in a significant way; and the raiment of the gods and goddesses, the size of the statues of Buddha and so on could be used as material for another *Golden Bough*. But the question at hand is whether the essential distinguishing feature of Japanese religion can be viewed as projections of some feature of Japanese childhood training.

Viewed in this way, it is at once clear that the very complexity of the problem is exactly what makes it easy to solve. The essence of Japanese religion is precisely that it contains not one God, in the sense that the western religions do, but rather gods in every shrine and element. Such gods resemble the deities of Greek or Roman myth much more than they resemble the Holy Trinity. Moreover, Japanese attitude toward these deities resembles the Occidental attitude toward those "childish" superstitions which he propitiates by not walking

under ladders or refraining from sitting down thirteen at table, much more than it does the western attitude toward God, the Father.

In a psychological as well as philological sense, indeed, the phrase "God the Father" may well contain the key to the situation. The Japanese Buddha is the senior partner in the Japanese theistic Zaibatsu, but he is not conceived in a paternal pattern; there is, indeed, no "father" god. It would be too easy to say that the Japanese need no father god because the real father of the family serves this purpose so well that a substitute is not required. It would be an oversimplification also to suggest that it is the easy relationship between contemporaries which makes a similar sort of semi-fraternal association with divinities acceptable to the Japanese. But both of these statements contain aspects of the truth. Other fragments may lie in the lack of repressed infantile fear which we have detected also in the Japanese attitude toward food and toward his fellow man; in the lack of sexual repression that goes with close contact between the sexes from earliest childhood, and with intimate one-room association with the parents; and even in the satisfactory adjustment to the world on a purely practical

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basis, which all of the above enhance and encourage.

To the western mind, the difference between the divine and the non-divine, *i.e.*, between repressed infantile fears and conscious rationalization, is so profound that it is difficult to conceive a link between them—with the result that theologians are somewhat troubled by such potential links as the Virgin birth, or whether Adam and Eve had navels. The Japanese, since they do not even consider the gods divine, are much more ready to regard humans as gods; hence the “divinity” of the Emperor. The status of the Emperor may well supply Exhibit B on the list of Japanese peculiarities to be related to the behavior pattern of childhood.

The Occidental idea that the Japanese consider the Emperor divine has been previously accounted for as an error of translation, consequent on the initial error of Occidentals supposing that the Japanese consider their gods to be divinities. In fact, however, the Emperor is not even a link between God and man, since no such link is needed, where not even the gods are godlike. But to say that the Emperor’s “divinity” merely brings him the degree of reverence which in America, for example, is ac-

were organized along the lines of the Japanese families which originated them.

Of course, most other human organizations, including U.S. corporations, are also patterned on the family, there is, in fact, no other model that they could be patterned on. But what used to amaze westerners about the structure of the Zaibatsu turns out to be, on close investigation, the precision of its resemblance to the Japanese family pattern, a precision which naturally enhanced the mystification since the nature of the family was in itself unknown. In U.S. corporations, the jealousies and rivalries normal to U.S. children are reproduced and reflected in the office. The "Boss" is a father symbol to whom projected infantile reactions are transferred. Corporations themselves and the relations between them are governed by elaborate contracts and legal definitions. In Japanese Zaibatsu such rivalries are minimized; the relations between the heads and the employees and among members of both groups were governed by convention rather than by law. Universal acceptance of the agreeable family pattern was tacit because the pattern in Japanese life is both universal and agreeable.

In the Zaibatsu, personal loyalties, rather

than contracts, sustained the interlocking directorates. That in America different results would derive from such paternalism is beside the point; once more a peculiarity of Japanese adult life can be readily derived from the peculiarities of Japanese childhood pattern, and readily understood in terms of it; and when so understood, the adult pattern seems less strange than inevitable.

At this point, it may be as well to see where this investigation is going because the reader by now may experience doubts on at least two grounds. He may find all this evidence unconvincing and feel that while perhaps there is some truth in it, much of the argument is too farfetched or oversimplified. Secondly he may feel that, even if it were all convincing, it would prove very little. After all, if we start from the premise that all human conduct can be derived from childhood conditioning, it adds very little to the store of knowledge to point out a few cases, most of them debatable, in which Japanese conduct conforms to this same principle.

These are fair objections. Furthermore, while the argument may seem to the general reader both useless and oversimplified, specialized

readers might feel even more, rather than less, dubious. Students of the Japanese could doubtless point to flaws in the evidence. Students of the psychological principle involved could doubtless detect flaws in its application. Readers who qualify on both counts, if there be any such, would be all the more likely to find fault on both scores. However, here it may be as well to admit that, so far, the whole trend of the investigation has been a little disingenuous. The real point was not so much to gain credence for the specific points at issue; better qualified psychologists and anthropologists should attend to this chore, and can handle it more extensively. Nor was it the intention to prove an already widely accepted principle by bringing in a few new bits of testimony. The underlying purpose was simply to show that, if it be admitted that childhood conditioning controls human conduct, it should also be admitted that this control is more obvious and more complete in Japan than elsewhere.

For the purposes of this admission, it is not essential that the reader grant that all, or even any, of the several derivations attempted were correct ones, much less that they were proved beyond doubt. All that he needs to admit is

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that in Japan some connection between adult conduct and childhood conditioning seems more apparent than it might seem elsewhere; or, if he prefers, that whatever degree of plausibility the principle may seem to have, this plausibility is greater than it would have been if some people other than the Japanese had been chosen as an example. This is an extremely general, because basic, admission and not one which can be proved by the pseudo-Euclidean methods used heretofore. But if it be made, it would constitute one really important clue to what may be called the Japanese character. This is that—in the very special sense of being readily traceable to its origins—this character is a childish one.

Other races and people, to be sure, project their infantile attitudes in adult life just as inevitably as do the Japanese; but the relation between the image and the projection is less dramatically discernible. The trick is done with so many mirrors that, to students of behavior who are not technicians or specialists, it even creates the illusion that this relationship is nonexistent. And technicians who do know how the trick is worked are almost forced to believe that the very purpose of most conscious adult

behavior is to conceal its subconscious childish origins.

In Japan, on the contrary, one does not have to be a behaviorist to see the process at work; nor need it be thought that the connections are apparent only because they are themselves as foreign as the modes of behavior which they relate. Since all human beings naturally cling to, or retrogress emotionally toward, those periods of their lives which were most agreeable to them; and since in Japan even more than elsewhere, infancy is such a period, it seems natural enough that the connection between Japanese behavior as adults and Japanese behavior as children should be especially noticeable. And a mere glance at the whole horizon of Japanese life, or the whole perspective of Japanese history, will show, as might be expected, that both are colored by the special glow, and drawn in the fine and crafty lines of this special yearning for the remotest past.

With this deep subconscious impulse as a clue, much that seems strange in Japanese behavior becomes easily explicable. Japanese reverence for the parent; the inclusion of the prenatal period in computing age; even the

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enthusiasm for Fujiyama can now all be read as signs pointing in the same direction. The sudden changes of mood of the Japanese; their quickness and dexterity; their docility when confronted by authority, and their lack of self-discipline when exempted from it; their stoic acceptance of the world and its conditions as conceived by them; these are the flexibility, the obedience, the unruliness and the stoicism of adults who possess and cling, in a way unimaginable to Occidentals, to the emotional status of childhood.

The use of the word "childish" is of course misleading—though it seems better to use a simple word for a condition for which even the ponderous lexicon of the psychologists has not as yet provided a term. But it would be dangerous to use the word without full consciousness of its specific limitations. Especially, it must be borne in mind that the kind of childishness under discussion also assures a kind of supersubtlety, directly opposed to the connotations of "childish" and with the obverse associations. The Japanese live as long as westerners; and if their emotional life is, in a way, kept at a childish level, their mental life devel-

ops, albeit in somewhat childish ways, to a compensating extent.

In this sense, the childishness of the Japanese supplies a basis for understanding or starting to understand Japanese aesthetics. The muted songs of the three stringed lutes—with their subdued harmonies, their, to the western ear, tuneless melodies, their fragile emotions—what are these except cradle songs, diminished in stature by an ear too nostalgic to find pleasure in the great uproars of the world, as they are increased in sophistication by a mind turned inward on itself and backward in time? The delicate and childish gayety of Japanese paintings; the heartfelt simplicity of the Japanese room; the deep delight in a literature whose motivations are basically babyish ones of loyalty and obedience, and which is above all, “classic,” or part of the past: these two are symptomatic. And likewise when the Japanese writer attempts, not an eighteen-word poem, or some fragile, lyric fantasy, but a western theme we can see why, like the rich man who piles his western room with hideous higgledy-piggledy furniture, the effort must be doomed to failure. He is trying to be *grown up* and the effort is as absurd as that of a small boy wearing his

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father's suit on Hallowe'en—which, incidentally, is very much the impression that even the most dignified Japanese statesman somehow naturally creates when he puts on a frock coat and a top hat.

Indeed this childishness, in the special sense in which it is used here, can, if correctly understood, supply the key to most of the aspects of Japanese behavior which must puzzle westerners. It explains the phenomenon of a people who can be docile and industrious at home under authority but who are suddenly converted into monsters of ferocity when the authority is removed abroad; for westerners behave this way too, but not so much so after they reach adolescence. The friendliness of the Japanese to each other; their quick appreciations; their delight in fire and water; such characteristics are the balance of a national character in which the compensating factors are cunning, assimilativeness, and an artful sophistication which reaches its apex in the search for simplicity, apparent artlessness, and the appearance of childish ingenuousness; a character symbolized by the ceremonious intake of breath with which the most elegant Japanese

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unconsciously but exactly imitates the sucking sounds made by a child at its mother's breast.

Having now considered what the Japanese are like and how they got that way, a few cases in point may be in order. What are individual Japanese up to these days, and how, if at all, do they corroborate our findings about them in the abstract?

X

When Americans want to know "what the Japanese feel about us" or "whether they are really becoming democratic or is it just a front," writers who try to answer the questions are forced to recall that the truth is *they* and *the Japanese* do not truly exist in this sense at all. Human beings lead individual lives; and each only knows what happens inside his own head. Wars themselves are possible only because each person has to bear only his own difficulties therein, and not the cumulative suffering of the whole nation.

In victory, Americans are generally preoccupied with the individual adjustments of everyday life, rather than with the vague sense of national triumph. Individual Japanese are preoccupied, not with atoning for the national guilt, but with getting along from day to day which in Japan is an even more difficult, and therefore even more absorbing, problem than it is in the United States.

Japan's seventy-three million people, when

they think about the war at all, feel no sense of individual guilt for Pearl Harbor. On the other hand, they may suppose that Americans feel an individual sense of responsibility to the rest of the world, if only on account of the atomic bomb. Nor is this unjustifiable. When Americans wonder what is going to happen next, they have no reason to take the defeated Japanese into immediate consideration. Domestic conditions are more pressing. But, conversely, when the Japanese wonder what is going to happen next, they may wonder with good cause how Americans are reacting to the victory, and what Americans plan to do about them.

However shocking it may seem to Americans that individual Japanese do not feel much to blame for the war, it is by no means as alarming as the thought would be for a Japanese that Americans, for the most part, do not think about Japan at all. Perhaps fortunately, such thoughts, in either nation, rarely reach the stage of realization. Individual Americans go on assuming that the Japanese are either overcome by a sense of genuine remorse, or else that they must at least be pretending to be so overcome; and individual Japanese, who are actually bothered by neither emotion, go about their

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daily tasks buoyed up by the equally preposterous notion that, having first conquered their country and then sent over an army of occupation, Americans must at least be sufficiently interested to care what happens to it next.

That the Japanese reaction to the war is not to think about it much seems much more excusable than American indignation that this should be the case. However, though Japan's preoccupation with the present may be the only reaction that can in any way be considered typical, it is nonetheless true that when pressed, individual Japanese will have some ideas on the war and the defeat, born largely of their individual adjustment to these conditions; and some of these may be worth considering, as isolated cases.

The Baron K— went to an American school and an American university, where he played on the golf team. In the early thirties, when he came back to Japan, he led the life of a Tokyo playboy; American college or school friends who traveled in Japan remember the magnificent dinners he arranged for them and the luxurious weekends at one of his father's half-dozen country estates. Naturally the Baron K— spoke perfect English (learned from a

tutor) with the slightly British accent which, since American slang is now in fashion, dates and classifies its user. When the war came, illness kept K—— out of the armed forces. He lived in Tokyo through the bombings, though he could have gone to the country, and spent much of his time listening to overseas broadcasts which confirmed his well-founded feeling that defeat was only a matter of time. Kempitai agents caught him at this practice; he bought them off and then even invited them in to listen with him, pointing out the logic of the American propaganda and making bets with them on the outcome. The bombings of Tokyo cheered him considerably, as a confirmation of his point of view.

Occupation authorities soon requisitioned eight of the nine Tokyo residences in the K—— family. Herded into the ninth, with his brother's family, the Baron K—— set about finding old friends among the occupation forces, and soon did so. He invited them to his house and urged them to bring their friends. An ample stock of prewar Scotch whiskey and a collection of pretty girl friends helped make this establishment a regular meeting place. Long discussions about the war were part of the routine; and

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K—'s mildly cynical and largely Occidental viewpoint was frequently expressed in more or less the following terms:

Japanese Army people, like army people all over the world, are simply fools who do not understand anything outside their own limited profession. When Japanese Army leaders got control of our government, the war was inevitable; nothing anyone could do would have stopped it. Most thinking Japanese were against the war because they knew it would be lost; even ordinary citizens were against it too because they had always liked America from what little they knew about it. But there wasn't anything they could do either. MacArthur is making a wonderful job of the occupation; the question is what will happen later on. But that depends on what America does with the Japanese economy; the matter is entirely in your hands. The Japanese people are willing to work—they will do whatever you tell them.

Keiko S— came to Tokyo as a small girl, about 1895. At that time the city still had no electric light and illumination was supplied by cheap wicks in plates of oil. In the forty years after that she saw the amazing development of what was still almost a medieval town into a great modern city. This convinced her that life was unpredictable, that anything at all could

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happen, good or bad. The war did not surprise her greatly. When bombs destroyed the little shop near the Ginza where she sold cakes and wine, she moved to the suburbs and lived with friends, whom she helped with housework, nursing, and cooking. The instant that the war was over, animated by nostalgia, she came back to Tokyo and scraped up enough money to open a tiny booth in one of the open air shack markets that line the city's sidewalks. Here, huddled over a tiny charcoal brazier, with a few strips of dried fish and a jug of black-market saki, she eked out a tiny living. When Americans asked her about the war, she stated her views enthusiastically, grinning with toothless sophistication:

The men who run the government never know anything because they are so powerful that no one dares tell them things they don't want to hear. Now, as for me, I am an ignorant old woman. But even I knew that when I was a girl we had oil lamps and now we have electric lights. And even I could have told them that if Americans could make a change like that, they could make a lot of others too.

Why didn't the people in the government know that you had all these machines, like the one I saw going down the street today? It was as big as a

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house, much bigger in fact. And if they knew, why did they try to make war against you? They should have known better, but they were just ignorant. They did not know about the machines and they didn't know enough not to make war because no one dared to tell them anything. I could have told them myself.

Saburo Kurusu, the special emissary whose arrival in Washington just before Pearl Harbor later looked like part of a prearranged scheme to keep America off guard, spent many months in comfortable diplomatic internment at White Sulphur Springs. He then returned to Japan and retired to a cottage at the charming mountain resort of Karuizawa, where many members of the foreign colony had their summer residence. Easily Japan's most distinguished diplomat in the era that preceded World War II, Kurusu perhaps did more than anyone else to arrange the tripartite pact allying Japan with Germany and Italy. This was his greatest diplomatic coup and resulted in a scrapbook full of photographs showing himself and his family in intimate, jolly poses with Hitler, Mussolini, von Ribbentrop and the rest. Kurusu's wife is an American woman, of an old and distinguished New York family. Their wedding was

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one of the brighter events of a Glen Cove, Long Island, summer season, just before the first world war.

In Karuizawa, in the fall of 1946, Kurusu was naturally concerned with keeping out of the panel of culprits at the war criminals' trial. In this he was successful; he and his charming wife and their daughters, who went to American finishing schools and met Mussolini in Rome, enjoyed receiving the young American officers who, staying at a nearby rest camp, often dropped in to call in the afternoons and evenings.

Kurusu, when he talked about the war, somehow seemed to convey the impression that the whole thing was merely an error in diplomacy. If something else had happened in 1931, Japan might never have had to go into Manchuria: how easy it would have been to stop Hitler in 1935, and how much better for all concerned if he had been stopped! And, if America did not see fit to do anything about him then, who could blame the Japanese, hard up as they were, and desperate for raw materials, for making, later on, the tripartite pact? Of course, for himself, he saw the defects in it; but as a

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good diplomat and a loyal subject it was, naturally, his business to obey orders.

It was then that the scrapbook would be brought out and the photographs in it displayed, with honest pride in the great events which they memorialized: here a review of troops in Rome; here a meeting with Molotov ("You know, I should not say it, but I never really liked him much") in Moscow; the Kurusu at a Nuremberg party rally. Madame Kurusu, whose upbringing took place on New York's Washington Square, was puzzled by one thing. "Tell me," she would ask American visitors, "is it really true that, at the beginning of the war, Americans actually believed that my husband knew about the plan to attack Pearl Harbor when he was trying to reach a settlement in Washington?" This was not a rhetorical question, nor was it asked for effect. It was polite and ingenuous and charming; and it pained her polite and ingenuous visitors to have to reply that most Americans, not only at the beginning of the war but still, if they gave the matter any thought at all, believed exactly that....

The Baron K—, Keiko S—, and the celebrated M. Kurusu were scarcely typical Japa-

nese. But then, who is the typical Japanese? To be sure, no such thing exists. Still, if one wanted to pick more or less at random a character at least representative of Japan and no other place, and of this and no other period, one might do worse than consider the case of Miss Honorable Peach Blossom. Honorable Peach Blossom is a Tokyo geisha, and, as such, something very special and very rare. Yet, if one knows about her and about how she lives, one knows something at least about Japan in 1947.

One day, while swimming in a pool near Tokyo, Peach Blossom acquired a mild case of athlete's foot. Shortly thereafter she mentioned this mishap to a U.S. medical officer whom she met at a party. The officer gave her some medicine which cured the athlete's foot but also stained her toenails purple.

Peach Blossom's purple toenails came to the attention of her girl friends when they met in the public bathhouse, which most of them visit twice a day. However, as Peach Blossom, out of embarrassment, offered no explanation for the color of her toenails, her acquaintances could not properly request one, and the matter rested for some days. Then Peach Blossom was

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summoned to the office of the Shimbashi Geisha Association, of which she is a member.

"I hear," said the Association's ranking executive, herself an elderly ex-geisha, "some strange rumor that you have not only taken to painting your toenails like American women but that you have even gone them one better by painting them dark purple. Of course there can be no foundation for this rumor?"

By explaining the true nature of the situation Honorable Peach Blossom was able to reassure the lady executive, but the incident left her with mixed feelings. On the one hand it made her sad to think that at least one of her colleagues had been trying to undermine her position in Tokyo's Flower and Willow World, or café society. On the other hand the effort was obviously inspired by envy and was thus an agreeable tribute. So far Peach Blossom found it difficult to decide what form of revenge would be suitably delicate, or even upon whom to take it. She allowed herself the pleasure of issuing a sinister warning to the suspect party by means of an extreme politeness.

Envy of Peach Blossom's position in the Flower and Willow World was justifiable, for the position is exalted. Indeed, since Shimbashi

is the Times Square of Tokyo, its Geisha Association the most famous in the nation, and Peach Blossom currently the most popular geisha on its lists, a good case could be made out that she is the top geisha in Japan as a whole.

The term "geisha" or "agreeable art-girl," can be used in Japan as are the terms "model" or "chorus girl" in the U.S., either precisely or euphemistically. Girls to whom it applies only as a euphemism copy the manners and appearance of real geisha and often succeed at least in fooling foreigners, which leads to some confusion. Real geisha like Peach Blossom, however, occupy an important and respected role in the social structure of Japan, as a whole, as does the rest of the Flower and Willow World. Peach Blossom's status in Tokyo is analogous to that of a top flight Powers model in New York, save that she exerts a considerably larger influence upon the course of local and international affairs.

Before the war, Peach Blossom associated chiefly not with playboys and crooners but with Japan's major political, industrial and noble personages. During the war, the Flower and Willow World suspended operations but cur-

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rently both its activities and those of Peach Blossom are increasing. Nowadays, Japanese hosts who can afford to entertain at all naturally want to entertain Americans, and international geisha parties are currently the best in Tokyo. In the past year, Peach Blossom, who has a lively and acquisitive mind, has picked up enough English to converse easily with Americans. While most of the seventy odd geisha in the Shimbashi district are dated up a mere fortnight ahead of time, for all sorts of geisha parties, Peach Blossom's evenings are booked solidly for a month, mostly for international affairs of which she often has two or three scheduled for the same evening. Peach Blossom's qualifications as a geisha, however, are not based primarily on her linguistic skill or even on her beauty, though this is considerable by either Eastern or Western standards, but rather upon other accomplishments.

Geisha specialize in singing, dancing or playing on the samisen, which is a sort of long-handled lute or banjo whose three strings are sufficient for the peculiar Japanese scale of half tones. At the age of twenty-eight, Peach Blossom is not only herself an expert performer on the samisen but also a qualified teacher of

this recondite instrument and has a special name to prove it. Her regular professional name of Peach Blossom, of course, is merely one which she chose herself, in accord with geisha regulations in this matter. Just as professional wrestlers choose names that have to do with features on the landscape like mountains or rivers, geisha choose names of horticultural articles. Peaches are especially popular and almost every geisha district in Japan has its own Miss Honorable Peach Blossom. However, as no two girls in the same district ever have the same name, it is possible to distinguish them by using the name of the district. Among Peach Blossoms, the Shimbashi Peach Blossom is naturally the choicest.

In Tokyo, Peach Blossom leads a life not only of social probity, according to Japanese moral standards which are somewhere between those of America and those of France, but also of comparative affluence. About half of her income derives from a trust fund made available for her by a patron or protector with whom she shared an extra-marital but entirely conventional relationship for four years before the war. The rest derives from her earnings as a professional guest at parties which average

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about ten dollars an evening, depending on the number she attends. Her gross earnings average 170 yen a night, based on the prevailing rate for a full three-hour appearance. Out of this the Association deducts 102 for income tax, 11 for dues and 7 for a restaurant tip but the remaining 50 allow Peach Blossom enough to pay for her rent, maid and food with a little bit left over. In addition, she enjoys a fluctuating extra increment from gifts and favors. Her chief expense outside of rent is of course her wardrobe; but as kimonos last indefinitely, this amounts to a capital investment.

Before the war, Honorable Peach Blossom had some three hundred kimonos of the world's finest obtainable silk which, on the New York market, might have been worth about five hundred to a thousand dollars each. Wartime losses and the current lack of material have now cut down her stock considerably but she could still hold her own in any international contest for the title of world's best dressed woman. With no encumbrances save her clothes and her one remaining samisen, her living requirements are modest. Attended by one maid, she inhabits a small room around the corner from the offices of the Geisha Association,

where she spends most of her mornings taking lessons, practicing, chatting with her friends and keeping up with Flower and Willow World developments in general.

Black-market prices and rationing have curtailed the activities of the Shimbashi Geisha Association, which used to have about a thousand girls on its lists, but there are still cozy little restaurants in the neighborhood where its members can go out to have lunch in groups of three or four. Restaurants frequented by geisha are likely to be frequented also by male members of the Flower and Willow World, just like the Stork Club or Colony in New York. More likely than not, such individuals will spy Peach Blossom or one of the friends with her and gallantly offer to foot the bill for their repast. The girls object to this, but not with much sincerity. After lunch comes the second hot bath of the day, which started with the first one at about nine o'clock. The second bath lasts from three to four. Dressing takes an hour although Peach Blossom can accomplish in two minutes what would take the average Japanese girl the best part of thirty; namely the proper tying of her sash. Old-fashioned geisha head-dress, involving yard-long coils embellished

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with flowers, pins and little balls, used to take a half hour by itself, but Peach Blossom saves time here. She wears her hair short and is even considering an upswept coiffure which, unlike painted toe nails, would be less a breach of art-girl etiquette than a return to classic tradition. Toward five o'clock Peach Blossom is ready for the evening. By this time a ricksha is waiting at her door to take her to the scene of the festivities.

At the restaurant where the party takes place Peach Blossom enters by the back door which leads to the powder room. Here she spends a few minutes putting finishing touches on her appearance and inspecting the strings of her samisen. She and whatever other geisha are present then proceed to the room where the party is being given. Here, at a long lacquered table which is the only article of furniture in it, anywhere from three to forty gentlemen will be kneeling or squatting on little cushions placed on the straw-mat flooring. Peach Blossom and her colleagues kneel between or next to them and attend to pouring hot rice wine into their cups, chatting with them on any subject that may come up and, from time to time, going over to the side of the room to put on

an act. While Peach Blossom plays the samisen, one of her colleagues sings and the other dances. While dancing, singing or playing the samisen, a geisha of course maintains a blank facial expression, except for occasional narrowing or opening of the eyes, according to a special code. When the dance is over the guests applaud and Peach Blossom and her friends return to the table.

The party breaks up around ten or eleven, with the guests more or less drunk. Peach Blossom and her friends are cold sober and usually hungry, though they may have been given some food after the male guests are finished—a possibility for which Peach Blossom keeps prepared by carrying two made-to-order, folding silver chopsticks in her handbag. Rickshas, which have been scuttling about the Shim-bashi district all evening carrying girls from one party to another, are waiting at the back door. Unless the guests have offered the girls a ride, which happens rather rarely, the latter go home singly, occupied with thoughts of their conduct at the party and self-interrogation as to whether they distinguished themselves thereby. At home Miss Peach Blossom's maid has supper—a bowl of rice, some tea and

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perhaps a bit of raw fish—waiting. While she nibbles this Peach Blossom allows her mind to rove into the future, at least as far as the next evening. Her last thoughts of the day as she lies down between quilts on the straw floor to go to sleep are likely to be of what costume she will wear the next evening, who is likely to be at that party, and whether it will be as much fun as tonight's....

Among the strange myths about the geisha which have long been current outside Japan is one to the effect that girls are sold into it as a sort of bondage by their parents. While it is true that in some instances a promising young girl may be handed over to a recognized geisha teacher by her parents, just as a European violin prodigy may be handed over to an expert violin teacher, the notion of bondage scarcely applies. In many cases the choice of such a career is made by the geisha herself, just as a U.S. girl may decide to become a model, and for the same reason, namely, excitement, glamour, and attention. In Peach Blossom's case, circumstances were unusually favorable. None the less, her present eminence in the Flower and Willow World is the result, not only of talent and opportunity, but also of en-

thusiastic perseverance of which she needed a full quota to overcome all the obstacles which even in her case stood in her way.

Peach Blossom's debut in the Flower and Willow World coincided with her birth, in the town of Shizuoka about three hours outside of Tokyo, where her father owned a geisha restaurant. Shizuoka geisha, who are eager to keep on good terms with this influential gentleman, naturally made much of his small daughter. Peach Blossom—who name then was plain Blessed-with-Prosperity Kanemoto—was incidentally charmed by these attentions, and decided in her infancy to become a geisha also when she grew up. This decision, however, was the easiest part of her preparation. Difficulties developed as soon as she was old enough to walk.

The first difficulty was that of learning how to sing, dance and play the samisen. Blessed-with-Prosperity's lessons in these arts started, in line with tradition, on the sixth day of the sixth month of the sixth year of her life. She hated the lessons heartily but as all little Japanese girls, geisha or otherwise, whose parents can afford it are supposed to receive the rudiments of education in these equivalents of

western drawing-room deportment, her objections did no good whatever. Meanwhile, she learned rapidly and had mastered the rudiments of all three arts by the time she finished primary school, where she was a scholastic leader and often president of her class.

In primary school Blessed-with-Prosperity attributed her pre-eminence over her classmates to superior family background. Like other grown-up denizens of the Flower and Willow World, she was exceptionally well dressed and bathed twice daily instead of only once like ordinary children. However, at high school, which she entered at thirteen, the penalties of her position became noticeable. By this time her father had died and three of her best girl friends, whose parents also belonged to the Flower and Willow World, had left school to start their professional training. When Blessed-with-Prosperity said she wanted to do likewise, she met with domestic interference. Her mother and her older brother, now the head of the family, urged her to keep on with school and maybe even go to college, if her marks justified this unusual honor.

Blessed-with-Prosperity's debut in her chosen field was hastened by an unexpected crisis.

Eager to keep up with her would-be geisha friends, she took to bringing books on geisha art to class with her and reading them in moments spare or otherwise. One day her teacher found her with a slim volume of geisha songs concealed behind her atlas and made her stand up silently in front of the room for the rest of the day. To Blessed-with-Prosperity, whose misdemeanor had been inspired by the eagerness to be conspicuous in a very different role, this ironic punishment was unbearable. When she left high school that afternoon, she vowed never to return. Instead, she settled down to study geisha arts in earnest.

Learning enough about art and deportment to be a real geisha takes about five years. Somewhere along the line, however, a girl may become an apprentice geisha and attend parties as a sort of stand-in, just for practice. Blessed-with-Prosperity's debut was occasioned by an enormous Shizuoka party given at the home of a captain of industry to which one hundred male guests were invited and for which geisha were rounded up from all surrounding districts. This party delighted Blessed-with-Prosperity but her delight proved a boomerang. In the year that followed none of the other Shizuoka

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geisha parties she went to measured up to its standard. She decided that she needed larger worlds to conquer.

For the next year, instead of practicing at provincial parties, she applied herself strictly to her studies and at seventeen went up to Tokyo to be examined by the committee of the Shimbashi Association. At the examination her performance—which included not only singing, dancing and lute playing but also tea-powder stirring, saki pouring, conversation on assorted topics, morals, and obi tying—was a great success. She assumed her professional name, secured a room in a geisha dormitory run by a friend of her family, and set forth to her first urban party. Unlike her original debut, it was a miserable experience. Sophisticated city geisha in the powder room called her a country bumpkin and teased her so much that she actually cried. Pride enabled her to swallow her misery; within a week or so, she felt able to cope with her new surroundings and has enjoyed them ever since.

Peach Blossom's alliance with her protector, a rich connoisseur of geisha art whom she met at the classes of a singing teacher which he attended as an amateur, began when she was

twenty. Impressed by her talent, he made it possible for her to devote herself even more diligently to her music and eventually to secure her own degree as a samisen teacher. By this time Peach Blossom was twenty-five and the war with the U.S. was well under way. Peach Blossom ignored the war as far as possible until the winter of 1945. By then the government had closed all geisha party restaurants and her protector had retired from the scene—though she was still living with her two maids in the house he had given her, near the British Embassy. When the house burned to the ground, along with most of her possessions, in an air raid that spring, Peach Blossom went back to Shizuoka, where she remained until last summer. Then news reached her that the Flower and Willow World was starting up again in Tokyo and she came back to see for herself.

In Tokyo, Peach Blossom found that most of the Shimbashi area had been burned out. Several of her friends had been killed in the air raids. Most of the good restaurants had simply vanished and the rest were doing business under difficulties, due to rationing and high prices. Geisha parties in the old days had been given by members of Japan's great cor-

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porations, by the nobility or by high rank politicians, who were all well acquainted with each other as well as with the Shimbashi geishas. These old friends were not in evidence. It all seemed most depressing, and Peach Blossom thought of going back to Shizuoka.

On further investigation, Peach Blossom found that a dozen or so of her colleagues—among them her particular friends, Last Fine Pine Tree and her sister, Little Legendary Peach Boy—had come back to town at about the same time as herself. A few of the very best restaurants were still in business. At them, new hosts were giving parties for American officers and for the officials of an institution called SCAP, which seemed to be even more powerful than the great corporations in the old days. If Americans could not apparently learn how to appreciate fine samisen playing, she could at least learn from them how to speak their language. In any case, there were parties every night, parties to dress for in the afternoon and to talk over the next day, to think about in private and to build a life around. Peach Blossom stayed in Tokyo.

In order to understand about a geisha, it is necessary first to understand one or two things

about Japanese marriages. Japanese wives do not, as generally supposed, occupy a role entirely subordinate to their husbands. That they take care to appear to do so is, in fact, partly because the reverse is true. Furthermore, Japanese male children are so outrageously spoiled, especially by their mothers and sisters, that while Japanese wives may make a valiant effort to coddle their husbands also, this effort is doomed to fall far short of the coddling to which the husband is accustomed. Hence, while Europeans think the Japanese husband gets extreme subservience from his wife, the Japanese husband, using a different scale of comparison, thinks he gets treated very harshly. The richer a Japanese family is the more it can afford to spoil its progeny. Rich Japanese husbands thus feel a need for outside solicitude even more than the poor ones. The function of the geisha is to furnish it by fulfilling, insofar as possible, the complex Japanese maternal role of slave, nurse and all-around entertainer.

Since the institution of geisha is an indispensable buttress to the Japanese social structure, it is built upon a firm foundation, monetarily and otherwise. The Shimbashi Geisha Association dates back almost a hundred years and

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owns over a million dollars worth of stocks and real estate, including its own building near Tokyo's Broadway, which is a muddy road called the Ginza. The prime function of the Association is to act as a booking office or registry from which the restaurant owners, who act as go-betweens for the hosts who give the dinners at them, may contract for geisha to attend their parties. Acting as go-between for the geisha themselves, the association sees that the best girls go to the most elaborate parties and that restaurant proprietors and girls are as contented as possible.

Since the Geisha Association is not legally organized as a property-owning entity, its holdings are in the name of a subsidiary company, whose officers receive substantial salaries and whose stock may also be available to outside buyers. The officers of the company, however, are responsible to the officers of the association who in turn are mostly ex-geisha who have become restauranteurs. Income from company funds is used for pensions to old, unlucky geisha, elaborate funerals, and of course stockholders' dividends. The income derives from rents, membership dues and receipts from the annual Eastern Dance Festival staged every

spring at the Shimbashi Association's theater which is rented to outside producers all the rest of the year. Similar geisha festivals are held each April in Kyoto which is Japan's previous capital and Tokyo's rival as a center of culture, geisha and otherwise. The Tokyo and Kyoto festivals, at each of which fifty or one hundred geisha take turns putting on their acts, amount to a sort of geisha world series. During each city's festival, the whole geisha population of the other makes a pilgrimage to inspect its rivals and castigate them in a ceremonious fashion. Tokyo geisha consider Kyoto geisha old-hat, overformal and behind the times. Kyoto geisha consider Tokyo geisha upstarts. Patrons regard the former as more cold-hearted but even better dressed, which is certainly true at the moment since Kyoto, a center of the silk industry, was the only major Japanese city that remained unbombed.

That kimonos last forever does not mean of course that the same ones can be worn frequently. Exactly the reverse is true because for one thing, new ones are required for each of the seasons, and for another, because special conventions govern the pattern in precise accordance with the age of the wearer. It would

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never do for a geisha of twenty-eight like Peach Blossom to wear a kimono that would be entirely suitable for a geisha of twenty-four, like Last Fine Pine Tree. Peach Blossom is now down to a mere fifty or so suitable for evening wear though of course she has as many again for morning and afternoon occasions. All that enables her to get along with this modicum is the fact that the kimono by itself is by no means the crucial point of a geisha's dress. The crucial point is the combination formed by the kimono and the sash, which goes with it. Peach Blossom also has a hundred and fifty or so sashes, and by skilfully combining these with her kimonos in the most artful manner it is possible, according to the laws of permutation, for her to go about indefinitely without ever being dressed the same way twice.

While obi and kimono are the main points of a geisha's costume it is the small details, like her scarf and footgloves which really show whether she is well dressed. The scarf must of course be changed every day since it is designed to show off the back of the neck. Peach Blossom's back-of-the-neck is excellent, being slim, smooth and slightly inclined forward, which is one reason she is considering the up-

sweep hairdo. As to the footgloves, these will have four snappers along the heel instead of the three which are conventional, for the geisha must be on special guard against the impropriety of showing a scrap of ankle.

The footgloves are really light mittens with a separate compartment for the big toe, enabling the wearer to cling comfortably to the cords of her sandals. The important thing about them is that they must always be scrupulously clean, which is by no means easy since they are made of white cotton and worn while scrambling about muddy streets in open-air sandals. How embarrassing a speck of mud on a footglove can be Peach Blossom learned on one sad occasion when her cautious habit of carrying a spare pair in her handbag only served to increase her mortification.

On this occasion what happened first was that having got a speck of mud on her footglove, she failed to notice it until she reached a party where it was brought to her attention by the glance of a male guest, resting on it. When she hurried to the powder room, the male guest followed her on some pretext and actually saw her barefooted, while she was in the act of changing to her spares. Even this,

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however, was not the crowning horror which was reserved until several hours later. In her haste to conceal what she was doing in the powder room, Peach Blossom hid the mud-specked footglove in the first place that came handy. This chanced to be the left sleeve of her kimono where she also keeps her linen handkerchief. Thus when, having momentarily forgotten about the earlier mischief she reached for her handkerchief, she not only pulled out the spotted footglove but actually proceeded to dab her face with it. The gentleman who had first noticed the smudge on the footglove and then seen her changing it, now called her attention to this final error. This experience still troubles Peach Blossom in occasional nightmares. At the time she merely thanked the observant gentleman politely for his helpful courtesy.

What enabled Peach Blossom to handle the smudged footglove incident with no outward show of her interior commotion was, of course, the social poise for which, even among geisha who specialize in this quality, she is notable. This accomplishment also helps her to deal with the main current novelty of the Flower and Willow World which is the sudden ap-

pearance in it of Americans. Americans almost always have some mistaken ideas about geisha which must be tactfully corrected. Here, however, Peach Blossom has an additional advantage; for while the Americans know nothing whatever about geisha she knows quite a lot about them from reading American books and seeing American movies.

According to her study of the subject, which has been extensive, drunken Americans are more inclined to be amorous than are drunken Japanese, but they cry less readily. Japanese geisha parties not infrequently wind up with all the guests in tears, owing to sadness induced by lute songs.

Among western actors Peach Blossom's favorite is Charles Boyer, although she wishes he had more hair, but she also likes Gregory Peck. Among books, her favorite is *Gone With the Wind*, although in arguments with other geisha on the subject she takes the negative view of both its heroes, saying that Ashley Wilkes is too feminine and that Rhett Butler is just like any Tokyo black-marketeer. However, while she generally prefers U.S. to Japanese movies, she prefers Japanese to U.S. books. Her favorites are mystery novels and the classical *Tales*

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of *Genji* about Japanese court life in the Ninth Century A.D.

Neither her interest in classical literature nor the fact that her own conditions may seem part of the past prevent Peach Blossom from taking a lively interest in current events. In the first place, geisha have to be up on politics along with everything else, so that they can discuss such matters with their guests if they arise at parties. In the second place, politics naturally came up especially frequently at Shimbashi geisha parties, which indeed were often given for the precise purpose of promoting friendly understandings between Zaibatsu heads, army and navy bigwigs, and top-rank government officials. Peach Blossom, for example, is well acquainted with most of the war criminals in the dock at the international tribunal, as well as many of Japan's more praiseworthy leading figures. She and her colleagues were delighted when they got the vote last spring and argued eagerly among themselves as to whom they should support for premier. Most of the girls at the association decided for Hatoyama, whom practically all knew personally. They were correspondingly disappointed

when, somewhat belatedly, he got purged by SCAP.

As to whether in the long run the American occupation will affect the Flower and Willow World for better or for worse Peach Blossom has not as yet decided. However, so far things seem to be picking up and she has not yet altered her eventual ambition which, like that of most practicing geisha, is some day to have a restaurant of her own. The kind of café Peach Blossom has in mind will cost about a hundred thousand dollars. This is more money than she has available and it may be that she will need a partner or a new protector to help her in this venture. Americans are ruled out by the trading-with-the-enemy act so Peach Blossom is looking about for a suitable compatriot. Meanwhile she is keeping up with her samisen and trying to improve her technique even further. At present the object of Peach Blossom's most intense concentration is a brand new geisha dance-song which is being created by the Shimbashi Association's private dancing teacher who also wrote the story. The dance-song is called *Wharf Rain* and has a plot which is typical of geisha songs in general.

The plot of the new song *Wharf Rain* con-

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cerns a geisha who goes out for a stroll. This geisha is not a young geisha but rather an elderly one. The rain is not heavy but somewhat on the gentle side. The elderly geisha stops beside a rather small canal where she sees a sort of barge. It occurs to her that the people on the barge might be having a love affair and that, if so, the love affair might be going well or else on the other hand it might be going badly. The elderly geisha debates this matter with herself for a while, standing there in the gentle rain. Then she figures out that it is time to go home, and does so.

The tune of *Wharf Rain* fits the story perfectly and Peach Blossom plans to try it at the next Spring Festival.

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PART III

The Context

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XI

Peach Blossom's future, professional and private, will not depend wholly on the reception which the song *Wharf Rain* receives at the geisha festival. It will also be affected, even more practically, by what becomes of Japan. On a much larger scale, Japan's future will not depend wholly upon the character of its people individually or en masse, nor even upon the interaction between this character and the U.S. occupation. The occupation itself and American policy concerning it are to a considerable degree controlled by larger issues, most specifically the issue of the current world rivalry between the United States and Soviet Russia. In contemplating the future of Japan it is necessary to evaluate not only the U.S. occupation and the Japanese response to it but also Russian objectives and the methods which may deeply affect it, directly or otherwise.

Quite aside from its importance on other scores, indeed, Japan would be of immense importance at the moment if only because, along

with Germany and Austria, it is the only place where U.S. policy and Soviet policy actually try to operate together and come to grips with each other. Japan differs from Germany and Austria in that in those countries Russia has the stronger leverage in military and political authority, whereas in Japan the United States has, so far at least, maintained fairly complete control. This by no means indicates that the Russians are unaware of the importance of Japan or bereft of techniques for achieving their ends there. It only means that the techniques are different and the ends themselves, at present anyway, somewhat more remote. Neither the ends nor the means are, on that account, less worthy of attention.

That the Russians do not have an army of their own in Japan is, of course, no accident. It is because the terms on which they were invited to send one—*i.e.*, complete subservience to MacArthur—were, although identical with those which satisfied the British, incompatible with Soviet notions in such matters. The absence of a direct hand in running Japan, however, may have been less of a blow to Soviet hopes than it seemed. For one thing, they doubtless expected to have their hands full

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with the occupation of Northern Korea, where they do have complete control. For another, they may have felt and perhaps still feel that America's influence in Japan could eventually be turned to their advantage all the better to the degree that they were officially disassociated with it.

Confronted by an inability to secure outright military authority over the Japanese Islands but conscious of Japan's value in what many Russians regard as the inevitable war with the U.S., the Russians have proceeded to do the best they can with what they have. This consists, on the negative side, of doing everything in their limited capacity to obstruct and hamper the occupation; and, on the positive side, of doing everything in their somewhat less limited capacity to spread propaganda and develop a communist leadership which will be capable of taking over the government when the U.S. occupation retires.

Russian obstruction consists most spectacularly of the loud protests lodged by General Kuzma Derevyanko at every Allied Council meeting about everything that SCAP has done in the fortnight since the last one. General Derevyanko's activities in Tokyo, however,

are by no means confined to his fortnightly *jeux d'esprit* at these meetings. As the head of the official Soviet Mission, he has other and more weighty responsibilities to discharge.

Of the other Allied missions to SCAP, most number less than fifty. The total personnel of all of them falls short of the total of the Russian one, which is well over four hundred. Furthermore, these numbers are deceptive for the Russian members are highly peripatetic; new ones keep arriving and old ones keep flying out. According to the Russians, the reason they need five times as many diplomatic agents in Japan as any of the other occupying powers, including England, is that they require a double set of translators for both English and Japanese. This explanation is all the more plausible since they have a good many unofficial as well as official documents to deal with. There may also be other reasons, including a desire to study democracy at work, especially in its military phases, a subject in which the Russians and their employees show an even more intense interest than the Japanese themselves.

In any case, it would perhaps be more appropriate to compare the size of the Russian Mission not with the others in Tokyo but rather

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with other Russian missions in other countries, which are as a rule, considering the conditions, even more overgrown. According to communist conceptions, the function of diplomacy is much more complex than that which old-fashioned varieties of democracy assign to it, and hence needs more practitioners. Russian embassies all over the world tend greatly to outnumber those of less energetic and ebullient governments. The only wonder about the Tokyo entourage is that it outnumbers its local competitors by no more than the margin exhibited by Russian representations in Mexico City, Havana, Montreal or Paris.

The composition of the Russian Mission in Tokyo has been a matter of some interest to Allied Intelligence officers. It amounts, among other things, to a complete military headquarters, with top-rank specialists in supply, logistics, and administration, as well as, naturally, intelligence. It is equipped to take command of an army on a moment's notice, if one became available. A good many of the minor commuters from Vladivostok also turn out to be "reservists" or "discharged military personnel." While the same may be true of American or British civilian administrators, there seems

reason to believe that the military connections of the Russians are both closer and more purposeful.

Of the four hundred or so Russians in Tokyo, about half are quartered in a large hotel next door to the Tokyo Correspondents' Club, which houses many of the Allied correspondents. Herein, the intimate details of their way of life, if not their professional activities, are usually concealed by no curtain of any sort. As far as can be ascertained by the sounds that drift through the open windows, and the sights to be observed through them, the Tovarichi spend so much of their time in singing and carousing that it is hard to believe that they have much left over for more sinister pursuits. The duties and diversions of the higher ranking Russian envoys are, of course, less readily investigated. Such personages live either at the elaborately guarded Soviet Embassy or at a collection of private houses scattered around the town—which the Russians felt free to sublease until it was called to their attention that real estate operations, like everything else in Japan, were subject to U.S. approval.

In dealing with the Russians, the occupation authorities found that the most practical and

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intelligible system was one of partial reciprocity for the treatment of U.S. correspondents in Russian-held areas on the mainland and elsewhere. After the first year or so, Russian applications for entry permits, exit permits, billets, and other minor facilities began to encounter inexplicable delays, like those which attended similar requests made by Americans in Russian areas. This appeared to be a deep shock to the comrades and they found themselves in frequent disputation over minor technicalities.

The technicalities which the Russians found worth quarreling about were often somewhat mystifying to the American authorities who had to handle their complaints. Fairly typical, for instance, was an official protest that Russian citizens arriving at the Atsugi airport were being treated like cattle and herded together with ropes on debarking from their plane. On investigation it was found that the ropes referred to were those placed at the edge of the airport to warn all visitors and passengers to keep off the runways. The Russians grudgingly accepted this explanation; but they still seemed to feel that, for the safeguarding of Soviet aristocrats, some other and less demeaning barriers would have been more suitable.

More dramatic were the experiences of five Soviet correspondents who turned up in Tokyo toward the middle of the summer of 1946. All of these estimable and charming gentlemen had been, or were still, members of the Russian armed forces, and two of them were correspondents for service publications. In view of the open connections between the Russian press and the Russian government it was of course safe to assume that, if not actual, accredited spies, they were scarcely functioning in the same capacity as that of ordinary correspondents for the capitalist free press. Nonetheless, they were housed at the Press Club and accorded the freedom of the city, including a house of their own in the suburbs in case they felt the need of more privacy than the club afforded.

When the Russian correspondents decided that they wanted to make a tour of the hinterlands, they were given free rail transportation to enable them to do so. However, on this junket, Army Intelligence saw fit to send two conducting officers with them to help plan their trip and make it pleasant. When the Russians came back, they sounded a good deal like Mr. William L. White after his excursion

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through the U.S.S.R. They complained that, while they had seen all the famous geisha of Kyoto and enough Shinto shrines and statues of Buddhas to last them a lifetime, they had not been allowed to visit Japanese factories, let alone encouraged to roam at will through U.S. military establishments. The Russians did not seem especially surprised at these restrictions, doubtless under the impression that they were entirely conventional. They soon consoled themselves by organizing an expedition to the top of Mount Fujiyama, to which the Army interposed no obstacles. Some of their leftist American colleagues, however, deeply shocked by what they considered an infringement of the freedom of the press, wrote indignant dispatches on the subject, to the amusement of their Russian colleagues.

One of the sidelines of the Russian Mission is to maintain contact with, and give support to, the Japanese Communist Party. Though currently represented by only four Diet members in the House of Representatives, the Party probably has a total of about 15,000 or so avowed members and is undoubtedly the most skillfully led and certainly the most purposeful political body in Japan. Of its three chief lead-

ers, Sanzo Nozaka, Toshio Shiga and Kyuichi Tokuda, the latter two spent upwards of fifteen years in prisons from which, along with all other political offenders, they were released by MacArthur in September, 1945. Nozaka is Russian-trained and spent the years between 1931 and 1945 at Moscow and in China, as a member in good standing of the Supreme Presidium of the Comintern. A first-rate orator, who denies among other things that he has any official connections with Moscow at present, he appears to be the best bet as a Japanese Tito, if occasion to install one were ever to present itself.

How well-established the Party is in Japan remains to be seen, but the indications are that its immediate program is to stay underground and aim merely at gaining control of key spots in the key industries, especially the media of propaganda and communication. That it is amply equipped with funds can be judged from the fact that although it seated only six Diet members it spent three times as much on electioneering as the Socialists, who seated ninety-one, in the 1946 elections. It is also suggested by its extensive propaganda activities which include a string of newssheets, magazines and

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propaganda pamphlets—some which seem equipped to run at a substantial loss without disconcerting their local proprietors—to say nothing of comparatively wide activities in the book-publishing business.

Russian procedure in Tokyo publishing generally and in book-publishing particularly supplies a familiar but interesting example of the advantages afforded by the Soviet concept of diplomatic propaganda work. According to this concept, as is well known, foreign propaganda is not only a normal but an exceedingly important portion of the functions of the government as a whole and especially of its embassies. In the U.S., of course, foreign propaganda is conducted, if at all, subconsciously through the media of movies and printed matter exported for profit; and how firmly this concept applies is perhaps best proved by the very efforts of the U.S. State Department to finance its rather forlorn little experiment in Russian-language broadcasting.

Before the war, U.S., and Japanese publishers operated according to a convention whereby translations and publications of each other's books without specific permission or payment was generally and reciprocally authorized. This

arrangement, however, worked to the advantage of the Japanese who took more interest in U.S. books than the U.S. took in Japanese books; and it was not regarded as resuming effect at the conclusion of hostilities. Meanwhile, pending the signing of a peace treaty, no new and more satisfactory arrangement could be set up; and thus the best that SCAP's authorities could do was to authorize translations and publications of U.S. books with provisional royalties set aside for the copyright owners. That these royalties were in blocked as well as depreciated yen naturally gave publishers no extra incentive to compete for a market of whose existence, indeed, they may have been more or less unaware.

This state of affairs was not obviously the fault of SCAP nor of anyone else in particular but rather a more or less inevitable result of a free enterprise system which operates so well that domestic profits exceed those in foreign markets not less in the publishing field than in others where exports are of less ideological importance. However, the fact remains that of all the vast number of books recently published in the U.S., despite a public demand perhaps best proved by the sensational sales of the Japanese edition of *Reader's Digest* among many

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other indices, only three new U.S. books of general interest had been published in Japan through the end of October, 1946. Precise figures on the number and sales of Russian books, not to mention other Russian language media, were not available; but despite the intrinsic superiority of the U.S. position, in regard both to supply and demand, the Soviet output far outdistanced its competition.

How much direct monetary support Japanese Communists get from the Soviet Mission remains a question. In 1946 there were rumors that perhaps a subsidiary source of income lay in a sudden influx of counterfeit money which seemed to be seeping into Japan from Northern Korean sources, private or otherwise. Along with equally persistent rumors of piracy by Russian ships based on the Sakhalines, at the expense of Japanese fishing fleets, these were hard to prove. Like all other extra-legal communist activities in Japan, they were conducted with comparative impunity because the Japanese police force lacked the power or capacity to detect or punish them, and the U.S. occupation lacked the means. Geared to tracking down Japanese militarists and stamping out the Japanese underground, if any, General

FALLEN SUN

Willoughby's highly competent G-2 section naturally made no boast of being able to keep complete tabs on its erstwhile allies. Indeed, as of 1946, it had not even seen fit to release definitive findings on what was then the major mystery of the whereabouts of the Japanese Kwantung Army.

The Kwantung Army, composed of some 1,500,000 thoroughly substantial Japanese officers and men, vanished immediately after V-J Day and for the next year or so was heard of only indirectly. One report was that it is at present employed as slave labor in the Siberian railways and salt mines. Another more likely one indicated that some portions of it were being used to supply aid to the Chinese communists in their Civil War while the more élite elements were withdrawn for indoctrination and perhaps eventual repatriation as a fifth column, like the von Paulus army after Stalingrad. In any case, the army's disappearance proved in one sense a blessing in disguise, since it serves as a more effective antidote to Soviet propaganda in Japan than anything the occupation could possibly have dreamed up.

SCAP authorities neither pressed the question of the Kwantung Army nor capitalized on it as

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a means of stirring up anti-Soviet feeling. They did, however, in addition to authorizing communist parades in Tokyo, authorize at least one parade on behalf of the missing survivors, in which peasants from all over Japan made a pilgrimage to Tokyo in September, 1946 and marched past the Soviet Embassy carrying banners with pathetic mottoes like the following: "O Moon, tell me where my son is now!"

No answer was forthcoming either from General Derevyanko or from the celestial body so apostrophized.

In 1947, a repatriation program of sorts was under way; and long after the last Japs in U.S. hands at the close of hostilities had been restored to their homeland, the Russian-held survivors began trickling back at a rate which in the spring reached 50,000 a month. Even if this rate were maintained, it would take well over a year to repatriate the whole army or whatever part of it is capable of returning if that is the Soviet intention. Meanwhile, despite whatever efforts were made to indoctrinate them in their absence, the returnees' reports of their treatment are not likely to diminish the impact upon native opinion by the delay in their return.

The struggle for Japan, if it may be called that, between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. began, like that for Europe, at the Yalta Conference—which, if not one of the world's most decisive battles, may yet go down in history as one of its most decisive conversations. At that time, along with Eastern Europe, Russia was rewarded for her role in helping to finish World War II by several enormous chunks of Asia. As far as Japan was concerned, Russia's role consisted primarily and most significantly in sending emissaries to pose for the surrender pictures on the afterdeck of the *Missouri*—which were later used to convince the home population that Russia had defeated Japan single-handed. Russia's rewards, not confined to these cultural benefits, also included Manchuria and Northern Korea.

The celebrated looting of Manchuria began promptly and was conducted, according to the best available evidence, with the efficiency characteristic of communism in this branch of industry. Since it was accompanied by the fall of the equally characteristic iron curtain it is hard to be precise about its consequences. The Russian occupation of Northern Korea is another matter; for the boundary line between the

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two Korean occupation zones constitutes the only place in Asia where U.S. and Russian forces are actually in continuous disposition. Russian behavior in Korea may shed some light on what it would have been in Japan had the same opportunities existed there, and what it will be if such opportunities are created in the future.

The boundary between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. occupation zones in Korea is the thirty-eighth parallel of latitude which intersects the peninsula just north of Seoul, the capital. How or why this parallel was selected has never been explained but, since it has no economic or political justification, the best guess seems to be that it was chosen arbitrarily on the optimistic assumption that, as the occupying forces would be friendly, it did not much matter where the chores of one began and the other ended. This assumption, like some others made at Yalta, proved to be unjustified.

On moving into Northern Korea, the Russians consecrated themselves to an unusually energetic campaign of murder, rape and pillage. Having thereby established their prestige, they settled down to living off the country while conducting a more conservative program of re-

organizing the terrain along communist principles, entrenching themselves along the border on the South, raising a Korean Army of one hundred thousand against the day when a civil war may be practical, and using their newly gained footholds as a vantage point for penetration of the U.S. zone. U.S. forces in Korea, even more than in Japan, are of token proportions, being only intended for, and adequate to, the function of keeping order in a liberated nation. The Russian occupation is a combat army which outnumbers ours by five to one and could throw it out tomorrow if it seemed advisable to do so. Russian troops along the border line, unlike U.S. troops, are maintained at full strength, apparently under orders to shoot to kill in the event of unauthorized infiltrations by civilians or U.S. military personnel. From the military point of view, the inequality of troop dispositions and the difference in attitude between the two armies is inconvenient and humiliating but not disastrous. What is more to the point is that the dismemberment of Korea wrecks this miserable little nation quite as thoroughly as the dismemberment of Germany wrecks Europe, and with considerable less justice, since the Koreans after all

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were the first victims of Japanese imperialism and Japan's most implacable enemies.

Never, to be sure, an advanced nation in any sense, the Koreans only real basis for any claim to independence was an intense desire for it, engendered by forty years of Japanese rule. Nonetheless, after V-J Day the nation might, with careful handling, have been equipped for self-government in a decade or so, providing that a generous liberator had done everything possible to facilitate the process. This would have included, among other things, explaining to the Koreans that representative democracy was difficult enough with a total of a dozen or so parties and did not require the two hundred or so which they were prepared to provide for the purpose. With the country cut in half, any hope of putting it in order would probably have been forlorn even if both occupying powers had been sincerely co-operative; and this was not the case.

While travelers from the U.S. zone are barred from entering the Russian one, Russian emissaries have had no difficulty in entering the U.S. zone. Communist emissaries found Seoul's already hopelessly disorganized politics a favorable environment in which to operate and

were thus able to add to the difficulties of the U.S. in setting up any kind of workable provisional government in the South. Meanwhile, the plan agreed upon at Potsdam to provide Korea with a national government has made little headway. In accordance with a decision taken at the December—1945 Moscow Meeting of Foreign Ministers, a Joint U.S.-Soviet Commission met in 1946 to discuss merging the two zones under a central government. A replica of many other such conferences with the U.S.S.R., this one reached an impasse when, after weeks of haggling over details, it finally became apparent that the U.S. felt reluctant about handing over its zone as well as the north to a communist regime. The conferees then disbanded. A year or so later, after Secretary of State Marshall's visit to Moscow, the Joint Commission was hopefully reconvened to attack the problem again.

American observers whose first encounter with post-war Russia occurs in Korea or Japan are often somewhat surprised or distressed by Soviet tactics. The distress may be justifiable but the surprise is not; for the tactics are completely consistent with those which the U.S.S.R.

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uses everywhere else in the world in implementing its entirely logical and consistent world policy. Similarly, U.S. policy in Japan is not to be divorced from U.S. world policy, of which it forms a part. In decisions concerning Japan, like those concerning other regions more or less peripheral to the globe's two existing power centers, purely local considerations are secondary, except insofar as they affect the primary factors of geopolitics and global strategy.

Japan's obvious strategic importance in relation to Asia has often been compared to that of the British Isles in relation to Europe. In fact, it is probably greater. Such is the shape of the Japanese archipelago that it controls all of the Eastern seacoast of Asia not controlled more or less by Alaska on the North and the Philippines on the South. From the Russian point of view control of Japan would thus also mean control of China. Likewise, with the U.S. in control of Japan, it would do Russia no more good to occupy the China coast than it ultimately did Hitler to occupy the Channel ports.

From the U.S. point of view, Japan's current strategic importance is even more apparent. The island bases, which were of inestimable

value in the last war, would be of comparatively small value in the next one. Restored by the atom bomb and the latest aircraft design to their historic insignificance, they could probably serve no better purpose than that of refuges for a few of the lazier or more cautious members of the human race, while the braver and more ambitious destroyed each other and such habitable real estate as happened to be more conveniently situated. But while the U.S. could conceivably, in the next war, span the Atlantic without the convenient base of England off the European continent, the Pacific is considerably wider. To get at Russia, if this ever becomes necessary, the U.S. would need Japan as a base. Conversely, of course, by holding Japan, the U.S. effectively prevents Russia from using the Pacific as a lane of attack.

In the military sense, the comparative assets of the United States and Soviet Russia may roughly cancel each other out. Russia, to be sure, is geographically much handier, but being, for the moment at least, equipped with neither a Navy nor the atom bomb, this advantage would be hard to capitalize. The U.S., although farther away, is not only equipped to overcome her geographical handicap but is

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also currently on the spot. However, it is at this point that purely local considerations cease to be secondary; for according to U.S. world policy, the question of whose ally Japan will be in the next war or, more realistically, whose sphere of influence will include her, is to be left largely for Japan herself to decide. The answer boils down, in short, to a question of Japan's internal politics.

Here too the relative advantages of the U.S.S.R. and the United States may eventually come closer to canceling out than might be supposed from present indications. And it is because of this that the Russians were not perhaps as disheartened as they might otherwise have been at being deprived of an active military role in the occupation.

From the political point of view, the list of Russia's advantages in Japan must start again with geographical proximity. On this plane the absence of weapons is no handicap whatever; but the fact that Tokyo is only four hours by air from Vladivostok is a considerable convenience. An additional point that has been rather widely overlooked is that, ideologically and spiritually, as well as geographically, Russian communism is much closer to Japan than

U.S. democracy. Accustomed to paternal supervision by an emperor and authoritarian rule by a military oligarchy, the Japanese are better preconditioned for the kind of dictatorship required by communism than for competitive democracy and the secret ballot. Habituated to a communal or socialistic social structure, they might conceivably find Marxian regimentation, Soviet schemes for land reform and so forth much more to their habit, and perhaps to their taste, than individualism and free enterprise. Finally, whatever else it may be, Shintoism is such an extremely diluted form of peoples' opiate that even a communist state would not object much more to its continuance than the people would to its removal.

That overt communism has not so far made much apparent headway in Japan by no means suggests that the Russians are unaware of these assets or failing to exploit them. However, their almost complacent acquiescence in the principle of complete control of the occupation by the United States may have been based upon at least one miscalculation. Reasoning from their own experience, the Russians must have remembered that countries where the Soviet Army has been in residence usually hate and

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fear Marxism. Consequently, they may well have expected that the Japanese, after a taste of compulsory democracy, would develop a violent allergy to it, thus simplifying their eventual conversion to Stalinism. That no such trend as yet appears imminent should not lead the U.S. into an equally misplaced assurance that it is unthinkable in the future.

U.S. assets in Japan, of course, start with the fact that international law at least resembles ordinary law in that possession constitutes nine points of it. As long as we actually remain in Japan there seems no reason to suppose that we cannot, with a minimal use of force, control her political life. It seems likely, moreover, that we will retain such control, at least until such time as Soviet tendencies toward expansion are somewhat modified. However, since the very point of U.S. policy is eventually to get out of Japan and let her run her own affairs, this asset is not a permanent one. The biggest asset we have is, again, simply that the occupation has to date been a success. If it continues in the same way the Japanese may, when we leave, appreciate the virtues of their new way of life enough to resist the efforts of the neighbors to alter their political point of view.

Despite present favorable indications, this remains a considerable gamble. The gamble is all the more risky because through the next few years the Japanese will undoubtedly have to accept, along with democracy, exactly those miseries originally caused by the war, for which the Russians expect that they will eventually blame the U.S. The gamble must be undertaken and may even be undertaken confidently since, left to its own devices, no nation has yet voted itself out of democracy and into communism. It is not one which should be undertaken carelessly or in the belief that our adversary in the game will play according to our rule book.

XII

In view of the nature of the Japanese, their unexpectedly enthusiastic reaction to the U.S. occupation in general and to General MacArthur in particular may be not illogical but inevitable. This reaction greatly facilitates the occupation and may even guarantee its progress, over a short term, toward the objectives defined in the Potsdam Declaration. It by no means determines its eventual effect. What this will be it is still impossible to say since, even if we knew all about the Japanese and all about the occupation, there remain many other imponderables which will affect the course of events. The best that can be done at the moment then is to make some estimate of the size of the effect—and of its possible significance, for better or for worse.

It is easy enough to dramatize the occupation in superficial terms of East meeting West, and the old conflicting with the new. What gives the situation its real drama and its enormous importance goes much deeper. What is

now happening in Japan stems quite directly from the deepest wells of human history; and its outcome may quite possibly—in Hitler's phrase which proved so inappropriate to the occupation of France—determine the history of the next thousand years, or even a few more than that.

Human life started on the globe, so far as can be ascertained, somewhere in Asia Minor and fanned outward from there into the East and West. It may be far-fetched to suppose that some fundamental difference in attitude toward the past and the future, some intuitive difference in reactions to the fundamental facts of night and day, as well as the mere circumstances of primitive economy, determined which peoples turned East and which turned West. But it is surely not far-fetched to suppose that, having chosen different ways, the different peoples were differently conditioned by them. If only this much be acknowledged, then it follows that the Japanese are the end product of the Eastern-moving branch of human culture and constitute the epitome of the traits that produced or were produced by it; and that, likewise, the Americans are the epitome of the traits which produced, or were produced by,

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the branch that started and continued toward the West.

We have seen how, individually, the Japanese are retrogressive toward their childhood. It may be that this characteristic is best exhibited by Japanese architecture, of which the peculiarly curved roof may be an attempt to reproduce the line of the tents in which the Japanese lived during the nomadic period that preceded this settling down on the ultimate eastern islands. Skyscrapers, on the contrary, are nothing if not a new departure in the world's architecture; and the essence of Western culture generally, and of American culture especially, is accurately symbolized thereby. Western culture differs from Eastern culture fundamentally—while the latter cherishes yesterday, the former prizes tomorrow; and indeed it was the search for new things, made in the track of the sunset, that caused Europeans to get to America in the first place, and then caused Americans to get to the coast of California. Once the westerners got that far, the two main branches of civilization were separated only by the world's greatest geographical barrier, the Pacific Ocean; and, in view of the nature

of the western branch, it was a safe bet that this barrier would eventually be crossed.

But what the crossing means is something else again. Unlike that of the Atlantic, which in effect merely gave Europeans a spare room to play about in for a few generations, the crossing of the Pacific by the most essentially western representative of Western culture, and the imposition of this culture by force upon what is by definition the most oriental nation in the Orient, is a milestone quite unprecedented in the history of the globe. It raises for the future the question of whether European culture, which has never seeped backward into Asia, can be brought to it in a direction clockwise from some observer on the North Pole.

The contrast between the two civilizations now so dramatically juxtaposed is thus not only the most intense that it would have been possible to arrange; but it is also amplified and completed by a contrast in attitudes which guarantees that it will have a maximum effect. It is not altogether by chance that the representative of conquered eastern culture shows the assimilative capacities of a child prodigy; nor that the representative of western culture

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has assumed the role of an omnipotent teacher. It is, rather, the result of that interior logic in events which makes it possible sometimes to define geography in terms of history, and vice versa. What remains is the question of the actual relations between teacher and pupil; what will the former teach and what will the latter absorb?

When General MacArthur says, as he is wont to do, that Japan is a vacuum ready to be filled by western democracy, and that the Japanese are "avid" to learn all about it, he is telling no more than the truth. He may be making a mistake in the supposition that it is "democracy" that appeals to them. It is not because they like democracy that they want to learn from Americans; it is because they like to learn anything, and democracy happens to be what Americans are trying to teach them.

It is just this eagerness to learn, this childish aptitude for the perfect copy, that is at once the occupation's greatest promise and its greatest danger. Promise because, if we can utilize it properly, it may enable us to give western culture a seat in the Orient from which it might eventually work back through China and Russia and India toward Europe again, establishing

a vast progressive spiral which would set a pattern for the centuries to come. Danger because in itself it creates a dangerous illusion of success just when this is least justifiable.

The essence of democracy is the desire to do things for oneself. But in teaching this doubtlessly admirable form of government to the Japanese, our machinery is a military government so compact that, by comparison with Mussolini's famous bundle of sticks, MacArthur's is a mere box of matches.

The more avidly the Japanese "learn democracy" from such a teacher the more, in actuality, they are practicing obedience, which is something quite different from, if not indeed precisely the reverse of, democracy. And there seems some danger that the better the MacArthur regime seems to succeed in teaching the Japanese to govern themselves, the better it may actually succeed in teaching them to do something else entirely.

Of course, MacArthur himself is quite aware of this danger and tries to circumvent it not only by removing restrictions as rapidly as possible and proposing to remove them wholly, but also in the meantime by giving as little guidance as possible. Nonetheless, it would not

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be altogether surprising if the Japanese, with their wonderful sense of absorption, were to picture democracy as a procedure wherein the nation first voted and then asked a higher authority if it had voted the right way. When the higher authority of MacArthur is removed, the Japanese might be tempted to replace him with a similar institution of their own devising—which would leave us all just where we were when we started, or a little farther back.

The occupation of the oldest country in the world by the newest, being an entirely unprecedented situation, is not one for which it is easy to lay down recommendations, let alone solid rules. It would be a grave mistake to suppose, even if the occupation's success to date were more real than apparent (which is a question that only time can settle) that this would argue much for its success in the future. The adaptability of the Japanese, which has enabled them at least to seem to respond favorably to the treatment MacArthur has given them, might just as well enable them to react quickly in an opposite direction once the treatment were suspended or another one substituted for it. The latter, furthermore, is an omnipresent possibility as long as Russia, which

will continue to be geographically much handier, also continues to display its present missionary zeal.

Japanese social behavior, and the childhood conditioning which determines it, are perhaps even more amenable to reform along communist than along democratic lines; and while avidity for mere learning may enable the Japanese eventually to adapt American patterns, the same avidity would enable them even more readily to adapt Russian ones, which much more closely resemble their own prewar regime. In short, while the defeat of Japan, and the occupation by the U.S., guarantees profound changes in Japan, it by no means guarantees the changes that at present seem to be in prospect there. And it is quite conceivable that, if certain developments were to occur, the occupation would result not in the extension of European culture but in that of communist culture. This would be predicated, however, not only upon a complete and sudden withdrawal of Occidental supervision but also by its replacement from Russia; and it may thus be considered an unlikely extreme. For the present at least, in suggesting the alternatives of the occupation's ultimate significance, it can

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be disregarded in favor of more moderate, and more likely, possibilities.

If it were not for Russia, which is, after all, an extraneous problem, MacArthur could long since have run Japan with a kitchen cabinet, a household staff, and an aide to keep track of his appointments. As it is, the army of occupation is likely to dwindle in the next few years, even if more slowly than he himself proposes. It should be replaced by a group, however small, of first-class administrators and, even more important, first-class sociologists who could determine just how much and how well the Japanese are learning their lessons and how long they are likely to retain them. The reform of the Japanese should start not in the school but in the cradle; and it would take a really comprehensive study of the national mores, as well as a really superb staff of studious administrators, to determine what changes in upbringing make for the desired results and see to it that these changes were adopted eagerly by the Japanese—as they probably would be, once their purpose was made clear.

Nothing like this has ever been attempted before; but then, nothing like the conquest of Japan was ever attempted before either, and

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it seems a pity to throw away our chance after going to so much trouble to secure it. It is also true that Japan is like no other nation on earth, despite the fundamental similarity of its human beings to other human beings; and the present era is like no other era. New techniques in education and new methods of testing culture are available; and it requires only intelligent effort and willingness to apply them.

Unfortunately, as Americans proved in Europe after World War I, and are seemingly bent on proving there again, it is easy once the basic war aim, "victory," has been achieved, to assume that other objectives, in terms of which the victory was defined, must therefore have been accomplished also. It may be wiser to guess at the final results of the occupation less from the optimistic basis of what should be done than from the more pessimistic one suggested by the past-performance charts. According to these, then, what will probably happen is that when MacArthur quite properly decides that his part of the work is completed, and removes his presence, the whole project will start to go to seed. In the first place, MacArthur's successor will enjoy none of the vast prestige which is such an important factor in his regime;

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in the second place, as the war recedes into the past, the Japanese will tend to blame the occupation rather than the war for their economic miseries, which are likely to grow worse instead of better; and in the third place, Washington, which was never designed to run such enterprises, and is not yet equipped to do so, instead of taking new interest in the outcome will take less, and send out fewer and poorer administrators instead of more and better ones. The net of all this could be that the Japanese will finally emerge from their novel experience with a smattering of democratic manners but no great change in their own basic conditioning attitude toward life. They would, to be sure, have no war potential and no wish to wage war, at least upon the U.S., for some time to come; but they would not, either, have derived more than a minute share of the profit which the situation could be made to yield.

The actual outcome may well be somewhere between the two extremes. The rewards for success and the penalties for failure are too great to enable Washington really to wash its hands of the whole matter, as it may be inclined to do. The Japanese themselves may, by studying their own situation from a scientific view-

point, correct some of the basic peculiarities of family life which lie at the root of their culture and behavior patterns; and by so doing, reach a healthy if incomplete conformity with Western culture rather than a false but complete approximation of it. At what expense to their own culture such a conformity could be attained must remain to be seen; but it certainly cannot, even under the best of circumstances, be attained without a sacrifice of much that makes them, even now, such a charming as well as such a bewildering anachronism.

The price that the Japanese pay will be, of course, part of the price of the world's painful consolidation as though for an unlikely war with some planet in outer space, which seems to be the end product of the last century's mechanical improvement in communications and transport. But they will not pay it alone, for the world too will lose whatever they lose in the process. Nor is the challenge of Japan directed toward America alone; for American civilization, whatever its defects, is also European civilization; and it is European civilization that is being tested in Tokyo, more completely and more extensively than it has ever been tested before.

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